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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF WASHINGTON 
COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT, 
Petitioner. 
KEYSTONE CONVERSIONS, LLC, a Utah 
Limited Liability Company, 
Respondent. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 010501616 
Judge: G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before this Court for hearing on October 18, 2001 pursuant to a Petition 
filed August 15, 2001 by Petitioner Board of Trustees of the Washington County Water 
Conservancy District (hereinafter "District"). Pursuant to a Stipulation between the parties the 
scope of the hearing and of this judgment is "[T]o address only the legal question of whether or 
not the fee imposed by the Washington County Water Conservancy District as part of its Rules 
adopted July 17, 2001, is or is not an impact fee." The Court issued a Ruling on this matter on 
January 15. 2002, which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as if fully 
set forth herein. Based upon this Ruling, 
r.i S: o 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
The initial water availability fee included as part of the District's Rules adopted July 17, 
2001 is an impact fee pursuant to the statutory definition in Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102. 
DATED this XL daY of i 5 m ' 2002. 
h 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
-JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM 
TO FORM: 
Attorney for Washington County 
Watar_C<5nservancy District 
G. Rand Beacham 
District Court Judge 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF 




KEYSTONE CONVERSIONS, LLC, 
a Utah Limited Liability Company, 
Respondent. 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on October 18, 2001 pursuant to the 
Petition filed August 15, 2001 by Petitioner Board of Trustees ofWashington County Water 
Conservancy District (hereafter the "District") and the parties' October 16, 2001 Stipulation 
limiting the scope of the hearing.1 Having reviewed the Petition, the Trial Memorandum 
filed by Respondent Keystone Conversions, LLC (hereafter "Keystone"), the documents filed 
by the parties, and relevant legal authorities, having heard the arguments of counsel, and 
having reviewed the file for this action, the Court rules as follows: 
PROCEDURE 
This action was commenced by the District's filing of a Petition which recites that it 
1This ruling has been delayed by the peculiar nature of the issue and the procedure of this matter, 
and by the year-end vacation and the illness of the undersigned. The Court apologizes for this delay. 
RULING 
Civil No. 010501616 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
was filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (district court jurisdiction) and § 17A-2-1442 
(hereafter "Section 1442"). Keystone also filed a complaint to commence another action, 
Keystone Conversions, LLC v. Washington County Water Conservancy District Civil No. 
010501630, in this district court. The parties stipulated to consolidation of the cases, and the 
Order to Consolidate was entered September 18, 2001. 
By the Stipulation and Order regarding the October 18, 2001 hearing, the parties 
agreed to limit the hearing as follows: "[T]o address only the legal question of whether or 
not the fee imposed by the Washington County Water Conservancy District as part of its 
Rules adopted July 17, 2001, is or is not an impact fee . . ." The parties further stipulated 
"that the District has the power to make and enforce all reasonable rules and regulations for 
the management, control, delivery, use and distribution of its water." 
Section 1442 is part of the Water Conservancy Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1401 
et seq., under which the District is organized as a water conservancy district with a board of 
trustees having the powers granted pursuant to the Act. Section 1442 purports to provide a 
procedure whereby the board of a water conservancy district may "file a petition in the court, 
praying a judicial examination and determination of. . . any tax or assessment levied . . . of 
[sic] the district. . ." Section 1442 does not require a petitioner to identify any respondent 
in the petition, and provides for "[njotice of the filing of the petition" to be "served by 
publication.5' Section 1442 does not directly provide for a hearing in court, but implies such 
a hearing by providing that "[a]ny owner of property in the district . . . may appear and 
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demur to orans" ~~r'- - ^-ir - .: :.J cate r:\oc ior the hearing . .and the 
petition shall be taken as confessed bT' -)V ~-—-^- •*. - r i. . •__; ^ _ ion 1442 
further provides that "[t]he petition and notice shall be sufficient to ' 
junsdictii.ni " \ IhuuL specifying of what or whom the court would have jurisdiction. Most 
significantly, Section 1442 then provide fh'ill upon heai uig, the court shall examine into and 
determine all matters and 'things affecting 'the question submitted, shall make such findings 
with i eference thereto and render such judgment and decree thereon as the case warrants." 
The last four sentences of Sei/t i< ml 442 i naely recite 'what is already provided by other laws 
and rules. 
; ue procedures provided by Section 1442 appear to this Court to skirt SCT - • '.-1 
constitutional principle1!, hci \ ice by publication upon unnamed persons seems to g:ve short 
shrift to due process of law, especially whrn ir is considered thai diepetitionsha.il be taken 
as confessed by all persons who fail so to appear." A statute simp I v recinm* flim ni.1 i«• u IT 
I ihtaiu , uiispeLilied jurisdiction upon the basis of a filed petition and published notice of that 
petition does not necessarily meet roustih. . -.uidards regarding the jurisdiction of the 
courts over persons and'their property. Entry ^f i uidgmentor drrree affcctinii the light a ijl 
Luuderuiiied persons who may well have had no actual notice of the petition also seems to 
ignore d- - % ... ._.,;,;[; ^442 Airports to create judicial procedures 
which tills Coun considers to be ohdi * - r ahi i sillier party has challenged 
the constitutionality of Section 1442, however, and apparently no such challenge hcV«- reached 
a Utah appellate court in any other case. It appears to this Court that appellate review of 
Section 1442 is overdue. 
FACTS 
At the hearing of the District's Petition, the Court heard the arguments and proffers 
of the parties' counsel, but no witness testified and no sworn document was filed. 
Consequently, the Court cannot make findings of fact "based on oral or documentary 
evidence" as normally contemplated under Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Furthermore, although it appears that there are few issues of fact between the parties, there 
was no stipulated set of facts presented to the Court. After the hearing, the Court obtained 
some clarification on the fact issues through a telephone conference with the parties' 
counsel. 
The District relies on the allegations of its Petition and the two documents attached 
as exhibits to the Petition: (A) the "Final Rules and Regulations for Secondary Retail Water 
Service for the La Verkin Creek Area," amended July 17, 2001, including an Exhibit A 
which outlines the three fees imposed thereby (hereafter the "Final Rules"), and (B) the 
"Availability, User & Standby Fee Analysis" dated July 17, 2001. In its Trial Memorandum, 
Keystone included copies of other documents: (A) an article published in The Spectrum 
newspaper on May 20, 2001, (B) the District's "Draft May 23,2001 Capital Facilities Plan" 
and summary, (C) the District's draft "Development Impact Fee Analysis" dated May 2001 
and summary, (D) the District's "Resolution . . . Approving a Capital Facilities Plan and 
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Imposing Development Impact Fees and Charges" which the District was to adopt, (E) 
Kevstone's W T l L L C Li V_/ U j C etions to the IC:'S proposed impact fee and proposed capital 
facilities plan , (I : ) the District's } lini it zis :)f } 1'eetii ig for J i lb 1 7, 2001 ((h) a "Capital 
Facilities Plan & Development Impact Fee Analysis for Ash Creek'Special Service District" 
dated May 1997, (H) a "Weber Basin Water Conservancy District Capital Facilities Plan, and 
Impact F ee Analysis" " dated Septembei .. . .. •: . ,m^: . ''Resolution Clarifying 
Pol ic) r and A mendi ng R i lies and R eg ' ^  T *" }~* ] ]- ^ ' 01 , a nd (J) a n " A greeni exit 
for Joint and Cooperative Action" dated December 28, 1998 between the District and the 
Jov,;, w: iuqueiMiic aiiu exhibits "thereto. Ii i addition to these documents, the text of 
Ke\ ^ • f - : • * • • n i nch ides ma n\ statements of fact onh some of v h ich are 
supported by any reference to the basis therefor. At the hearing, Keystone also gave the 
Court a copy of an "Agreement" dated December 31, 1996 between the District and UCFH 
Dev elopment Compan} , I -.C " for thepui chase and sale of w ater rights and the pro isiori of 
"irrigation connections." From all these sources, the relevant facts, so far as this Court is 
able to determine, are as follows: 
1 he District has constructed, and it owns and manages, a secondary water system 
wh ich presently si lpplies secondary] rrigationw atei to residents :>f theT :)w n of! :»qn len • i] le 
and is capable of providing wholesale irrigation water to areas of the towns of La Verkin and 
Toquerville known, as the "La Verkin Creek Area." The system constructed by the District 
i i icli i les si ich facilities as a ci eek cl i vei sioi i, a pump statioi i7 pi.pel.ii les ai id fit: tings, and. a 
5 . 
metering and control station. The District primarily provides water to municipalities as a 
"wholesaler" of water, and only provides service to individuals on a "retail" basis when other 
sources are unavailable. The District does not require or encourage individual property 
owners to obtain their water service from the District. In particular, the District's water 
system was not constructed specifically for Keystone. 
Prior to adoption of the Final Rules on July 17,2001, the District had published notice 
of a public hearing on a proposed new "impact fee" to be imposed on new developments to 
which the District would provide water service. The District's draft "Development Impact 
Fee Analysis" dated May 2001 proposed calculating the impact fee on the basis of the cost 
of the District's system and the size of the area which could be served through the system. 
That Analysis also recommended that "A Development Impact Fee . . . should be assessed 
to all developments where service has been committed before the final plat is recorded." The 
District's proposed Resolution would have imposed impact fees of the sort contemplated in 
the Impact Fees Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq. As contemplated in the Impact 
Fees Act, the District had also prepared a draft Capital Facilities Plan, which concluded that, 
since the District's resources were already committed to existing obligations, "if a situation 
should arise which requires the District to provide water directly in connection with any 
development activity, any new projects or alterations to existing projects to provide retail 
water must be paid for through impact fees." 
Keystone objected to the District's impact fee proposal both before and at a public 
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hearing on June 12, 2001. The District then postponed any decision on its plans until its July 
17, 2001 meeting. At that meeting, however, the District produced the Availability, User & 
Standby Fee Analysis and the Final Rules, changing the recommendation from an "impact 
fee" to three different fees. After discussion and public comment, including objections by 
Keystone, the District's board adopted the Final Rules. In doing so, the District did not 
comply, and did not intend to comply, with the Impact Fees Act. 
The Final Rules require that an owner of property within one of the communities in 
the La Verkin Creek Area who wants to obtain water service from the District "shall first 
make application to that community for retail water service." The owner may apply to the 
District for service only if the owner's "community," i.e., the municipality in which the 
owner's property is located, "is unable to provide retail water service to the applicant" and 
the owner gives the District specific written proof thereof. The owner must then sign and 
submit to the District "a Water Application and Agreement." If that is approved by the 
District, the owner is responsible to construct and pay for all of the facilities necessary to get 
water from the District's system to the owner's property and all such construction must meet 
the District's standards. After construction and acceptance by the District, all such facilities 
become the property of the District. Approval of the owner's application also subjects the 
owner to all the provisions of the Final Rules, of course, including payment of fees. 
Of the three fees imposed pursuant to the District's Final Rules, the only fee 
challenged by Keystone is the "initial water availability fee" (hereafter the "availability fee"). 
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Paragraph 18 of the Final Rules provides, in part, that "[r]ates, charges, and fees shall be 
reasonably related, to the extent possible, to the cost of providing the service for which they 
are assessed." Exhibit A to the Final Rules specifies that the availability fee "shall be due 
and payable for all lots within a subdivision upon request by the developer for water 
service," and includes the current fee schedule in which availability fees are imposed on the 
basis of the size of the lot. The per-acre amount of the availability fee was calculated by 
dividing the number of acres in the District's potential service area into the total cost of the 
system already constructed by the District. 
Although the parties have argued their positions primarily with respect to new 
development of property, the Final Rules do not limit applications to property developers. 
The District has attempted to distance itself from development approval matters; paragraph 
1 of the Final Rules provides: "The District does not authorize development activities, 
whether by approval of subdivision plats, issuance of building permits, or otherwise. The 
District does not intend to impose any payment of money upon development activity as a 
condition of development approval in connection with provision of water from the La Verkin 
Creek Area." 
There appears to be one slight fact issue in this regard, however, and it was on this 
issue that the Court conferred with the parties' counsel after the hearing: 
a. The District has argued that it does not coordinate with or affect a town's 
approvals of new development proposals. The District asserts that Keystone 
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may (and should) apply to another entity, known as Toquerville Secondary 
Water System or "TSWS," for secondary service. TSWS is organized through 
an interlocal cooperation agreement among Toquerville Town, Toquerville 
Irrigation Company and the District. The District also asserts that Keystone 
hopes to avoid asking Toquerville or TSWS for service because Keystone is 
in a dispute with Toquerville. 
b. Keystone asserted in its Trial Memorandum that "the District knows that the 
subdivision ordinances of both Toquerville and La Verkin require [italics in 
original] a secondary water system to be in place as a condition of 
development approval. Indeed, it is impossible for a developer to obtain 
development approval without such a system, regardless of who is requiring 
the fee." Keystone does not directly assert that the two towns require that the 
District's secondary water system "be in place," but that is the implication of 
Keystone's argument. Keystone asserts that TSWS is controlled by the 
District, but that assertion is not supported by the language of die Agreement 
for Joint and Cooperative and the Resolution on which Keystone relies. 
Upon consideration of the parties' representations, the following facts appear to be 
uncontested: Keystone is required to have a secondary water system in place in order to 
obtain subdivision development approval from Toquerville Town. Keystone is not required 
to have a connection to the District's system, and would not even be allowed to apply for 
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service from the District unless it first applied to Toquerville and/or to TSWS and was unable 
to obtain service there. The District's approval of Keystone's application for service would 
not ensure that Keystone's development would be approved by Toquerville. 
ANALYSIS 
Keystone argues that the District's availability fee is an impact fee and that the 
District cannot impose this fee upon Keystone because the District has not complied with the 
Impact Fees Act. The District argues that it abandoned the idea of an impact fee and that the 
availability fee is simply a rational fee assessed to recoup the costs of construction of its 
system when the District commits to reserve its services for an approved applicant. 
The District bases much of its argument on the fact that it does not encourage 
developers to apply to it for secondary water service and that any such application is 
"voluntary." The District emphasizes that it will not even accept an application without 
proof that the applicant has been refused service by the "community" in which the 
applicant's property is located. Neither of these arguments is material to the issue presented 
to the Court, however. The District's Petition prays for the Court to determine whether the 
District's Final Rules impose impact fees, without reference to Keystone or any other 
particular applicant. The District's ability to reject an application because, for example, the 
applicant has not been refused service by his community, does not mean that the availability 
fee that the District may have imposed is or is not an impact fee. If the Final Rules do 
improperly impose impact fees, the problem is not corrected by the District's insistence that 
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its system be the developer's "last resort." Consequently, the Court's determination in this 
case must assume that someone has applied or will apply to the District for service under 
circumstances which require the Disti ict to i i lake a decision at :H it tl le applicati in 
• The Impact Fees 4 ct gives 'the following definitions of relevant terms: • • 
a. "'Impact fee' means a payment of money imposed upon development activity 
as a condition o i development approval.' ' Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(7 )(a). 
. • b. ' .• "'Development .'k'tivitv' moans a ny const uction or expansion of a building, 
structure, or use, any change in use of a building or structure, or any changes 
in the use of land that creates additional demand and neec ii-i LL-OUC 
f. . 
c. "'Development approval' means any written authorization from a local 
political subdivision that authorizes the commencement of development 
activity.' ^ tan L. ode Ann § . . •. - ^ 
d. • .'' "Public faciJ ities ' i n cli ides "water rights and water supHv treatment, and 
distribution facilities" which are "owned and operated by or on behalf of a 
. local political subdiwsiL , . ,,in L^ue .*um , . ^^-^w^, . .». 
Keystone Ilisi digues that thr itvail.ibilth fee is an impat t f-v Iwnnse (V) the District,. 
which is a local political subdivision, owns and operates a secondary water system, which 
includes public facilities for "water supply, teatment, and distribution,5' fii keystone's 
construction of a "subdivision secondary water system' " is '"con <: .... . ••.-. c \p :;..-* vf a 
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. . . structure . . . that creates additional demand and need for public facilities" and is, 
therefore, a development activity, (iii) the District requires Keystone to obtam the District's 
wntten authorization, or development approval, before commencing construction of a 
secondary water system for Keystone's property if it is to be connected to the District's 
system, and (iv) Keystone must pay the District's availability fee as a condition of obtaining 
the District's development approval.2 Keystone's second point is a bit circular, however, to 
the extent that it argues that its construction of the secondary water system on its own 
property creates additional demand and need for the secondary water system on its own 
property. The stronger point is that Keystone's construction of the secondary water system 
on its own property creates additional demand and need for the public facilities constituting 
the District's secondary water system, and this argument is sound. Even if the District had 
so much existing service capacity that it could absorb new connections without expanding 
its system, any construction of new subdivision facilities which were to be connected to the 
District's system would create additional demand on the District's system. Without such 
excess capacity, any new connections would create additional need for public facilities to 
be added to the District's system. This would be true of any applicant's construction of a 
secondary water system on its own property In this sense, the District's availability fee does 
2This argument assumes, of course, that Keystone must connect to the District's secondary water 
system, if Keystone can go elsewhere for service, the District's availability fee is of no concern to 
Keystone The District has filed the petition in this case, however, and seeks a Section 1442 "judicial 
examination and determination" pertaining to its availability fee, regardless of v\ho applies to it for service 
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constitute an in1 pact fee iimfT the Impart F^s A t^. • - • . ."• . -. • 
Keystone's alternative argument is that (i) loquervilie will not approve Keystone's 
subdivision development activity unless Keystone has a secondary water system, (ii) 'the 
District has the only secondary water system ii om w hich Keystone -could obtain serv ice, (Iii) 
the District will not a How Keystone to obtain service unless Keystone pays "the availability 
fee, and (iv) 'the statutory definition of ''''impact fee" as one imposed "as a condition of 
development approval" does not require 'that the f ee be demanded by or paid ic ;.:u cody 
giving the development appi o vul 1 hi •; argument" does n< it: appear ft>be •'-'i.-l ; -" V -n~r -
"development activity" is the subdivision generally, and if Keystone must apply to the 
District for service because no other such service is available and that service is a condition 
i MJIIIJT villc 'J iippiovai ul kussloiu' •> jijhtli\ i >[''ii, (Ii-; I > i «t r i > t'<- ap'pi o\\i 1 ofKeysfnritf's 
anop cation is a necessary predicate to Toquerville's approval of the subdivision but it is not 
a "written-authorization... that authorizes the commencement of development activity''" and, 
"therefore, the ,,wince's approval is not "development approval..'"'3 Even though, co ntrars to 
the District's argi iment, the District's approva 1 of a n appl ication for secondary water service 
does affect the municipality's subdivision development approval, it does not constitute 
JIn fact, there could be many other governmental approvals, certifications, and licenses which are 
necessary predicates to obtaining Toquerville's approval of Keystone's subdivision, but the fees therefor 
are not "impact fees" just because Toquerville's approval cannot be obtained unless the developer pays 
them, for example, Toquerville may require that a particular developer have a contractor's license and a 
business license in order to obtain Toquerville's approval of the developer's subdivision, but that would not 
mean that the fees paid to the State Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for the 
contractor's license and to the Town Clerk for the business license are ;;impact fees." 
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"development approval" which would make the District's availability fee constitute an 
impact fee. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the'availability fee imposed 
by the District's Final Rules is an impact fee under the Impact Fees Act. Counsel for 
Keystone is hereby directed to submit an appropriate judgment pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration and to attach thereto a copy of this Ruling as 
contemplated by Rule 4-504(6). 
Dated this IS day of January, 2002. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
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Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2) (c). 
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Statement of Issues 
Issue One: The Seventh District Juvenile Court Judge (the Honorable 
Judge Mary Manley) allowed Keith Eddington (the Attorney for the State) to 
use discovery (Nichole's hand written witness statement - Exhibit One) in 
the adjudication trial of 5 December 2003 which was NOT sent to the 
appellant as required by the Scheduling/Pre-Trial Conference Order. 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court properly decided "to admit or 
bar testimony for failure to adhere to discovery obligations." Arrellano, 964 
P.2datll69. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. Seepages 18-20 & 31 of Record 
Index. 
Issue Two: The Honorable Judge Mary Manley allowed Keith Eddington 
to use four witnesses in the adjudication trial of 5 December 2003 which 
were NOT sent to the appellant on a witness list as required by the 
Scheduling/Pre-Trial Conference Order. 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court should bar a witness's 
testimony because a party failed to comply with discovery obligations. See 
State v. Begisbe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. Seepages 18-20 of Record Index. 
2 
Issue Three: The Honorable Judge Mary Manley used a preponderance of 
the evidence given by the witnesses and discovery of Issues One and Two 
above to uphold the substantiated findings of the DCFS in this matter. 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court should bar a witness's 
testimony because a party failed to comply with discovery obligations. See 
State v. Begisbe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. Seepages 32-42 of Record Index. 
Issue Four: The Honorable Judge Mary Manley did not sanction Keith 
Eddington for failure to comply fully with the Scheduling/Pre-Trial 
Conference Order. 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court properly selected and imposed 
sanctions for discovery violations. See Tuck v. Godfrey, 367 Utah Adv. Rep. 
42, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Also, whether the trial court properly imposed 
or denied sanctions under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37. See Pennington, 
973 P.2d at 940. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. Seepages 18-20, 32-42 of Record 
Index. 
Issue Five: The Honorable Judge Mary Manley did not dismiss this case 
even though Mr. Eddington did not comply fully with the Scheduling/Pre-
Trial Conference Order. 
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Standard of Review: Whether the trial court properly refused to dismiss 
this case for noncompliance with a scheduling order. See A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. Seepages 52-42 of Record Index. 
Constitutional Provisions 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals Jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction 
of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts. 
Article VIII, Section 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts -
- Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except 
as limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all 
extraordinary writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and 
appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally 
with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from 
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the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over 
the cause. 
62A-4a-116.6. Notice and opportunity for court hearing for persons 
listed in Licensing Information System. 
(1) Persons whose names were listed on the Licensing Information 
System as of May 6, 2002 and who have not been the subject of a court 
determination with respect to the alleged incident of abuse or neglect may at 
any time: 
(a) request review by the division of their case and removal of their name 
from the Licensing Information System pursuant to Subsection (3); or 
(b) file a petition for an evidentiary hearing and a request for a finding of 
unsubstantiated or without merit. 
78-3a-320. Additional finding at adjudication hearing — Petition — 
Court records. 
(3) Any person described in Subsection 62A-4a-116.6 (1) may at any 
time file with the court a petition for removal of the person's name from the 
Licensing Information System. At the conclusion of the hearing on the 
petition, the court shall: 
(a) make a finding of substantiated, unsubstantiated, or without merit; 
(b) include the finding described in Subsection (l)(a) in a written order; 
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and 
(c) deliver a certified copy of the order described in Subsection (l)(b) to 
the division. 
Statement of the Case 
This case has been brought against me because of my poor judgment 
and lack of good common sense while trying to share my love with the 
children of our church congregation. A single lady DCFS caseworker 
substantiated the accusations that I sexually abused one child and was also 
lewd toward her and another child (see Addendum pages A-l & A-2). 
Seeking to appeal the DCFS substantiated finding, it took more than two 
years of DCFS delays, many letters written from me to higher authorities, 
and a change of Utah Law to finally receive an appeal hearing in the 
Juvenile Court. At the pre-hearing, the Juvenile Court Judge issued a 
scheduling order which I believe was not followed by the state attorney. At 
the adjudication trial the Judge, using a preponderance of the evidence, 
upheld the DCFS substantiated findings. 
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Facts Relevant to the Issues 
Honorable Judges of the Appellate Court: We thank God the Father 
that He has finally given me the opportunity (after nearly three years) to 
state the facts of this case before an unbiased panel of judges. My attached 
Verified Petition against Substantiation (see Addendum page AS) and my 
initial interview with Moab Police Officer Eddie Guerrero (see 
Addendum page A-4) will give a background understanding of the facts in 
case. PLEASE READ THEM BOTH! 
I am a Christian and a preacher (evangelist) of the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ (Acts 11:26; 2 Timothy 4:5) with the church of Christ (Romans 
16:16). I LOVE the Lord our God and all of His creation (people, animals, 
nature). Because I love God, I do the best I can to keep His commandments 
(Ecclesiastes 12:13; John 14:15). 
I am also a retired Naval Officer. I honorably served this country to 
keep it free for you and me during the Viet Nam era (1969 - 1989) at 
various commands around the world including Utah (see Addendum page A-
5). I am also a loving husband, father, and grandfather. Since 1972, my wife 
and I have raised and cared for four wonderful children and now two 
grandchildren. 
When my conduct with children (kissing and hugging them) was 
brought to my attention by the policeman (Eddie Guerrero) who first 
investigated this case, he graciously mentioned the fact that other people did 
not view my intended loving actions as I viewed them. This revelation 
opened my eyes and throughout the interviews I admitted my lack of good 
common sense. Your Honors, from that first interview until this day I have 
repented of my actions - i.e., changed my mind about doing certain things 
with children. 
The DCFS caseworker, on the other hand, refused to speak to me and 
personally hear my side of the story. She and her superiors then did all they 
could to disgrace my name and have the police charge me with a crime. 
Because of this substantiated case I and my family have suffered physically, 
spiritually, and financially since June 2001. 
After more than two years of DCFS delays, on 16 October 2003 I was 
finally allowed to appear before Juvenile Court Judge Mary Manley for a 
pre-trial hearing to appeal the July 2001 substantiated findings of the DCFS 
in this matter. No longer being able to afford legal representation (due to the 
DCFS delays my previous lawyers earned a fee of more than $27,000 trying 
to defend me), I went to the pre-trial hearing alone. 
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Mr. Keith Eddington did not attend the hearing; however, he sent a 
representative. During the pre-trial hearing the Honorable Judge Mary 
Manley issued an order requiring parties, Mr. Eddington and I, to exchange 
discovery by 30 October 2003 and a witness list by 24 November 2003 (see 
Record Index page 18). I obeyed the order to the letter; however, Mr. 
Eddington did not send me any discovery or a witness list. 
During the hearing it was also suggested by Judge Manley that I speak 
privately with Mr. Eddington before the adjudication trial. Knowing I would 
not be able to communicate with Mr. Eddington as lawyers do, I simply 
wrote him a letter again stating that I had repented of the mistakes I made in 
my relationships and asking for this case to be unsubstantiated and dismissed 
(see Addendum page A-6). I received no response to this letter from Mr. 
Eddington. 
On 5 December 2003 I went to the adjudication trial alone. I assumed 
Mr. Eddington had decided to dismiss my case (since he had not 
acknowledged my letter and, in my opinion, had not complied with the 
orders in the Scheduling/Pre-Trial Conference Order); therefore, I did not 
prepare myself for the trial nor bring any witnesses. To my surprise Mr. 
Eddington came to the trial, and with him were four witnesses. 
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Before his witnesses were called, Judge Manley effectively silenced 
me by stating that she had read my Verified Petition (see Addendum page A-
3) and considered my appeal concerns about a possible DCFS religious 
persecution to not be germane to this case. I wondered why. 
When Mr. Eddington was ready to call his witnesses I objected on the 
grounds that I had not received discovery or a witness list. Judge Manley 
questioned him and he gave her a letter (see Addendum page A-7) to show 
that the DCFS had sent all discovery he planned to use in this trial to me and 
my previous lawyers in August 2001. Please notice that the letter plainly 
states that "all victims statements and interviews have been withheld." The 
Honorable Judge Mary Manley accepted the DCFS letter as fulfillment of 
the requirement for discovery. I wondered why. 
I then objected to Mr. Eddington's use of witnesses. The Judge asked 
him for proof that he had sent a witness list. I didn't understand exactly what 
he quietly said to her, but basically he implied that a witness list had been 
sent to my former attorneys back in 2001. Even though he had no proof that 
he had sent a witness list, Judge Manley accepted his statement and 
overruled my objections. No witness list was ever sent to me or my 
former attorneys. 
10 
At that point in the proceedings I felt Judge Manley should have 
sanctioned Mr. Eddington and dismissed my case as unsubstantiated for not 
complying with her orders, but instead she stated that I SHOULD HAVE 
KNOWN Mr. Eddington would at least use the victims as witnesses. She 
then allowed Mr. Eddington to take testimony from all four of his witnesses. 
I wondered why. 
COMMENT: If "I should have known" what witnesses Mr. 
Eddington would use, why did Judge Manley order him to send a witness 
list? 
As the fourth and final witness was testifying (Eddie Guerrero), Mr. 
Eddington pulled out a hand written witness statement from one of the 
victims (Nichole Harrison) which I had never seen, because it had NEVER 
been sent to me or my former attorneys as discovery. He requested Judge 
Manley to enter it as an exhibit and evidence (see Record Index page 31). 
She asked if I objected. Not being a lawyer and realizing she had previously 
overruled my objections to discovery, I decided it was useless to object 
again. She quickly complied with Mr. Eddington's request. 
At the close of the trial the Honorable Judge use a preponderance of 
the written and verbal evidence given by the witnesses to uphold the DCFS 
substantiated finding against me (see Record Index pages 32-42). 
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Summary of Arguments 
1. Getting to the truth was never the goal of the DCFS. They simply 
made and substantiated their accusations and then did all they could to 
delay or keep me from appealing their findings. 
2. At the time of my loving relationship with the two victims of this 
case, they were being treated as if they were my own children 
(NOTE: during the adjudication trial they both admitted to this fact). 
With the exception of experiencing an erection while they were 
playing and bouncing around on my lap as I taught them to drive, 
the things I have been accused of doing by the Utah DCFS have 
resulted from loving actions I have displayed with my own physical 
children and hundreds of other children across the United States. I am 
sorry for not better controlling my body reactions and I have repented. 
3. Using lies, out of context statements, and my intended loving actions 
the attorney for the state manufactured a preponderance of evidence 
for the Juvenile Court Judge to use in upholding the substantiated 
findings against me. 
4. The Juvenile Court Judge did not fulfill her duty in giving me a fair 
and unbiased hearing. She did not sanction the attorney for the state 
for not complying with her Scheduling/Pre-Trial Conference Order. 
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Arguments 
1. The DCFS has NEVER been interested in obtaining the truth 
concerning their allegations. Using the excuse that the Moab police 
was investigating this as a criminal case, their lady caseworker (Darla 
Taylor) refused to speak with me and get my side of the story. 
However, she spoke to many others, and using their testimony she 
accused me of the three above mentioned allegations [along with five 
other Emotional Maltreatment allegations which have already been 
unsubstantiated and dismissed (see Addendum page A-8)] and then 
substantiated them. Again, she did these things without ever 
speaking to me. 
Because of the DCFS delays in giving me a hearing and the 
unfair treatment I felt I was receiving from the DCFS, I wrote many 
letters to the political authorities in Utah asking for their help (see 
Addendum pages A-9, A-10). 
As the months went by, I learned that the letters I wrote to 
many of the political leaders of Utah resulted in a CHANGE of Utah 
Law (PRAISE GOD)! The unbridled power of a single DCFS 
caseworker to substantiate an allegation was taken away and placed 
into the hands of the Juvenile Court by the 2002 General Session of 
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the Utah State Legislature (DCFS Management Information System 
Amendments). I firmly believe that this change in law alone should 
have been reason enough for the three DCFS caseworker allegations 
in this case to be dismissed as unsubstantiated (as the other five were), 
yet it did not happen. NOTE: Even if my name is never removed 
from the Utah Licensing Database, I thank God daily that because of 
my case no other citizen of Utah will have a DCFS caseworker get 
away with treating them as I have been treated. 
Many more months of DCFS delays in granting me a hearing 
caused me to write more letters to the political leaders in and outside 
of Utah asking for their help (see Addendum pages A-l1 - A-19). 
Finally a pre-hearing was granted in October 2003. 
2. My kissing the children of our congregation was the whole pretense 
that began this investigation in May of 2001 [see Addendum page A-4 
(12, 15)]. When interviewed, I explained to Officer Guerrero that I did 
indeed give the children a Holy Kiss in accordance with the teachings 
of the Bible (Romans 16:16). A holy kiss (to me) is no more than a 
hug and/or a light kiss on the cheek or lips [see Addendum page A-4 
m 
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3. In an effort to get her to accuse me of something Tera Begay was 
subjected to three or more interviews by the DCFS and police. In the 
first interview she said I once quickly kissed her and then stuck my 
tongue out to wet her lips [see Addendum page A-20 (1, 2)]). During 
the adjudication trial, in order to manufacture a preponderance of 
evidence, Mr. Eddington managed to get Tera Begay to say I once put 
my tongue down her throat when I kissed her. In truth, I have never 
used my tongue to kiss Tera, Nichole, or any of the other children 
who were involved in this case. And my tongue certainly has not been 
down their throat [see Addendum page A-4 (12)J. 
4. In an effort to manufacture a preponderance of evidence, during the 
adjudication trial Mr. Eddington brought up a camping trip in Salina, 
UT where someone accused me of touching Tera Begay while she 
was sleeping in a tent. The Moab, UT DCFS investigated that 
accusation immediately after it happened in March 1999. The DCFS 
caseworker spoke to me, Tera, and other witnesses. Tera denied all the 
accusations that had been leveled against me and the caseworker 
rightfully dismiss the case as unsubstantiated (see Addendum page A-
21). In the first interview with Tera concerning this present case, she 
continued to say nothing happened during the camping trip to Salina 
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[see Addendum page A-20 (3) and Addendum page A-4 (4)]. 
However, in subsequent interviews and during the adjudication trial, 
the DCFS, police, and Mr. Eddington got Tera to change her original 
denials and now accuse me of rubbing her stomach while she was 
sleeping in the tent. 
5. Nichole Harrison is now over 21 years old. My relationship with her 
occurred when she was maybe nine or ten years old. The perceptions 
she had of our loving relationship when she was a child are certainly 
different than her present perceptions [see Addendum page A-4 (8)J. 
Only she and God know why she has said so many bad things about 
my family and me now that she is an adult. For example, in an effort 
to manufacture a preponderance of evidence, the DCFS helped her 
"remember" that I asked her to put on lip gloss used by my wife and 
then I sucked on her lips because I liked the taste of the lip gloss. The 
DCFS interviewed my wife. If they wanted the truth, why didn't they 
ask her about the lip gloss? If they had, she would have told them that 
she has NEVER worn lip gloss (see Addendum page A-22). In truth, I 
never asked Nichole to wear any one's lip gloss and I have never 
sucked on any child's lips. 
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The DCFS accused me of sexually abusing Nichole. However, 
testimony does Nichole accuse me of such abuse. In 
l ad slir iiilinillnl III.ml I in \vi lint ill In h i iu ,tn< I\pc ol se M L ill II 
relations with her [see Addendum page A 23 ( J„ 4 )/ She also testified 
that it was my son (also named Samuel) that possibly did things with 
or to her that might be seen as sexual abuse [see Addendum page A-23 
« 2)J. 
. udinglon usea i. . . , ;i. ; would married them 
;• nderaiicc of 
evidence. If the lady DCFS caseworker had spoken to mv the nnil<"\( 
of my statements could have been explained. I often counseled and 
talked with the girls and boys of our congregation concerning their 
relationship with the opposite sex. My goal was to increase their self-
esteem and teach tl ic it i 1 1 lot to quickl> ; .ove and marry just ANY 
piTsmi wl in ortiiik1« ,ilnni> I uniiiM'k'd Ihrin In I on l>, I'm ;i lu.'isnn \ l io 
would treat them right before they rush into marriage. Using myself as 
an example, I told the girls that I would even be willing to marry them 
if my wife was not living. We understood at the time of the 
discussions that I would and could not possibly marry a nine or ten 
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year old girl. This case has helped me understand how foolish it was 
to use such language with children, and I've repented. 
7. Mr. Eddington used the fact that I sometimes playfully slapped the 
children on their backside as they left the church van, and that I gave 
them piggy back rides and touched their little behinds as I helped 
them climb on my back in order to manufacture a preponderance of 
evidence. Your Honors, Officer Guerrero understood the "slapping" 
for what it was - a playful gesture like a "coach with his players" [see 
Addendum page A-4 (9, 14, and 15)]. I have always given my 
physical children and many other children piggy back rides. Again, I 
treated all of them as if they were my own physical children [see 
Addendum page A-20 (1)]. 
8. In order to manufacture a preponderance of evidence, Mr. Eddington 
used the fact that I bought gifts for the victims to imply that I was 
"grooming" the children. Again, I am a Christian. That means I am 
doing my best to follow Christ and His teachings. Jesus taught, "It is 
more blessed to give than to receive" (Acts 20:35). In an effort to 
make this teaching a part of my life I have always given gifts to the 
girls, boys, and adults who come into my life [see Addendum page A-
4(3,17,19)]. 
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9. In order to manufacture a preponderance of evidence, Mr. Eddington 
mentioned the fact that when I took the children swimming I would 
touch their body. Yes, I taught my physical children and many other 
children to swim by placing my hands under their body to keep them 
from sinking. I learned to swim that way and I've seen professional 
instructors teach other children to swim that way. 
10. In order to manufacture a preponderance of evidence, Mr. Eddington 
mentioned the fact that I would change clothes when I took the 
children swimming at a beach. Yes, I would change clothes after we 
all came out of the water. If there were no changing facilities 
available, the children would go into my van or car and place towels 
on the windows as they changed. I would move away from the car and 
get behind a tree or bush as I changed clothes. Never did I undress 
directly in the presence of any child, and never did I knowing allow 
any of the children to see me changing clothes. 
11. In order to manufacture a preponderance of evidence, Mr. Eddington 
mentioned the fact that I walked around my home with my robe on 
when the children were present. The children in question spent the 
night and many other hours at our home. Yes, at times when the 
children were in our home I and my wife walked around with our 
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robes on. Again, we treated the children of our congregation as our 
own children. Never did I knowingly expose the private parts of my 
physical body to the children in my home while I was wearing my 
robe. 
12.1 believe the Honorable Judge Mary Manley should have sanctioned 
Mr. Eddington for not complying with her orders in the Scheduling/ 
Pre-Trial Conference Order. I believe the hearing should have been 
dismissed with prejudice, the accusations unsubstantiated, and my 
name removed from the Utah Licensing Database as sanctions to Mr. 
Eddington for his failures to comply fully with the order. However, in 
her closing remarks when the adjudication trial ended, Judge Mary 
Manley stated to me that she was "TAKEN BACK" that in my 
Verified Petition for a hearing I could possibly think the DCFS was 
persecuting me for my religious beliefs and thus think myself a 
martyr. Her statement clearly implied her own bias against me and 
finally helped me understand why she allowed the adjudication trial to 
proceed without sanctions to Mr. Eddington. 
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Conclusion 
Your Honors, my former attorneys have more than 50 short and long 
letters of reference from people all over America concerning my character, 
integrity, liberality, and love. They had planned to enter these letters as 
exhibits if I had ever been granted a DCFS hearing while I was their client. 
If you are interested in what those who know me have to say about me, 
please contact my former attorneys and ask or order them to fax you copies 
of the statements (contact Steve Alderman or Tim Dunn at: Dunn and Dunn, 
Attorneys At Law, Suite 460 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84102, 1-888-386-6529). 
Your Honors: I am now asking you, the Appellate Court, to dismiss 
with prejudice this case, unsubstantiated the three accusations against me, 
and have my name removed from the Utah Licensing Database. 
'$L~*RA* fe BY A s ^ ^ X X * %**#^~-<! 
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Douglas E. West 
Deputy Direcor 
Ken R. Patterson 
Director 
Samuel A. Matthews 
169 W Walnut Lane ?99 
vlOAB, LT 34532 
Case Number: 999425 
Dear Samuel A. Matthews: 
DIVISION OF CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES 
NOTICE OF AGENCY ACTION: Child Protective Services 
Date: 07/11/2001 
NOTICE OF AGENCY ACTION 
Recently, the Division of Child and Family Services f'DCFS") received an alleganon that you were responsible for child 
ibuse or neglect. As required by state law, DCFS invesngated this alleganon.* Based on its investigation. DCFS 
:oncluded that in its opinion, there was a reasonable basis co believe ±ar you were responsible for the listed abuse or 
leglect. Support for DCFS* initial finding includes die following 
Evidence observed or presented :o the investigator confirmed :ha: ±e abuse occurred and that you were responsible 
for the abuse 
Victim's Name Alleganon Descnpnon Initial Findine 
Nichol M. Harrison 





This letter explains how this finding of abuse might affect you. how you can obtain a copy of your records, and how you 
can request an administrative hearing :o challenge :he finding and its jiclusion on the licensing database 
How Could This Finding of Abuse or \eglect Affect You? 
If you apply for job or a license JI the areas described below the licensing authonnes or other authorized state agencies 
may review your abuse or neglect record, and diey could deny you a license or employment or volunteer service. If you 
are currently licensed, employed or serving as a volunteer in one of these areas, the finding of abuse or neglect could 
result ui die terrrunanon of your license, employment or volunteer service (See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-l 16 ) 
Some Activities Affected bv a Finding of Abuse or \eglect: 
• Employment or volunteer work with the Utah Department of Human Sen ices: 
• Employment or volunteer work with an agency licensed by the Department of Human Services to provide sen ices to 
children, 
• Teaching, working or volunteering in a public school, 
• Operating as a licensed child care prov ider or program, or .voiking as an employee of a licensed child care provider or 
program. 
• Adopting a child. 
• Working as a licensed foster parent. 
• Employment or volunteer work with a heaith care facility that provides direct care to children. 
• Employment or volunteer work with the Office of the Guardian ad Litem. 
A 
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Oouglas E West 
Deputy Director 
Ken R. Patterson 
Director 
Samuel A. Matthew s 
268 W Walnut Ln 
MOAB, UT 84532 
Case Number: 996348 
Dear Samuel A Matthews 
DIVISION OF CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES 
NOTICE OF AGENCY ACTION: Child Protective Services 
Date: 07/13/2001 
NOTICE OF AGENCY ACTION 
Recently, the Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS") received an allegation that you were responsible for child 
abuse or neglect As required by state law DCFS investigated this alleganon * Based on its investigation, DCFS 
concluded that in its opinion, there was a reasonable basis to belie* e that ou were responsible for the listed abuse or 
neglect. Support for DCFS' initial finding includes the following 
Evidence observed or presented :o the investigator confirmed ±at the aouse occurred and that ^ou were responsible 
for the abuse 
Victims Name Allegation Description Initial F nding 
Tera L Begav 
Tera L Begav 




This letter explains how this finding of abuse might affect you. how you can obtain a copy of your records, and how you 
can request an administrative hearing to challenge the finding and its inclusion on the licensing database 
HoMf Could This Finding of Abuse or \ezlect Affect You? 
If you apply tor job or a license in the areas described oeiow, the iicensing authorities or other authorized state agencies 
may review ,our abuse or neglect record, and .he> could deny >ou a licence or employment or volunteer ^erviLe It
 7ou 
are currently licensed employed or serving as a volunteer in one of these areas, the finding of abuse or neglect could 
result in the terminanon of your license, employment or volunteer service (See Utah Code Ann § 62A-4a-l 16 ) 
Some Activities Affected by a Finding of Abuse or \ezlect: 
• Employment or volunteer work with the Utah Department of Human Ser c^s. 
• Employment or volunteer work with an agency licensed by the Department of Human Services to provide services to 
children. 
• Teaching, working or vohmteenng m a public school. 
• Operating as a licensed child care provider or program or working as an eTinloyee of a licensed child care pro\ ider or 
program. 
• Adopting a child. 
• Working as a licensed foster parent. 
• Employment or volunteer work with a health care taciliry that provides direct care to children. 
• Employment or volunteer work with 'he Office of die Guardian ad Litem 
A 
IN THE DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT, 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




City, State, ZIP Date of Birth 
vs. 
Division of Child and Family 
Services, Respondent 
120 North 200 West, Room 225 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
(801)538-4100 
Petitioner swears that the following is true: 
(1) Petitioner received notice on or about Auty <£&&/ that the Division of Child and 
Family Services had made a supported finding of severe abuse or neglect against the Petitioner, and 
that Petitioner would be included in the Division of Child and Family Services licensing database. 
(Attach copy of notice from agency). 
(2) Petitioner has NOT been subject to any of the following court determinations 
with respect to the alleged incident of abuse or neglect: conviction; juvenile court adjudication; plea of 
guilty; plea of guilty and mentally ill; or no contest 
(3) Petitioner challenges the finding made by Division of Child and Family Services, and 
inclusion in the Licensing Database. Petitioner requests a court hearing because: [Describe in detail 
facts which you believe contradict the finding of the Division of Child and Family Services, 
including what happened, where, who was involved (including minor children and family and 
household members), and if medical or police intervention was required. Attach relevant 
medical, dental, or police records.] 
VERIFIED PETITION AGAINST 
SUBSTANTIATION IN DCFS LICENSING 
DATABASE 
(FORM A) 
Case No. <j ?i> 3 &+???&* 
Judge 
i 
18 July 2003 
Dear Judge: I am a preacher of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. I preached the truth of God's 
word (the Bible) via newspaper, radio, television, and house to house all over the State of 
Utah from 1984 to 2001. Many of the things I preached can be found at my below web 
site: 
http://home.eartMink.net/~mrsamerical 
During my nearly twenty years of ministry in the State of Utah, many religious leaders of 
the majority controlling church (and other major denominational churches) showed me in 
various ways that they were upset by the plain Bible teaching found at the above web site 
(especially under the section entitled Correcting Denominational Errors). Since May of 
2001 my family and I have been subject to an all out attack of Satan to get us out of Utah 
and hinder the spreading of the Word of God in that state. 
In May 2001, an investigation was begun by the Moab, UT police stating that I was seen 
touching, hugging, holding, and kissing the children of our church. It was reported that 
while in this loving relationship I used my tongue while kissing them. The police talked 
to me in person on two different occasions (once under oath) concerning their 
investigation. I answered their questions, admitting to various mistakes I had made in my 
relationships with the children. I assume the police believed my words because they did 
not nor have they yet charged me with any crime. 
Yet, in what I believe to be an orchestrated religious persecution, in late May 2001, the 
Utah Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) were called in to continue the 
investigation. The lady DCFS caseworker immediately disrupted our church, the lives of 
many of our children and their families, and of least importance, my life. In doing her job 
she spoke to children in Moab, Vernal, and probably other parts of Utah. I have no 
problem with that. However, my problem lies in the fact that she never once spoke to 
me in all her investigation. Not once did she attempt to contact me for an interview or 
statement. All my efforts to contact or speak to her came to no avail. 
In July 2001, this all powerful DCFS caseworker boldly accused me of five counts of 
emotional maltreatment (general), two counts of lewdness, and one count of sexual abuse 
against the children of our church. She didn't stop there! She then SUBSTANTIATED 
her accusations and had my name placed on the Utah Licensing Database (ULD); thus 
CLOSING the case - all this without ever speaking to me. Such power! 
Summary: In Utah, a single DCFS caseworker (backed by her superiors and their 
superiors, etc.), had the power to shame a person's name before his family, the church, 
and the people of the world, all without ever talking to the person. They had the power 
to destroy the life of a loving, hard-working, respected citizen of the United States of 
America without ever talking to him. That policy was wrong and I appeal her findings 
on that point. 
In late July 2001,1 obtained an attorney and in accordance with the then applicable 
statutory mandates; I appealed the DCFS substantiated accusations by filing a request for 
administrative review. The appeal obligated the DCFS to give me a hearing and an 
opportunity to face them as my accusers. During the hearing, the Administrative Law 
Judge was to review the findings in the cases and decide rather or not the DCFS 
caseworker followed policy and law. 
However, using various delaying tactics, the DCFS (even to this date) has not granted my 
administrative review. For two years I have been denied my right as a citizen of Utah to 
face my accusers. I therefore believe the DCFS investigation, substantiated accusations, 
and delays in giving me an appeal hearing are a form of religious persecution to stop me 
from preaching the things appearing in my above web site. That policy is wrong and I 
appeal her findings on that point also. 
My appeal hearing was set and delayed various times during the months of August -
December 2001. My life was placed in limbo during that time. In October 2001, growing 
tired of the DCFS delays and their power over my life, I wrote letters voicing my 
concerns to the Governor and the Attorney Greneral of Utah, the state Senators, the Grand 
County Representatives, the Mayor and District Attorney of Moab, and others. These 
wise elected officials must have agreed with my concerns, for soon after the laws of Utah 
were changed. 
During the 2002 General Session, the Utah State Legislature passed an act entitled DCFS 
Management Information System Amendments. This act took away the unbridled 
substantiating power of a DCFS caseworker and placed it under the jurisdiction of the 
Utah Juvenile Court. This change in the law is enough evidence that the policy of the 
DCFS case worker was wrong and therefore the accusations against me should be 
dismissed. 
Many more DCFS delays came about to deny my Administrative Review in 2002. 
Finally, in November 2002, the DCFS granted my hearing on the five emotional 
maltreatment (general) substantiated accusations. On or about 10 November 2002,1 flew 
from Connecticut to Utah with my witnesses and case ready. Two days BEFORE the 
hearing the DCFS unsubstantiated and dismissed all five of these accusations. 
In May 2002, the new Utah laws governing cases like mine came into effect. The three 
severe abuse substantiated accusations (lewdness - Case #996348 and lewdness/sexual 
abuse - Case #999425) were placed under your authority (the Juvenile Court). This new 
law obligated the DCFS to send me a Notice of Agency Action detailing my rights to 
again appeal these accusations. However, the DCFS knew that as long as these three 
substantiated accusations stayed in their ULD and hung over my head, I would be denied 
the freedom to work in my called and chosen profession (Gospel preacher). Thus, no 
Notice of Agency Action was sent. I again believe this lack of compliance with state law 
was a form of religious persecution to keep me from teaching the truth of God's Word in 
Utah and beyond. That policy is wrong! 
•y A-*(J) 
Finally, after I again contacted the Governor of Utah in May of 2003, he ordered the 
DCFS to send me the attached Notices of Agency Action. I received these notices on 18 
July 2003 (two years after the case began). 
(4) For the above reasons, I now respectfully request that the Utah Juvenile Court enter 
an order establishing that the finding of the Division of Child and Family Services was 
unsubstantiated, or without merit, for Case #996348 and Case #999425, and to order that 
Division of Child and Family Services remove my name from their Licensing Database. 
Pet i t ioner :^€L^^^Y ^ ~ ^f' o^^S*M 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me on 18 JULY 2003. 
C § b > a u °— 
LYNN GRILLO 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES MAY 31,2007 
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Date: June 4, 2001 
Time: 8:00 a.m. 
Interview with Sam Matthews by Officer Eddie Guerrero 
SM: I'm supposed to be having my representative to be here with me, but I, uh... 
EG: Who is your representative? 
SM: JimRaybum. 
EG: Okay. 
SM: He's supposed to be here at 8:00 o'clock. 
EG: Well, we just get some information straightened up a little bit while we wait for 
him. 
SM: Okay. 
EG: While we discuss this, what I would like to do is, I will record our conversation so 
I don't miss anything. 
SM: And that's why I've got Jim coming, too. so I don't miss anything. 
EG: Also, throughout the conversation. I just want you to be aware that you are free to 
leave, so if you decide not to talk anymore, you are not obligated to stay here. 
SM: It's alright. 
EG: Okay? While we are waiting for him. let me just make sure I've got some correct 
information. Your phone number is[259-4801. 
SM: Yes. 
EG: Today is June 4. It is 8:00 o'clock in the morning. Your address is space 99? 
SM: 269 West Walnut Lane. 
EG: Is it space 99? 
SM: Y e s / 
EG: I wasn't sure of the space. I'm not sure if it was 98 or 99 down there. Now.... 
SM: If he's not here, my aide, we can go ahead and get started man. so.... 
EG: Okay. Let me make sure we have our information is correct. You are the 
evangelist for the Church of Christ. 
SM: That's right. 
EG: What is the address of the Church of Christ? 
SM: 456 Emma Boulevard. P.O. Box 9i. The phone number is 6690. 
EG: I've heard some things....that you stepped down. Is that true. or.. .did you step 
down or....are you still the evangelist? 
SM: I don't do the preaching ever/ day. but I stiil work with the church. I teach the 
teens and I lead in prayer. Uh. so in a sense, yes. I stepped down. 
EG: Yeah. I wasn't....somebody had said that 
SM: We are planning to move to some place in August. What we are going to do we 
are not at liberty....we are moving to Connecticut. 
EG: Oh. do you have family in Connecticut'? 
SM: No, just where we want to go. 
EG: Oh. I've never been to Connecticut. 
SM: I was stationed there for 12 years. All of our kids were bom there and so we 
thought we might go back. 
EG: Yeah. I knew vou were in the service. You v- A : * - :e Va
 8- "? 
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SM: Yeah. 
EG: How many years were you in the Navy? 
SM: 20 years. 
EG: 20 years....whew! I was in the Army for a linle while. Then they discharged me 
because of a football injury. 
SM: (inaudible response) 
EG: Oh well, it was a good experience. 
SM: Let's get started then. He's not here. 
EG: Okay. Well, let me slide around here. .Are you comfortable? 
SM: Yes.' 
EG: Okay. Now. while we're talking about this, Fm going to ask you questions. 
SM: Okay. 
EG: If you bring the response up. then I can clarify on it, otherwise I can't add to it. 
Because....I will tell you this: There have been a few complaints made by made 
some of the younger people at your church, and. because they are juveniles. I 
can't lead you in questioning. 
SM: Okay. I can ask you questions? 
EG: You can ask me all the questions you want? 
SM: You can deal with it? 
EG: Yes. 
SM: Okay. 
EG: Um. for starters, do you have any questions before we get started? 
SM: No. 
EG: What I would like to talk to you about is that we've had....I have to pull this 
up....at least five girls that go to the church that have made some accusations 
asainst you. 
SM: Okay. 
EG: And what I would like to do is just kind of get your sice of the story on those 
accusations, find out if they are false. If they are false, proving that and going 
Irom there. 
SM: Okay. 
EG: One of the girls is a Tera Begay. 
SM: Aifrmative response. 
EG: Can you tell me anything about her? 
SM: UIL she is a member of the church. She is Navajo and she is. uh. ummm....I 
don't....she's brought a lot of Navajo kids to the Church of Christ. I love her like 
my own daughter. 
EG: Okay. How long has she been going to church there? 
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EG: Now, you said you came here in 199]. Where did you come here from? 
SM: Vernal Utah. 
EG: Vernal. And were you a pastor there in Vernal? 
SM: Yes. 
EG: How long were you a pastor? 
SM: Preacher. Preacher. 
EG: Preacher? Sorry. 
SM: That's alright. I'd been preaching there from 1989 :o 91. 
EG: 89 to 91? ^ 
SM: (Affirmative response) 
EG: Now you said that Tera brought a lot of the Navajo.... 
SM: She taught and invited them and they started worshipping.... 
EG: When I talked to Tera. she told me that you had done a lot of things for her 
family. 
SM: Yeah. I have. If they need diapers. I buy them diapers. If they need food. I buy 
them food. If they need money to go to the rez. I give money to go to the res. But 
not just her family. 
EG: Right. You do that with a lot of the families. 
SM: All the families. 
EG: Okay. Kow many teens...kids.. .do you have going to the church? 
SM: Probably about 60. 
EG: 60? Whew. That's a lot. Now. when I talked to Tera she told me about some 
incident that happened now...I can't even remember....a couple of years ago. 
may be....may be last summer.... that happened on a camping trip. There were 
some accusations made. 
SM: Yes. 
EG: And she kind of touched base on that a little bit. 
SM: It was investigated and it was found false. I don't know....I never did find out 
what the actual accusation was. and DCFS was coing that. Okay? 
EG: Okay. 
SM: .And I don't even know how they got involved in it. so I never did rind out exactly 
what it was. It was just son of dropped. I don't know who did the investigation 
here....a policeman here did the investigation on .r. I know that, so vou 20tta 
be.... 
EG: So. it was a Moab police officer that did the investigation? 
SM: Somebody right here. You got it in your records. .And it was false.... no thing 
happened, but I guess somebody accused me of something and I don't know if 
that is what's going on right now again, but. < in-j'rjv? :~^*i Viat's j cng on 
naht now a2ain because some of the accusations :hc~ rri-r ?' . „ a:? .-rutins, ^ou 
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know, the parenis I'm not sure who's doing it. but yeah, it was investigated by 
your policeman right here and nothing came out of it....and that was a few 
years... 
EG: But it was supposed to have happened in Salina. 
SM: It was on a camping trip. We took down about....ever/ year we have a camping 
trip in Salina. Utah. The Churches of Christ meet there and I am one of the 
speakers on that thing, and so...the (inaudible) camping trip, and so I brought 
about....I don't knew how many kids....my wife and I and some other people 
took a bunch of kids from Moab. I'm not even... .there must have been 10 kids 
from here. 
EG: How many days did you camp? 
SM: Three days. 
EG: Three days? 
SM: It is always on Memorial Day... .nor Memorial Day... .Labor Day weekend. 
September. 
EG: Were you ever contacted by anyone with DCFS or law enforcement out of the 
Salina area? 
SM: No. 
EG: Just our area? 
SM: (Affirmative response.) 
EG: So nothing ever happened with you and Tera and the accusations that were made 
there'? 
SM: No. nothing happened. Did she say something happened? 
EG: No. no. She said nothing happened and what she said was that one of the other 
giris that was going to :he church made up some accusations and made up some 
stories. 
SM: And that's...yeah....so that's one of my problems, but I guess we will get into 
that as we keep going. 
EG: .Alright. What about Treasa John? 
SM: Trisha. 
EG: Trisha. But her name is spelled Treasha. 
SM: It's pronounced Trisha. 
EG: Okay. How well do you knew her? 
SM: She is a Little Navajo girl....I don't know when she started coming. I can": 
remember how she started coming, but she started coming also and her sister 
started coming....wait a minute....now which one we are talking about? 
EG: Now there's a Treasha.... 
SM: (inaudible name) Latisha, and Treasha. Wh:cu one i:- v •;" i v ;c-:° 
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EG: Treasha. 
SM: Okay. She's the oldest one. Now I don't know her that well. The younger girl, her 
sister started coming first. Her sister was really involved in the church and 
Treasha was just son of like a sort of problem child. She wasn't living with her 
mother here in Moab. She was living out at the rez. Then she came up and staned 
living with her mother and then she staned coming to church, but she was really 
son of shy and quiet and laid back and so. the way I treat all the kids in our 
congregation with hugs and kisses and things like that, she was son of stand 
offish on that, and I think....and so I can imagine....that she has maybe 
complained. You know. I didn't really even think about it that much, but she was 
always son of stand-otfsh. but I would still son of hug her and kiss her. you 
know. and....and and...yeah. I see....that I probably scared her. 
EG: Okay. You said that you give the kids hugs and kisses. Can you claniy that with 
me° 
SM: Sure. Uh....uh...rm a Christian. Okay. I'm not (inaudible word). I do what :he 
Bible says. And the Bibie says :o greet one another with a holy kiss. That is in 
Romans 16:16. I don't knew if you know your Bibie at all. 
EG: A little bit, not much. 
SM: What's a holy kiss0 Weil, back in those days, the first century. I don't know 
exactly what a holy kiss was. I imagme it was a kiss on the cheek or something 
like that. To us today, a holy kiss can be...to me anyway....it can be a hug. you 
know. If I come up and greet you like that, that's a holy kiss. 
EG: Right. Okay. 
SM: To me and you. 
EG: Okay. 
SM: Okay. Member of our congregation. I hug them, you know. And a lot of them 
hug me back and we kiss each other on the cheek, or some even kiss on the lips. 
Uh. it's not the like I kiss my wife kind of kiss, or anything like that, not with the 
tongue and stun. Anyway. I heard something about I'm putting my tongue down 
some kids' mouths and stuif like that and that's another 
EG: Uh... 
SM: that I heard. Okay. Ma] be that's something you are going to tell me about, but 
it is not anytmng d^e tr.ac. L"h....so. I crrve the bus for the church....one oizhe 
vans. We've got :v.c \ans and I drive the vans to pick up the teenagers and pick 
up the little kids. And -A hen the kids come on. I give 'em a hug. I'm sitting in m> 
driver's seat with m> seatbelt on. I gi\e them a hug and. not just the giris. the 
boys too. and a kiss. Not just the little ones...the big ones too....teenagers, all of 
them... .all the way up to... the gamut... women, too. Anc. with Treasha... 
EG: Oh. okay (speaking to someone outside the :;o l4i. 
* - * 
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JR: Hi, Ed. 
EG: How we doing? 
JR: Well, I'm doing great. I apologize for all this. I knew you was working nights and 
when he asked me to be here at 8:00.1 thought 8:00 tonight, and then it dawned 
on me....I asked your mother, I said, when is Eddie working? She said he's back 
on days and I said, oh my goodness. I work with his mother. 
SM: Which one is your mom? 
EG: Connie. Connie Shepard. 
SM: Oh. okay good. ^Directed to J. Raybum): I was jusi explaining to him Treasha 
John is one of the young ladies who....I'm not sure...he hasn't told me what she 
said. but....she's made some kind of accusation against me. You remember 
Treasha? She's Latisha's big sister. Real quiet, dark haired girl. And so I was 
explaining to him why....he asked me some questions about I kiss and hug the 
kids, and so I was explaining to him why I did that and I went to Romans 16:16. 
so he would know what the holy kiss that the Church of Christ religion.... and I 
was explaining to him thai I. that a holy kiss for me. explained to him that it could 
be a handshake with him: it could be a hug; it could be a kiss on the cheek or 
whatever, and now I was telling him about on the bus how.... 
EG: Before we get going, because I am recording this so I don't miss anything. I need 
to make sure that my tape recorder acknowledges that you are here... 
JR: Okay 
EG: Jim Raybum just walked in and you are here for.... 
JR: Sam has asked me to come and be present. 
SM: To hear everything that is being said. That is why Fm going through all this with 
him, and so I explained to him now that I drive the bus....our church bus 
van....and when the kids come on. I give them a hug and a kiss. And Treasha was 
always stand-offish with that, but I would still do it anyway and maybe that is one 
of the problems that I've got with Treasha. but I'm not sure, so that is basically 
where I'm at v%i:h the....is it sergeant? 
EG: No. not yet. Urn.. ..now have you ever had any problems with Latisha? 
SM: Not that I know QL 
EG: Okay. She's never gave you the impression that she was uncomfortable. 
SM: Not reaily. 
EG: Not like Treasha d:c° 
SM: No. not like Treasha. 
EG: Okay. Was there any other girls at the church that gave oil the impression like 
Treasha did as far as being uncomfortable with the hugs and the kisses? 
SM: They haven't reaily approached me....yeah....mc.3 o*::b? \"av?;.^ z:' s are scrt 
of...son of sh> Like that, until you get to know :rcm. Pa\ . . \ z: £>>iiily has been 
7 
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there a long time. I've known her a long time, but she is still sort of shy like that, 
too. It's just a Navajo culture thing. [ think. And see. my culture thing is just the 
opposite. From Black people, we are real affectionate, so that's been a problem 
since I've been here for sure, with a lot of people, not knowing....so me are 
whites, some of the Navajos and some of the....now, I'm not making that as an 
excuse or anything like that, it's just that I notice that some of them are and I 
probably don't have enough sense to know when to back off and to just leave that 
alone, you know and not even try to hug them if they even some of the older 
ladies in the church, ufcu don't like to do that. And when I get that impression from 
them. I...I sort of try to stop doing that, but Fm just son of a hugging kind of 
person and I'm not trying to do anything wrong, Fm just sort of a huggy kind of 
person. 
EG: Have you ever had any of the parents or adult relatives of any of these girls 
approach you and talk about it? 
SM: Yeah. Tera's. Tera Begay's parents.. .said. Sam. you shouldn't be kissing on the 
girls....and so I stopped. 
EG: When did that happen? 
SM: When did they tell me that? 
EG: Yeah. 
SM: Boy. I don't even remember. Probably about a year ago. 
EG: A year ago? 
SM: Maybe. Maybe not that long ago. 
EG: And it was Tera's parents? 
SM: Mmm-huh ( afnrmative response). Did you talk to them in your investigation? 
EG: I talked to Tera's parents. Were they Tera's parents or her aunt that taiked to you? 
SM: Maybe it was her aunt....yeah...maybe it the aunt. 
EG: WelL her aunt said that she talked to you about it. 
SM: Yeah, it was her aunt. That's who it was....ah. what's her name....Shera. 
EG: Shera? 
SM: Yeah. Shera. \\"hen I say parents...they are all there together, you know... .and 
the mom is not there as much as Shera" s there....the mom is at the rez most of the 
time. 
EG: Yeah, when I talked to the mom she said that she was gone quite a bit... 
SM: So. >eah. Shera .s what I mean when I say parents. So. yeah, she told me that I 
shouldn't be kissing on....was it a year ago° I don't think it was that long ago. but 
I know that she said that "Sam. you shouldn't do that. 
EG: It seems like it was. when I talked to Shera. she said it was like a coupie of 
months ago that sk^ taiked to you about that. 
SM: Yeah, probabiy two months ago. I didn't think it was a whole yec - ag:. 
EG: Now. Fa>e Byliily I talked to her and I i.]_ j «.J-.c .J -^ :v._:. Johnson? 
* - * 
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SM: Mmm-huh. (affirmative response) 
EG: How well do you know Angel° 
SM: She's another Christian young lady...teer£ger....l3.1 think. Maybe she's 12. 
Let's see. Her and her two brothers were baptized right around the same time. I 
think. I don't remember exactly when. Jeremiah and Joshua. And she is very 
affectionate. A very affectionate young 3dy. She doesn't....she's never given me 
the impression that she minds the hugs n d kisses. She's never given me that 
impression that she does. She comes up :c me and puts her arms around me and 
others in the church ail the time. Angel I'm talking about. And she's never told 
me that I shouldn't give her a hug or i iiis. So. if she has complained about that. 
I'm not....she's never complained to me ibout it. 
EG: Okay. 
SM I don't know if that's see. you're net :eiiing me any of what the complaints 
are... 
EG: What I am trying to do is find out a little background on some of these girls. A lot 
of times young people, their perception t: things is a lot different than adults. 
SM: Yeah. 
EG: ...and that's what I've got :o find out a ittie bit first before I start asking you 
specific complaints about the complain: ney have filed. But what I'm curious 
about is if they have maybe added some things to it. or changed it a little bit. 
SM: Due to their perception.... 
EG: Right. Because a lot of times a child's trerception is going to be a lot different 
than an adult's, and when they explain .:. they don't explain it as well, so to 
speak. Some of these girls when I taike* to them and asked them to give me a 
statement on it. you know, their sense : : tune is off. Their perception of reality is 
a little different, things like that. So whet I'm trying to do is just to get a basis of 
your perception of these girls before we start going in and asking specific 
questions. 
SM: Okay. Well, this is how I look at Angel Now you said someone else with her. 
JR: Faye. 
EG: Faye. 
SM: Did yon vvant me co sa> something ac-t-t ?a\e. too 
EG: Sure. 
SM: I think I airead> said something about 7:; e 
EG: Yeah, you said she was shy. 
SM: Yeah, she's shy. 
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SM: But she is still a lovey child and. um....so." ion't have anything else to say about 
Faye. I know that she is son of shy. She i:esn't like the hugs and kisses. Even 
though I still do it with her....and I don*: -now....if I do anything in a playilil 
way....to me it's just a loving way. I den": ...I just don't have any other motives 
behind it... 
EG: This is something that you've done alwa; 5 no ugh. right? 
SM: Yeah. This is my personality. Everywhere I"\e been throughout my Navy career, 
ever/ congregation I've ever worked wim n my schooling... that's just me. I'm a 
hugger and a kisser, okay...and. you're r.n::. I understand that some people don't 
like that and my tauit is.. ..my fault is m : I don't have enough sense to know-
when to back oil. I think that's why [*m n rouble about this right now. 
EG: Well see. what I'm trying to find out is i: nothing has actuallv hacpened. 
SM: No. 
EG: Okay. And if the girls claim something barreled, then I have to investigate that. 
SM: I understand. But if they claim something lappened, nothing's happened. 
Nothing's happened. Except some hugs 2zi kisses. Now if that's what their 
complaints are, then. yeah. I'd admit that _ es. I did do this. But I haven't....I'm 
getting ahead of myself.. ..but I can just ztl; ou right now that I haven't touched 
these girls in their privates or anything like nat if any of them complained about 
anything like that. 
EG: Did anybody accuse you of doing that? 
SM: Rumors, man. There's rumors going arc _-; town that the Church of Christ has 
got a sex fiend over there. 
EG: Really? 
SM: Rumors, ya know. I heard a rumor about i:w I raped Tera Begay. That's another 
rumor. 
EG: Yeah, actually I heard that rumor after ;-: - said something to me. I heard about 
that rumor. I naven't hear;: an> rumors. :;.. -^h....but I've been out of town for a 
tew days, too. 
SM: I meant to ask you that. How did ycur n:;er come out? 
EG: He is doing him better. The> ha\e ta\er. -_- D if the ventilator and hopefully he 
will out of ICL". 
SM: Where is he? 
EG: He is in St. Mary's. So. hcpeiiilly he czr.:-. :e:ter and get home. Urn...now. 
going back you said that you picked thesr -..as up in a church van... 
SM: Mmm-huh. (afiirmative response) 
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EG: Did you used to have a blue car? 
SM: Yep.'Still do. 
EG: You sxiil have a blue car? 
SM: My son's got it. 
EG: Okay. And you also had a red car. 
SM: My wife's car. 
EG: Okay. 
SM: Do you use the red car :o pick these girls up? 
EG: Sometimes, not usually. Usually my blue car. ^'LLZ other vehicles do you use to 
pick these kids up1 
SM: The church vans and my two cars, that's it. 
EG: Now the church van. is one of them like l bus? 
SM: Yes. 
EG: So there's a white van. the fail size van. and the r.c bus. 
SM: Mmm-huh. (Affirmative response.) 
EG: Let's see here....what it is. I'm going to do is I'z. going to go through some oi 
the giris...some of the girls that I asked you ab:*z. :hey.... 
SM: Excuse me. Is it those five girls mainly the ones :za:....? 
EG: Oh no. no. What it is.. .these girls here...I've receded information from these 
girls. 
SM: Okay. 
EG: Not necessarily a complaint, but some informal::z. And. what I'm going to do is. 
I'm just kind of going to go through each girl t in I have talked to. kind of get an 
idea of what these girls are like in church and hc~" :hey act around you and those 
kind of things. 
SM: Okay. 
EG: .And then I'll go back and. you know, kind of :c -:n base on some of the other 
information. There were some of the girls that r_i en't reported anything. They've 
actually....we interviewed some girls that, that r erything was fine. One of 
them was Dezera Hopkins.... 
SM: Mrnm-uh. <'.Affirmathe response") 
EG: Now. how do you know Dezera? Actuaih Dezen and Aiieen. Ailv. 
SM: Ailv 
EG: How long have they been !n the church? 
SM: I don't know how long. It's been a few years. 
EG: A few years0 
SM: A few years, yeah. 
EG: Okav. What are those zs:s like? 
) . S,*^) 
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SM: Loving girls, you know. They both are....they live by DLT, down the street, down 
that little road.. ..DLT Auto, and I pick them up and they always give me a hug 
when they get on the bus and they always give me a hug when they get off. A hug 
and a kiss. I don't initiate it. They just come up to me and give it to me before 
they get on and off. They are usually at services every time the door is open. 
EG: Okay. Now, when you say a hug and a kiss. It is a hug and a kiss on the cheek or a 
hug and a kiss on the lips. 
SM: Like I'm standing here on my feet they'll walk over to me and....like you're 
sitting....you're me....they'll walk over to me and do like that that's a hug and 
a kiss. It's not that lip thing with them....it's just a....that's what I mean by a hug 
and a kiss. 
EG: Okay. 
SM: .And that's about all I can say about Dezzi and her sister. They're good kids. 
EG: Now, there are a couple of new giris that have just started going. One of them 
Tessa McKee. Yeah. I think she just maybe started going for a week and then, 
maybe stopped. 
SM: I don't even know her. 
EG: Okay. She's a little blonde haired girl. She started going with....I believe that she 
started going with Ally0 
SM: Oh. I think I know who you are talking about. No. she didn't start coming with 
My....well, maybe she did....but it is another little giri....uh...her mother works 
at the airport....what's that little girl's name. She lives on Kane Creek. 
EG: Okay, that's where Tessa lives. 
SM: Yeah, and see, Tessa started coming with this little girl and I think they....you 
got any little girl's names there? 
EG: Umm.. 
SM: She only came a couple of days....a couple of times and I took her up to Conez 
with me. too. when we went up to Conez. and she is a new girl. She... 
EG: Brittany. 
SM: Brittany! That's it. Brittany Long. 
EG: Brittany....Tessa, I think came with Brittany the first time. And then Brittany sort 
of started coming with .Ally. But. but Brittany didn't come with .Ally. The way I 
got invoKed with Brittany is that her mother I do a lot of work for the schools. 
here. And the principle at the elementary school has me come over and talk with 
kids from time to time, troubled kids that are having problems. Brittany happened 
to be one of these kids. Ker mother wanted to get Brittany involved in some 
spiritual activities and so as we talked during one of these.... there is a whole little 
program they've got at the program to do that, with counselors and everything 
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Brittany and her mother's boyfriend. Five c: us. I think. The result of that talk 
from 9:00 o'clock until 11:00 o'clock in ±e morning during the week, was that 
Brittany would start coming to church se r ies with us. I said I would pick her up 
in the van like I pick up all the other kids. 5-:. that was on a weekday and so that 
next Sunday I started picking her up. Like i l kids....when they get on the bus I 
give them a hug and a kiss and I just automatically started doing that with 
Brittany and she didn't show me any proc.e:rs with anything, so.. ..she only rode 
with me maybe three times, because then she stopped. And Tessa came one time 
and I'm sure. I remember now. Tessa was iz :he back of the van and I said. 
'Tessa, come on up and gi\'e me a hug." ir.i she wouldn't do it. And I said. 
"Okay, that's alright, you don't have to c: thai. Maybe as you get :o know me 
better you'll do that.'' I remember saying ::JL: to her when she was in the back of 
the van. Then as we rode on that day eveztmily she moved up a little closer and 
was talking to me. but that was about the iny relationship I had with her that I 
can remember. If she said I've done someizzig else.... 
EG: Oh. no. She didn't. 
SM: That's how Tessa got involved with the church, through Brittany. .And Brittany is 
a new girl and so maybe again. I don't kr.:*v if she....I guess she is not one of the 
ones who have complained, you didn't have her name, but maybe my affection 
towards her was more than she was used :: so fast because she didn't know me 
reaily. I don't know. I don't know what the complaints are. 
EG: Okay. Well....okay....so me of the complies....and I can't tell you each girl has 
actually complained. 
SM: That's fine. It doesn't matter. 
EG: What we've got is on different occasions i: different times, different girls have 
come forward and said that when you ga*e them a kiss that you put your tongue 
in their mouth. Okay? 
SM: Hmmm. 
EG: Umm. can you think of any reason these r r j would say something like that? 
SM: Maybe because I'\e got big dps and die,. ~SJ: :hink it's my tongue. I den': even 
know. I don't even kiss them that hard :c: :_-em"to even feel that way. 
Umm...if....you know, I can probabiy :hr_-: :>£ three girls that I even kiss on the 
lips...that I did....I don': even do that ar/Tr.:re. Because I figured some of these 
were some of the complaints mat maybe itrr.e of :he kids were making. And that 
was Ange!...ummm....Angel. .Ally, and rr.r-re Brittany when she first came that 
first time...and Treasha. you know, but Treisha didn't like it so I just stopped 
even trying to kiss her at ail. Treasha. bu: -T- Latisha. I would maybe kiss like 
that, but that's about the only giris that I ;ir. think of and if that is the complaint, 
that I was putting my tongue down their ~ : .ith. n c . i t wasn't like *7M: ?r all. It's 
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EG: Now. I had one girl who claims that chis trip to Cortez....one of the girls on the 
trip claims that she saw you touch another girl on the bun. 
SM: (Laughter). No kidding? 
EG: Okay? And what they said was that they saw this girl getting something out of 
one of the vans and while you were doing this, you put your hand up her skirt or 
something like that, okay? Now. there several girls on this trip to Conez and. I've 
already talked to the girl who is supposedly the one you touched her bun. She 
denied any of it. She said that nothing like that happened. Okay? Have you heard 
anything about that trip to Conez? Anything said about that? 
SM: Not a one. Not a one because nothing happened on that trip to Conez? 
EG: Do you remember who all went on that trip with ycu? 
SM: Girls and boys or just the girls? 
EG: Uh. yeah. .All the kids that went. 
SM: Okay. Faye. (inaudible words) Faye. Ally. Brittany...Faye. Ally. 
Brittany....Tera...Faye. .Ally. Brittany. Tera... .let me get the boys. TJ. Brando 
and Hank. Joshua, and there is one more boy my wife....and my wife, and I 
think there was one more boy and one more girl. I think there was like 10 kids 
and mv wife and I made 12. So. I missed one boy and one girL I think. 
EG: WhoisTJ0 
SM: Tyrone Applegate or Lopez. 
EG: Tyrone Lopez? 
SM: I think his last name is Appiegate. 
EG: Okay, and Brando? 
SM: Something Brando... .Kance. 
EG: And Joshua Johnson? 
SM: Angel's brother. 
EG: Okay. 
SM: .And .Angel. Did I say .Angel? 
EG: Nope. You said All>. 
SM: Ally was there, but I think Angei was there too, so she's the other giri. .And :here 
was one more boy. ^~hat boys did I name? 
EG: Hank. TJ and Joshua. 
SM: I chink there's one more boy. But they would know. But whatever that 
accusation was that I touched someone's bun and put my hand up her skin, that's 
a false one. I didn't do that. 
EG: Now some of these giris indicated that they were told, because this was some 
type of graduation or something like that, they were told to wear long dresses. 
SM: Yeah. 
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SM: No. (Laughter) No way, man. Uh....I try tc :each these kids modesty. I tell them 
not to even wear shorts to church services, azd especially when they are going out 
of town with me. I want them to wear long iresses and that's what I told them all 
to wear long dresses. Faye...Faye.... won't *ear a dress. You don't know Fave 
that well. Fave Bylilly. But Fave, Fave was vrth us....did I say Faye? Faye....I 
love Faye, but I wanted all the girls to wear .cng dresses. Faye said well Sam. I'm 
not going if I gotta wear a dress. I said well raby you just come on with your 
pants, because I wanted to go with her friends. So. welL no, I wouldn't even tell 
kids to wear short dresses. I wouldn't tell zr.t~ that because I don't teach that. So, 
no. if they said that I told them to wear short iresses. that no. they had the wrong 
perception of that or their imagination was r:rning wild with them. 
EG: Now. with the boys. The girls have already ::id me that there was kiss on the lips 
or the cheeks. Do you do that with the boys ison 
SM: Yes. 
EG: Because some of the boys have said, "no. wt don't get kissed on the lips, we ge: 
handshakes."' 
SM: No. they all get hugs....or they do now....I guess I have changed a little bit in 
time. You know. I'm growing more wiser e^  ery day and my relationship with 
people and I guess now I mainly do give the toys....cause see, we've got so many 
kids now. I mean when we only had a few k:is. everybody got a hug the boys 
and ever/body. But now. you got a 15 passenger bus with 20 kids on it and they 
are all trying to get off when we drop them : f and it's hard to get around in that 
thing, so it's hard to even reach them when trey finally get off, and so I guess I 
mainly do give them a shake now. especially me boys....and even some of the 
girls, you know. They just can't get over tc zzs driver. And Fm over here in my 
seat and the door's over there and you got kics all on the front row, and so I just 
sort of reach over now and like I said, some :f the girls just reach over and hug 
me like that, but that's about all we touch, as :hey are getting off. 
EG: One of the girls I talked to indicated that on :;us bus. She said the bus. It couid 
have been the van. I guess. Does the bus . is :here an alley in between the seats 
where the girls walk? Where the kids walk i:wn between the seats? 
SM: The bus. yeah. 
EG: Okay. There's not in the van. It's in the bus What :he> said was. well, actually 
this girl in particular, told me about an inc:ce-t when Tera was walking down the 
aisle and you slapped her bun. 
SM: Yeah. v\eil....you knov*. I'm not going to zzr:: her perception of what she saw. 
Okay. The kids. I piay with the kids and if" rut them on their leg or on their butt 
like that, it is nothing like I'm trying to fee. ir.rir butt, it'- jus* a hi:. 
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SM: Because, yeah.. ..yeah, you know these are like my kids, you know. I mean that's 
what they are. I look at them like my own kids. I treat them like my own kids, 
and, uh... J wouldn't do anything to hurt any of these kids. They are like my own 
kids. If that's what she saw me do....if I did that....and I won't deny that I may 
have done something like that, but it wasn't to try :o feel her behind or anything. 
EG: Okay. Do remember doing that to any of the kids? 
SM: Not specifically, no. I don't make a habit of doing something like that, 
now....so....if Tera said I did that, then I probably did it, but it wasn't something 
that....you said Tera said I did that? 
EG: Uh. no. actually I said that one of the kids that knows Tera told me about it. 
SM: Oh. And did you ask Tera about it? 
EG: I did and she was....Tera was a little apprehensive when I talked to her. So. I'm 
getting....Tera was actually interviewed by a DCF5 worker who came down from 
Vernal and I am waiting to get with that person arc talk to her about it. 
SM: Okay. Well if Tera said that.. ..and again. I'm sire Tera knows, that it wasn't 
anything meant by it if she says I did it. She knows me well enough to know that. 
Some of these newer girls. I don't know if it was a newer girl who said that, but 
some of them may not really know me because they haven't been around me. 
EG: Like I said, we've had a few girls come forward with some complaints. I've 
talked to several girls, so I am trying to piece everything together. Uh...I wouid 
have had this done last week, but nature got in the way. Urn. 
SM: Excuse me. Is that the...just so I don't lose my nrnd...is that the...the big 
complaint? 
EG: Tat big complaint that we've got right now is the tongue kissing. There are five 
girls that have come forward and said that you either put your tongue in their 
mouth or tried to. 
SM: Okay. 
EG: Alright. So what I'm trying to do is find out if these girls talked to each other or if 
their perception of things is a little different. Now. you indicated that Tera's aunt 
approached you and asked you not to kiss the girls? 
SM: Mmm-huh. (Affirmative answer) 
EG: Did she ask you not to kiss the girls on the lips or on the cheek or....? 
SM: I thmk she was saving on the lips, cause see. I I.. ..I I hug ana kiss Shara and 
Bernadette the same way whenever I go in their homes. But I hug them and 
we...we push faces together. And e\en the grandmother. Virginia, the same way. 
uh....his wiie. ..I see her at church e\ery...I grab her and we son of put faces 
together like that. So. when she told me that....to my recollection she was saying 
don't kiss them on the lips. She wasn't saying den": hug them. Ir j-o*:: f^ :.:em I 
do it when we are on the bus I do it, and tho c > -': s::\: ve ' -




Interview with Sam Matthews 
Page 16 
am in their home and I kiss and hug them before I leave. They don't say anything. 
It's not a lip thing. And I think that time. I was kissing them.. .they were just that 
close to me.. .the Begay family had been reai close to me for a long time, and so I 
guess I was kissing them a peck on the lip just like I kiss my granddaughter. My 
granddaughter is 5 years old and we hug and kiss on the lips all the time. Just like 
my wife and I. Okay. And so I sort of maybe get carried away with some of the 
kids who aren't my physical children and I need to be very careful about 
that....I'm beginning to learn through experience and wisdom and hindsight or 
whatever you want to call it. 
EG: You've never been accused before? 
SM: No. 
EG: No? So you've never had this kind of problem....just like in the last couple of 
months this started? 
SM: Yeah. The problem yeah, but I've been doing this forever, but this is the first 
complaint that I've known about it. Again, when I say complaints, I'm sure that 
there are members e\en in the congregation :hat have not liked me to do that, and 
they probably said something, and maybe even to me about it and I just son of 
blew it off maybe to not having any sense. Uh. but never to the police kind of 
thing. 
EG: When you were in Vernal did you ever have any accusations up in Vernal? 
SM: Not accusations like....when, you know again, nothing like that to the police, but 
I have always done this. I've always loved kids. .And you've got the girls up there. 
the same thing. I love them. I hold them. I hug 'em and what were some girls I 
can't even think of her name now.... Harrison... Harrison.... there's a girl up there 
named Harrison....Nicole. Nicole Harrison. And I treated her really, just like I 
treat my own kids and I think that that caused a problem with some of the 
members there. Again, nothing that went to :he police or anything like that and 
there was other kids up there the same way. so....I guess that's my problem 
there....if you want to call it a problem....is that I'm too loving....too affection...I 
show my affection too much. maybe too fas: 2nd not being sure that peopie 
understand what I'm doing. I don't know hew to better say that. What I guess I'm 
trying to-say is that in my heart, officer. I den't have any motives...any ulterior 
motives of molestation. .And that's what I :hmk this thing boils down to: Is Mr. 
Matthews trying to moles: these kids thai get on and off the bus with him or come 
to our church services? No. I don't ha\e these motives. Appearances though 
might, to some people, make it look that wa> Maybe even to the kids themselves, 
so that's something that I'm learning and :t .s taking me a long time to learn it 
because it is probably one of my problems. I don't learn things to fast like this. 
But I'm learning. 




Interview with Sam Matthews 
Page 17 
SM: Yeah. 
EG: Where did you do this before Vemai? 
SM: What? Preach? 
EG: Yeah. 
SM: I didn't. Vernal was the first place. Well, when I say I've been doing this for a 
long time. I mean I've been loving people for a long time. Twenty years in the 
Navy. man. ever/ congregation I go to. I love people. I hug people. I kiss people. 
That's just me and....and....I've never gotten in trouble for it though, until really 
now. I guess I should call this trouble. 
EG: Well, this could be trouble, but what I'm trying :o determine is if there has been a 
crime committed or if it is just some behavior that some people may feel is 
inappropriate. Just because some people think something is inappropriate doesn't 
necessarily mean it is a crime. 
SM: I agree with that. 
EG: So what I've got to do is determine whether or not a crime has been committed. 
And. at that point in time if I do determine a crime has been committed, then we 
do a whole different channel of events. I ' m these girls that have come 
forward.. ..can you think of any reason why they would make things up or if they 
would things up why they would direct it at you? 
SM: Uh... .well... .some of them probably can do it out of jealousy. I might treat some 
of the girls even better than I treat some of the other ones or some of the boys 
better than I treat....for instance, the Begay family. Them. I've really gone over 
and beyond in my treatment of the Begay family since I've known them. The 
Byiiily family. I have gone over and beyond m> treatment of the Byiiily family. 
Why do I treat them that way? Because they are poor in my eyes and they need 
things, and so I abundantly try to btess them with what they got. And it's because 
of the kids. The kids have become Christians. The kids worship with us. they have 
become baptized. They have become Christians. The parents aren't Christians. So, 
the parents are being... the whole family is being blessed because of these kids. 
How are they being biessed0 God is using me and my wife to bless them through 
material things...whatever it is that we do for them. Abundantly on some families. 
Other families like Treasha. anything her mom or dad ever wanted I would give 
them. I wash their clothes. 1 take them :o the laundromat. I've bought them milk 
and diapers and you name it....to bless their family also, but maybe not as 
abundantly as other families, and so the kids see this. They see what's going on. 
They are with me a lot of times Ln the \an as I'm going here or going there. I drop 
certain people off nrst. .And she doesn't want to get dropped off first, and so she 
gets made with me. and I take somebody else heme later. 
EG: Whv does she set mac? 
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SM: And I'm saying maybe jealousy or envy or something, you know, that's the only 
thing I can figure that she must have in her mind or maybe that's just her 
personality. I don't know. You asked me why would any of them possibly ever 
say anything. I'm trying to give you reasons why. Sometimes I take kids out for 
ice cream. I take them to Moab Diner and have ice cream. I take them to 
McDonald's and have ice cream. I take them to Maverik and let them buy ice 
cream. And I don't always take all the kids. I might drop some of the kids off 
first. .And they're kids and that's money, you knew. I've only got a limited 
amount of money so I keep some of the favorite kids with me and drop some of 
the other ones off and they might hear about it and they get angry about it and I 
don't know if it is a way to get back at me or something like that. 
EG: Who are some of the favorite kids? 
SM: It depends. It depends on who I got in the van. And I don't always do this. I'm 
saying sometimes....sometimes I rake the whole group. I have taken 20kids to 
McDonald's, man. and bought them all ice creams, so it's but the favorites are 
the Bylilly's, the Begays. umm....the favorites....the Bylilly's. the Begays....if 
they are in the van. They are not always with me. So there might be some others 
now. Felicia uh 
EG: What's Felicia's last name? 
SM: But anyway Felicia and her linle brother and her little sister and some other little 
bitty kids now that are starring to ride with me and I don't know some of their last 
names and they ride and I keep them a lot of times. Now we're picking up a lot 
more Navajo kids on Walnut Lane and sometimes they stay with me, but I don't 
think these are the ones who are complaining either, so I don't know. 
EG: How linle? 
SM: They go all the way down to three years old. 
EG: Because all of the complaints that we have had come in. the girls were between 
the ages of say 10 and 1-i. 
SM: So. that's the only thing that I can think of on why they would want "to say-
something bad about me is because maybe there is some jealousy there or some 
envy there, that I am treating other kids better than I am treating them. 
EG: Did you e\er call an> of these giris "my girl°" 
SM: Yeah. 
EG: Okay, who? Which of the girls have you said thai to? 
SM: Tera, Angei. Sa<- annah... 
EG: Savannah? 
SM: She doesn't live here anymore. 
EG: Oh. okav. 
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SM: Probablv all of them. Uh. I think....if vou ru: -is: a label on one 1 would sav it 
would be Tera being my girl. 
EG: Why is that? 
SM: Like I told you. I don't if it was before you gc: here. I told you that she was the 
first Navajo that starred brining all the Navajc kids.. .boys and girls.. .and she's 
just always been a favorite of mine because she's really done good work here in 
the Navajo kids... .and. I just love her family. y:ii know. 
EG: My understanding is Tera has been going the iczgest out of all these guys? 
SM: So. she's sort of like number one of all the kiis :here and. uh. and that I would do 
anything for. I would do anything for any of zztzi though, so see, that's what 
they might not understand. So even though I zr-e her a "my girl" title. I don't 
really treat her that much different than anybccy else. If those kids need clothes, 
man. I take them and buv them clothes. Anv ere of :henx All thev gotta do is tell 
me and I can...and if I had...and I hope I den": have to do any of this...go to 
court or anything like that sruffi but if I had :c. I could get you 20 kids as 
references: "Oh yeah. Mr. Matthews came in:: my house and he bought me shoes, 
and he did this for me and he did this for me.** ~vhy did I do those things? 
Because I love the kids and they don't have azi I do. I'm a retired Naval officer. 
They been giving me all the bucks and you krev churches have given me bucks 
to preach here. What else am I going to dc whh my money besides share with 
other people, and that's what I do. 
EG: That's very commendable. There's not too r^zy people in the world who would 
do that. 
SM: The bottom line for me. Officer Guerrero. is ~jr_s: Mmmm....I don't have any 
motive to molest anybody. .Anything that locks like it. is not it. 
EG: Okay. 
SM: I understand how it could look like it. but it is not it. 
EG: As Fve said before, uh. there hasn't been any accusations of molestation. It is 
merelythe kissing, and some of the girls have :ome forward and said like I 
explained to you before about the tongue, and :hat has caused them some concern. 
SM: Okay?^: 
EG: Some. uh. a little emotional distress, so they hive come forward with this 
compiaint and I am trying :c find out if it is "\e*:t." if it is substantiated. 
SM: It's procedure. 
EG: Right. 
SM: So what Vd be more than willing to do to heir iiong with this is. for those girls 
who have made that complaint. I wouid be filing to go to them and their parents 
and aoolosize to them for even making it see— 'ike I did anvihina like that. 
zf - K'?> 
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EG: Well, the only problem we have with that right now is that because there is an 
active investigation going OIL you really can't talk :o any of these kids about this 
because if you say something that you interpret as any type of threat, or anything 
like that, it could be considered witness tampering. 
SM: Gotcha. 
EG: So, I would suggest that you don't talk to these girls, and, after the investigation is 
done, when it is all said and done and everything is over, then if you want to talk 
to thenL it's fine. 
SM: I can apologize to their parents if they perceive that I.... 
EG: But while the investigation is going OIL ah. you can't talk to the parents or any of 
the kids because that could be construed as witness tampering and. we don't want 
that to happen. 
SM: Got it. And. uh. you'll continue your investigation for how long? How long will 
this....? 
EG: What'll happen is. the way the investigation work :s. when I gather all the 
evidence and talk to the people involved and. based on the evidence, we make a 
determination of whether or not a crime has been committed. If a crime has not 
been committed, then we close the case as unfounded. If we.... 
SM: You will let me know when that happens? 
EG: Yes. 
SM: But it could be months, still... .what do you think? 
EG: Um. no. no. this won't drag out for months. What will happen is. that depending 
what they do with me as far as may patrol duties, that takes me away from the 
investigation, so. it could drag out for a couple of weeks. 
SM: Okay. ~ 
EG: But. in the meantime, if... .you just go about your own business as usual, and if I 
need to get a ho id of you again, I will get a ho la of you and talk to you some more 
about the questions if I get any other evidence that comes up. 
SM: Okay. 
EG: Have you got any other questions? 
SM: I don't**. 
EG: Or anything else that you'd like to add? 
SM: JinL did you have anything? I think that I've said anything that I can say. I gave 
you my bottom line and that's where I'm coming from. 
EG: Well. I appreciate you coming down. What I'm going to do is take the 
information here and finish my investigation. 
SM: Cool. 
EG: We'll go from there. Does that work? 
SM: It works for me. 
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SM: Thank you for your....listening. 
JR: Is that all good writing? 
EG: I couldn't tell you what that says.... 
JR: I don't know what kind of statement you're making there, Eddie. 
EG: See ya later. 
EG: Interview ended at 8:56 a.m. 
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29 October 2003 
Mr. Keith Eddington 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
Child Protection Division 
140 West 425 South (330 —150) 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
Mr. Eddington, enclosed is my Discovery for case #427943. This is being sent to you 
IAW the Seventh District Juvenile Court Order (filed 16 Oct 2003). Ms. Richards has 
already given you most of this material; however, we have added an attachment on 
Trusting God and three of our lessons on Love. 
Hopefully, as you read my statement and compare it with my teachings on love you will 
have a better understanding of how my love caused me to be in this trouble with the 
DCFS. Much of this information was told to the Moab policeman investigating my case. 
It would have been said to your lady DCFS case worker if she had only spoken to me in 
June or July 2001. 
Also, IAW the Seventh District Juvenile Court Order my witness list is as follows: 
1. Everett Bohrer 
2. Yvonne Bliss 
3. Winona McGann 
4. TeraBegay 
Mr. Eddington, at my recent hearing before Ms. Richards and the judge, it was suggested 
that you and I talk on the phone. Since Fm not trained to speak as a lawyer, I will just say 
what I want you to hear in the below paragraphs. 
Mr. Eddington, I really don't want to have Nichole, Tera, and their families taken through 
any more of this mess. Fve admitted my mistakes to them, repented of my sins, and 
asked their forgiveness. Tera has forgiven me. 
Hopeful you are a God fearing man. If that is the case, would you please be merciful unto 
us and dismiss the DCFS substantiated findings against me? For nearly three years I have 
paid dearly for my errors. My heart is right in the sight of God, but my life will never be 
the same. I and my wife and family are more than ready to begin living again. We are 
trusting God! Please call if you have any concerns. 
With love in Christ, 
Samuel A. Matthews 
(860)448-8114 
DIVISION OF 
Child & Family Services 
August 9, 2001 
Mr. Samuel Matthews 
PO Box 1123 
Moab, UT 84532 
Re: Records Request 
Dear Mr. Matthews: 
I have completed your request for records from the Division of Child and Family 
Services. All referrant information has been removed (62A-4a-412). Also, any 
collateral agency information has been removed. All of the victims statements and 
interviews have been withheld. Otherwise this is a true and accurate copy of the record 
we have in our office 
You have the right to appeal the denial of any withheld information. If you choose to 
do so you will need to send a written statement, within 30 days of receipt of this letter, to 
the Chief Administrative officer of the Department of Human Services: Office of Legal 
.Affairs, 120 N 200 W, #319, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 Your appeal must contain 
your name, your mailing address, your daytime telephone number and a statement of the 
relief you seek. 
Copying costs have been waived. Your records are included with this letter. If you 
have any questions, besides appeals, please contact me at 781-4250. 
Sincerely, 
Cindy Birdiell 
Records Specialist/Assistant Caseworker 
A-7 
Ken R. Pat terson, Di rector 
1052 West Market Drive, Vernal , Utah 84078, Phone 435-781-4250. Fax 435-781-4270 
STATE OF UTAH I M ichae l O. Leavi t t , Governor I DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES I Robin Arnold-Wi l l iams, Execut ive D i rec to r 
ROBIN ARNOLD-WILLIAMS 
Executive Director 
Utah Department of Human Services 
isiL 
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT 
Governor 
RICHARD J. ANDERSON 
Director 
Division of Child & Family Services 
iNOvernutsr c±, CKJKJC. 
Samuel Matthews 
P O Box 1143 
GrotonCT 06340 
Dear N[r Matthews: 
Recently you requested an Administrative Hearing regarding Child Protective 
Services referral number's 996371,996375, 996477, 996499, and 996248 
regarding emotional maltreatment only, which named you as the perpetrator. The 
Division of Child and Family Services held an internal review of this case(s) and has 
recommended that the substantiation initially determined in this matter be 
amended to unsubstantiated. Please be advised that the database has been 
amended to reflect the changes in these records. 
CDincereiy, 
Nancy Bender 
Administrative Hearing Tracker 
Division of Child <& Family Services 
120 North 200 West #225 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Utah! 
Where ideas connect™ 
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UTAH STATE SENATE 
319 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 





CARBON, SAN JUAN, 
GRAND, EMERY, KANE and 
WASHINGTON COUNTIES 
566 N.DOVER CIRCLE 
PRICE, UT 84501 
(O) (801) 538-1406 
(H) (435) 637-0426 
FAX (435) 637-0426 
email: mdtnitrich@utahsenate.org 
October 23, 2001 
Mr. Samuel A. Matthews 
P. O. Box 204 
Moab, UT 84532 
Dear Mr. Matthews: 
Thank you for your letter of October 13, 2001, regarding your current situation with the Utah 
Department of Child and Family Services. I have reviewed the material you sent me and have a few 
observations to share with you. 
It is certainly in your favor to have retained counsel who will thoroughly investigate your case and 
capably represent your position regarding the allegations. You also appear to have many friends 
who can be supportive. 
Generally, our office does not become involved in cases where an individual has been charged or 
is under investigation. In fact, we have no jurisdiction over the actions or decisions of DCFS, nor 
can we obtain information regarding your case due to confidentiality constraints. Therefore, I 
suggest that you adhere to your lawyer's advice as you navigate your way during the next few 
months. If you are innocent, the system will work in your favor. 
If I can be of service to you at any time in the future, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Sincerely yours, 
•'7 
Senator Mike Dmitrich 
Senate Democratic Leader 
W 
A-9 
DEPAKTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
www.dhs.state.ut.us 
120 North 200 West #319 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
(801)538-4001 
(801) 538-4016 (fax) 
dirds@hs.state.ut.us 
an equal opportunity employer 
October 24, 2001 
SAMUEL A MATTHEWS 
PO BOX 204 
MOAB UT 84532 
Dear Mr. Matthews: 
The Governor has asked that I respond to your letter to him dated October 13, 2001. I am 
the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services. I understand the concern 
you feel regarding the Child and FamilyServic.es investigations. And, perhaps I can explain 
the process that is now taking place. The Child Protective cases alleging abuse have been 
substantiated and the cases are now closed. You have submitted a request for an 
Administrative Hearing to review the findings in the cases and whether or not the worker 
followed policy and law. This is the best course of action for you to take. The 
Administrative Law Judge will look at the case, hear from both sides, and then make a ruling. 
If you have further questions about the process please feel free to contact the Administrative 
Hearing Tracker for DCFS at (801) 538-4100. 
Sincerely, 
Robin Arnold-Williams, D.S.W. 
Executive Director 
C: Governor Michael O. Leavitt 
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October 24, 2001 
SAMUEL A MATTHEWS 
PO BOX 204 
MOAB UT 84532 
Dear Mr. Matthews: 
The Governor has asked that I respond to your letter to him dated October 13, 2001. I am 
the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services. I understand the concern 
you feel regarding the Child and Family Services investigations. And, perhaps I can explain 
the process that is now taking place. The Child Protective cases alleging abuse have been 
substantiated and the cases are now closed. You have submitted a request for an 
Administrative Hearing to review the findings in the cases and whether or not the worker 
followed policy and law. This is the best course of action for you to take. The 
Administrative Law Judge will look at the case, hear from both sides, and then make a ruling. 
If you have further questions about the process please feel free to contact the Administrative 
Hearing Tracker for DCFS at (801) 538-4100. 
Sincerely, 
Robin Arnold-Williams, D.S.W. 
Executive Director 
G Governor Michael O. Leavitt 
ROBIN ARNOLD WILLIAMS 
Executive Director 
Utah Department of Human Services 
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT 
Governor 
RICHARD J. ANDERSON 
Director 
Division of Child & Family Services 
May 21, 2003 
Samuel A. Matthews 
PO Box 1143 
Groton, CT 06340 
Dear Mr. Matthews, 
I have been asked by Robin Arnold-Williams, Executive Director of the Department of 
Human Services, to respond to your correspondence dated May 12, 2003. 
I would first like to apologize for the delays you have experienced in resolving your 
issues. As you pointed out in your coiTespondence, several important laws have changed 
and the complexity of these changes has significantly slowed the process for a number of 
people. 
I am hoping that at this point in time you hetve received notification that a juvenile court 
hearing has been scheduled based upon your petition. If this is not the case, please feel 




Duane Betournay v 
Constituent Services Coordinator 
Division of Child and Family Services 
DB/ie 
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UHhlb VAN HULLbN 
8TH DISTRICT, MARYLAND 
1419 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 
WASHINGTON, DC 20515 
(202)225-5341 
COMMITTEE ON 
EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE 
OMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 
Congreg* of ttje Untteb B>tatt$ 
Jlousie of &epre£entattoea 
DISTRICT OFFICE: 
51 MONROE STREET, #507 
ROCKVILLE, MD 20850 
www.house.gov/vanhollen 
chris.vanhollen@mail.house.gov 
agijmgton, ISC 20515 
June 4, 2003 
Mr. Samuel A. Matthews 
P.O. Box 1143 
Groton, CT 06340 
Dear Mr. Matthews: 
Thank you for contacting me with respect to your concern over the treatment of 
your Department of Children and Family Services case in Utah. 
There is a long-standing tradition that members of Congress be afforded the 
opportunity to serve their own constituents. Following this tradition, I have forwarded 
your letter to your Representative in Congress, the Honorable Rob Simmons of the 
Second Congressional District of Connecticut. 
I am hopeful that you will be hearing from Congressman Simmons soon. 
Sincerely 
Chris Van Hollen 
Member of Congress 
CVH/chc 
A-13 
18 June 2003 
Mr. Betournay: Thank you for sending the attached letter (dated 21 May 2003). Since receiving your letter 
(nearly a month ago) I've been waiting for someone from the Utah DCFS or Juvenile Court to contact me. 
No one has. I have not received any type of dismissal letter or notification of a scheduled hearing. As per 
your words, I am contacting you so that you can work to resolve these issues. I just want to go on with my 
life Mr. Betournay. 
With love in Christ, 
Samuel A. Matthews 
P. O. Box 1143 
Groton, CT 06340 
(860)448-8114 
http://liome.earthlinknet/-mrsamerica 1 
cc: Governor Michael O. Leavitt 
Robin Arnold-Williams 
A-14 
ROBIN ARNOLD WILLIAMS 
Executive Director 
Utah Department of Human Services 
MICHAEL O.LEAVITT 
Governor 
RICHARD J. ANDERSON 
Director 
Division of Child & Family Services 
June 24, 2003 
Mr. Samuel A. Matthews 
PO Box 1143 
Groton, CT 06340 
Dear Mr. Matthews, 
There seems to be some confusion and I hope that we can clear it up quickly. In the body 
of your letter dated May 12, 2003,1 thought that you had indicated that you had filed a 
petition in Juvenile Court. In contacting the region where you case is being handled, they 
can find no record of any such petition being filed. Without this, you would not have 
received notification of a hearing being scheduled. Perhaps you can check with your 
attorney and find out what has happened to your petition? 
Please feel free to contact me if you find matters are different from what I know to be the 
case at this moment. 
Sincerely, 
Duane E. Betournay 
Constituent Services Coordinator 
Division of Child and Family Services 
C Governor Michael O. Leavitt 
Robin Arnold-Williams 
Uah! 
Where ideas connect™ 
A-15 
190 Mnrth 1(\T\ W*»ct D„ , 00< * c«u T „i„» /"<:+-. TT*~U o/tirvj 
O F F I C E O F T H E V I C E P R E S I D E N T 
W A S H I N G T O N 
June 24, 2003 
Dear Samuel: 
Thank you for contacting Vice President Cheney concerning your legal matters. I am responding 
on his behalf. 
Although the Vice-President appreciates the concern that prompted you to write, the Vice 
President's office does not intervene in legal proceedings not involving the Vice President or his 
office directly. 
Again, thank you for bringing your views to Vice President Cheney's attention. Best wishes. 
Sincerely, 
Cecelia Boyer 
Special Assistant to the Vice President 
for Correspondence 
Samuel A. Matthews 
Post Office Box 1143 
Groton, Connecticut 06340-1143 
A-16 
1 July 2003 
Mr. Duane E. Betournay 
120 N. 200 W. #225 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Dear Mr. Betournay, 
Thank you for you prompt reply to my letter of 12 May 03. We hope this letter will help clear up the 
confusion over my case. 
In July 2001 I received a Notice of Agency Action (NAA) from the Utah DCFS dated 11 July 01 for case 
#999425 (Nicole Harrison) and a NAA dated 13 July 01 for case #996348 (Tera Begay). In the notices I 
was given 30 days to request a hearing to challenge the DCFS initial findings. I complied with the rules and 
requested a hearing. According to the NAA, an Administrative Hearing was to be scheduled and a notice 
was to be sent to me. The hearing was scheduled and delayed by the DCFS for months. Finally, the Utah 
law was changed (May 2002). 
On or about 1 July 2002 I received the enclosed Motions to Dismiss Administrative Hearing (MDAH). 
These motions were approved and my right to an Administrative Hearing by the DCFS became a "legal 
nullity.'* The above two cases were placed under the new law and assigned to the Juvenile Court. Please 
notice the highlighted lines in the Argument section of the MDAH: 
I quote, "Under the Amendments, the Notice previously sent to respondent is essentially a legal nullity, 
because the amendments require that a new Notice be served on the alleged perpetrator of specific forms of 
abuse... This new Notice must describe the rights that the alleged perpetrator has, under the new law, for 
challenging the particular substantiated finding." 
Sir, I've been patiently waiting since these MDAH's for the required "new Notice" to be served on me so 
that I could learn my rights and challenge the particular substantiated finding. Now you write and say you 
thought I had filed a petition in Juvenile Court. You go on to say that the region where my case is handled 
has no record of any such petition being filed. Well sir, that is exactly why I wrote you in the first place. 
The region knows they have not sent me a new Notice as required by the new law. How can I file a petition 
before I've been served a Notice (under the new law)? This is just another form of their delays and covert 
persecution for the Bible teachings I've publicly revealed against the majority religion and other religions 
in the State of Utah (see my web site for the teachings - http://home.eardilink.net/-mrsamo*ical). 
Sir, the delays by the DCFS allowed my lawyers to earn more than $27,000 on this case. The DCFS 
substantiated accusations have kept me from working as a minister since June 2001. All of my savings are 
gone and I am on the edge of bankruptcy. I cannot afford a lawyer; therefore I do not have one. I again ask 
you to have these two cases dismissed so that I can go on with my life. 
Thank you. 
With love in Christ, 
Samuel A. Matthews (USN Retired) 
Copy to: 
Governor Michael O. Leavitt 
Robin Arnold-Williams 
A-17 
ROBIN ARNOLD WILLIAMS 
Executive Director 
Utah Department of Human Services 
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT 
Governor 
RICHARD J. ANDERSON 
Director 
Division of Child & Family Services 
July 15, 2003 
Mr. Samuel Mathews 
POBox 1143 
Groton, CT 06340 
Dear Mr. Mathews, 
Thank you for your letter of July 1, 2003. It shed light on your issues and as a result, you 
will be sent a second notice of agency action. If that does not arrive within a short time 
period, please feel free to call me. I will ensure that you receive what you have 
requested. 
I can be reached at (801)538-4341 or by email at: dbetournay @utah.gov 
Sincerely, 
Duane E. Betournay, M.P.A. 
Constituent Services Coordinator 
Division of Child and Family Services 
State of Utah 
Governor Michael O. Leavitt 
Robin Arnold-Williams A-18 
Utah! 




CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
WASHINGTON, DC 20515 
July 23, 2003 
Mr. Samuel A. Matthews 
P.O.Box 1143 
Groton, Connecticut 06340 
Dear Mr. Matthews: 
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE 
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE 
TRANSPORTATION AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HIGHWAYS AND 
TRANSIT 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND 
MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 
VETERANS' AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH 
Thank you for contacting me regarding your issue with the Utah Juvenile Court. 
I can appreciate the difficulty you are facing. Unfortunately, I am unable to assist you with your 
case. While I do represent the residents of Connecticut's Second Congressional District on 
matters that involve governmental agencies, there is nothing I can do to assist in matters that 
involve litigation. The judicial branch is separate and distinct from the legislative branch in 
which I serve. Although I do, on occasion, receive requests from my constituents to intervene in 
court matters, I have no official authority to do so. 
I am sorry that I am unable to share more favorable news with you at this time. If I can be of 




Second Dist%;t, Connecticut 
RS: slh 
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1 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 
WASHINGTON. DC 20515 
2 COURTHOUSE SQUARE 
5TH FLOOR 
100 RJVER V I E W CENTER 
S U I T E 195 
KOI 051 8 
Case #0105188 
Interview with Tera Begay bv Darla Taylor 
May 22, 2001 
Page 5 
that's how I met Sam. through Talar.da. Ar.d she hasn't been going to church 
lately. I don't know why because her iad d:esn't believe in church. I guess, so 
that's the reason she stopped coming. 
DT: So, she comes to you and said that Sam wants you to be a part of his church? 
TB: Not his church. The Church of Chris:. 
DT: .And vou were 8... 9? 
TB: 9. 
DT: .And vou've 2one to church at the Church :d Chris: since then? 
TB: Yeah. 
DT: What kind of relationship do you have wi:h Sam? 
TB: Close/Like, we're very close. He tads :c ~e. even though I'm young. Um, well 
I got to know him for two years and then I r.arted knowing him better. We have a 
good relationship, like a family relationship, iike a father and daughter thing. 
We're that close. " ' 
DT: You said that the helped your family? 
TB: Yeah, he helped my family. He helped everybody's family a lot. And I don't 
know why they would be doing this :o him right now. 
DT: Okay. Some of the talk is about a hcly kiss. What do you know about that? 
TB: Not much. I didn't really know abor. it. un:u my name. Faye told me something 
about some holy kiss. I didn't know what she meant by that and last night when, 
the police came over asking me abou: that 2zd I told them I didn't really know 
anything about a holy .kiss and something else he said. I forget, but I told him that 
I hadn't heard of that before until he came ur with if Sam touched me or 
anything, which he hasn't. Well, he did. he gives me hugs. .And one time he did 
kiss me and stuck his tongue out and wet ~y lips and that's what I didn't like and 
I told my aunt because my mom really wasr.*: around, she's always at work, so I 
told my aunt about it. Shara. .And ~ sister did too. Carla. told...she saw it toe. 
and I guess my aunt confronted him about that, that we didn't like what he did 
that we were very uncomfortable urd: it. sc like after that, he stopped doing that. 
He just started saying goodbye and a nug ar.d that was it. .And I never seen him 
kiss another girl. I haven't. 
DT: So when did this kiss happen? 
TB: About like two months ago or a month age...I don't know. 
DT: So who was there? 
TB: Me. my sister, my little sister, my brother.. .yeah.. .and he just dropped Faye off 
because Faye live the closest to me. And. I d^n't know, there were h'ke some 
other kids. too. 
A-20 
Case #0105188 " = 0 1 0 5 1 8 8 
Interview with Tera Begay by Darla Taylor 
May 22, 2001 
Page 6 
DT: So where were you? 
TB: At my house. My house. In front of my house. He dropped me off cause he had 
to and drop everyone else off. 
DT: You were in what vehicle? 
TB: The church van. 
DT: So. there's quite a few kids, he dropped you off at your house.. .how.... you're 
going to get off the van and he.... 
TB: He's...welL even- time before I get off the van. I always give him a hug when I 
leave. But that time, he kissed me and I felt very uncomfortable with it and this 
time I told my aunt and my aunt confronted him about it and may aunt told him 
we didn't like what he did. 
DT: You said, and correct me if I have this wrong, you said that when he kissed you. 
he kind of wet your lips with his tongue. 
TB: Yeah. 
DT: So. did he move his tongue around? 
TB: Uh. no. he just like.. .it was like a quick one. 
DT: So, he like, stuck his tongue out and.... 
TB: .. .and wet my lips and put his tongue back in. 
DT: .And you say that's the only time that happened? 
TB: No. I think there was other times, too. but I never told my aunt or my mom 
because I thought I would get him in trouble for (inaudible)....so I didn't tell him. 
I: was like n\e more ;imes he GIG that, out yean, some oi me kids seen ium do 
that, and I was kind of like hoping they would tell somebody because I didn't 
wrant to be the one responsible for telling. 
DT: What other things have happened that have made you uncomfortable? 
TB: That was about it. 
DT: The kissing. 
TB: Yeah, the kissing. 
DT: The other times that it happened, where did it happen? 
TB: In the church van. or like after we dropped like some of the other people off 
like...he asks me to go pick up his car with him at the church building or we ask 
him if we can go with him to pick up his car. cause usually some of the kids don't 
want to go home because he takes us out to eat ice cream at McDonald's and 
then he brings us home, and then like, we just have him take us out for ice cream 
or something. But I remember one dav. I told mv mom I was 20ins to 20 with him 
and there was, I think. Angel and Faye were with me too, and we went to go to his 
car, and we dropped .Angel off and I think.. .yeah, he did kiss Angel too, but I 
didn't know if she was soins to tell her mom. so I left it alone. .-And then he 
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DT: Okay. Have you heard anything from any of the other kids about what happens on 
the trips? 
TB: Um-hnh. No. I haven't. 
DT: Okay. 
TB: Cause usuaUy nothing happens because none of the kids are alone with Sam. if 
that's what you mean by said or about anything else, because Sam's wife was 
there and we have other adults there, or if he did do something to somebody or 
some other girl or anything. I don't know that because I never see him alone with 
any other girl. 
DT: Okay. Alright. To recap, we have the five kissing incidents which may you 
uncomfortable either in the van or in.... 
TB: ....in his car. 
DT: And then the time he put his tongue out. 
TB: Mmm-hmh. 
DT: And then the slap on the butt. Is there any other thing? 
TB: No. There was one about Saiina. (inaudible)....and she said to my mom, I guess 
she said to my mom that, well I heard my mom talk, because she's been saying 
that Sam did something to me up in Saiina. but he didn't because we had other 
people.. .because Bryant would be in the tent, and there'd be me, Wanda, Sam 
sleeping at the end. that's because his wife left. And he would sleep in his own 
tent with his wife, until one night he slept in our tent and I was wondering why he 
would sleep in our tent, cause he has his own tent. And none of us girls wanted 
iHTTl tv 3iCz;Z IT* CUT wwllc... >vc '*Verc iirvC, W.ldL oTC ^WJU uoiJQg .!><±m. n c S iix^c iaAilig 
down sleeping by me and everything. And he's like, you know, he's like I want to 
sleep in here too. and then, we're like no. Sam, we want to have our own privacy. 
And, but he just wouldn't get out. so we're just, oh well so we just went to bed. 
Yeah, that's what happened, what he did. 
DT: So you went to Saiina? 
TB: Yeah. 
DT: Utah or Colorado? 
TB: Utah. 
DT: Okay. And him and his wife, and you and who else? 
TB: And some other adults, too. And. Wanda. Bryant. Cheryl and. uh... 
DT: So where did .America go? 
TB: She had to go home because she had to work the next day. 
DT: So she left.. ..and Sam stayed in you guys' tent, you girls? 
TB: Yeah and there was one boy there. 
DT: And. you.said nothing happened. 
TB: No thins happened, no. 
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To whom it may concern: 
I, America T. Matthews, have NEVER worn any kind of lip gloss. I 
wear lip stick only. 
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NW: Mmm-hmh. (Affirmative response) 
JM: Or would there be others also? 
NW: Some times Lydia would come with us. but most of the time it was just us. And 
he would take me out for ice cream and pizza....whatever I wanted, it was there. 
If I wanted anything it was there. 
JM: What did he say to you, if anything, to try to get you to do what he wanted to do? 
NW: I don't really remember him saying anything, I think it was more along the....like 
he was a preacher in the church and he was supposed to be good and he would 
just randomly spout out biblical things. He was just really smooth about things. 
He never told me. you know....his biggest thing was...he's from Detroit and the 
kids in the ghetto would treat each other like that, like they were brothers and 
sisters, that that's just how he was raised and that's just the way they lived. 
JM: And what would they do? The kissing....? 
NW: Mmm-hmh.. ..the touching, the friendliness and all the everything that he did was 
explained by what group he was from in the ghetto. And at the same time, he 
was.. .you know that was the first black family I had ever met and part of me was 
just wondering if that's just how they were. I was really little and I didn't know-
how the}' acted. Especially being a preacher. 
JM: So he's Afro-American? 
NW: Mmm-hmh. (.Affirmative response) 
JM: Is his wife Afro-American? 
NW: Mmm-hmh. (Affirmative response). 
JM: And his children are? 
NW: Mmm-hmh. (Affirmative response). 
JM: Did he ever make any threats to you? 
NW: No. never any threats? 
JM: Did he ever hurt you? 
NW: (inaudible response) 
JM: UK 
NW: His son was a little bit more touchy feeling than he was. I remember sleeping 
over at Lydia's house and she would be on the bed and I would sleep on the floor 
and still to this day I don't know if it was him or his son. but he would crawl in 
the bedroom and it was really dark, and they are dark, so I couldn't tell who it 
was. but he would just sneak up and I would pretend I was sleeping and he 
thought I was sleeping and he would go up my shirt and down my pants. 
JM: Under the shirt? 
NW: Yeah. 
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JM: Touch your breasts? 
NW: Mmm-hmlL (Affirmative response) 
JM: Touch your vagina? 
NW: Mmm-hmh. (Affirmative response) 
JM: Touch your buttocks? 
NW: Mmm-hmh. (Affirmative response).. 
JM: Um. when that touching occurred, what kind of a touch was it? 
NW: Like....I guess it would be like a careful, not to wake me up or disturb me kind of 
thing, but Sam. his son, had done that before, and I know that.... 
JM: So it was his jonJSammv? 
NW: Yeah, we were at the church serving, cleaning....and it was me, Lydia, Sammy 
-—an3 SamTSammy is Lydia's brother. 
JM: Okay. 
NW: We used to play hide and seek in the dark while Sam was cleaning and one time, I 
didn't know if Sammy was in there, but it was dark, and he came up behind me 
and just grabbed my breasts. 
JM: Over or under your clothing? 
NW: Over. 
JM: Did he touch anywhere else? 
NW: No. 
JM: .. .that particular time? Okay. When you were on the floor and whoever it was 
was under your clothing, would it be a....in describing the touch, would it be a 
touch of...of curiosity...a touch of caress....a touch of pinch and hurt....? 
NW: It was like a... 
JM: A light touch? A rubbing touch? 
NW: A rubbing touch. I would say... 
JM: Okay. 
NW: Not so hard that it.. .it was soft enough that he thought that I wouldn't wake up. 
JM: And that was on your breast? Your vagina and your bottom area? Describe that 
O touch to me kind of. 
NW: Urn. I would think.. .it...it is hard to explain. Cause when he would get close, I 
would pretend like I was shaking in my sleep, so sometimes it got rough, like.... 
JM: The touch got rough? 
NW: Grabbing, yeah, a grabbing touch..,. 
JM: Okay. 
NW: He was always trying to touch me in some way. 
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JM: That's just kind of the hierarchy of the way it was? 
NW: Mmm-hmh. (Affirmative response) 
JM: Uh. was there ever any time that any sexual relations occurred between you and 
he? 
NW: No. 
JM: He never had sex with you? 
NW: Unn-nhn. (negative response) 
JM: Why do you think that it did not progress to that point? 
NW: I don't know. I don't know why it didn't. I'm surprised that it didn't happen. I 
don't know why it didn't. 
JM: Why are you surprised it didn't? Looking back or at that time? 
NW: Looking back. I'm surprised that he didn't just go that far with me because he had 
me brainwashed thinkins I couldn't sav anvthins to anvone. no one would believe 
me. that you know, he was this big strong man that wants me and he'd take care 
of me. he'd give me anything I wanted. 
JM: And you kind of fell into that? 
NW: Yeah. 
JM: Did you play on that at all? 
NW: No. 
JM: Getting what you wanted? 
NW: Oh getting, yeah, getting what I wanted was jus that, but it also felt like he was 
saying, okay, well here's what you want now, so give me what I want and don't 
say anything. It was.. .that's just how it was... 
JM: So. did you give in to him to a certain degree at all to achieve that goal. 
NW: Not with the touching or anything like that....1 was nicer to him.. .you know, that 
I got what I want and now I'm happy, but when anything went on, I didn't let 
anything happen. I just got what I wanted. 




JM: Okay. Tninking why did I let it happen? 
NW: Mmm-hmh. (Affirmative response) 
JM: And I want you to understand that you are no different than the umpteen people I 
have dealt with who have sat in that same chair and there's some self-blame there. 
Why did I let it go this far? You know, I could have stopped it? Why didn't I do 
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JM: Okay. Did he ever say anything to you sexually and want you to do anything to 
him? 
NW: No. He never said anything sexually to me. 
JM: Didn't request you to do anything, touch him, anything like that? 
NW: No audible response. 
JM: Did you ever say anything to him? 
NW: No. I told him I didn't like sitting on his...I told him I didn't like a lot of things. 
but. it didn't, you know, change anything. 
JM: Didn't seem to matter to him? 
NW: No. 
JM: He just continued? 
NW: (No audible response.) 
JM: What is the one incident that you can remember most that caused you the 
most...to be the most uncomfortable? 
NW: Urn. I would say that time at the lake because after all that he was talking about 
his wife dying and then it just got really strange and that's about the time when I 
had to tell, someone because it was really strange and it scared me, 
JM: When he was talking about his wife dying and marrying you and going to live in 
his condo in the Virgin Islands. Did he ever show you a picture of his condo at the 
Virgin Islands? 
NW: They went down there a couple of weeks one summer and they wanted me to go, 
but I just didn't want to. 
JM: They went down as a family? 
NW: Yeah. 
JM: What do you think oughta happen with this situation? 
NW: I don't know. 
JM: How do you feel about it now? 
NW: I feel like I don't want him to do it to anyone else. At all. And the only reason it 
didn't go any farther than that is because it wouldn't have gone any farther than 
that in this town because he was a really good person in the community and I felt 
like if I did say anything, it would just be dropped anyway and I felt like.... 
JM: You didn't have a whole lot of faith in what was happening.... in what could have 
happened0 
NW: Yeah. 
JM: And it stopped because you did tell somebody? 
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COLLEEN WOOD, individually and as 
personal representative of the 
Estate of Raymond D. Wood, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE, FAILURE 
TO STATE A CLAIM, SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND FEES 
Case No. 0107700169 
Judge Bryner 
Conies now the Defendant Colleen Wood, by and through counsel, Michael K. Black of 
Young Kester and Petro, and submits herewith a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
support of the Motion for Consolidation, Failure to State a Claim, Summary Judgment and for 
fees. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April 14, 1987, a Decree of Divorce was entered by the Seventh Judicial 
District Court of Emery County, wherein the Plaintiff Karen Wood, was granted a Decree of 
Divorce against Raymond D. Wood (now deceased). See attached copy of Decree of Divorce. 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, paragraph 5 A, if reads: 
A. To Defendant [Raymond Wood]: The 1974 mobilehome and real property 
located in Orangeville, Emery County, and subject to the indebtedness thereon; the 
1984 Daytona automobile, subject to the indebtedness thereon; the Dodge four-
wheel drive pick-up truck; the 1978 fifthwheel camp trailer; the Century boat; the 
1982 Honda ATV three-wheeler; the dirt bike; the snowmobile; and a portion of 
the furniture and furnishings. 
3. In exchange Karen Wood was awarded, pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, a 
judgment in the amount of $10,000.00. Paragraph 5C of the Decree of Divorce reads: 
C. That Plaintiff [Karen Wood] shall and hereby is granted judgement against 
defendant in the amount of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000), the same 
being approximately one-half of the equity in those items outlined herein as being 
awarded to Defendant. Said judgement shall earn interest at the statutory rate until 
paid in full. 
4. Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, issues arose between Karen 
Wood and Raymond Wood regarding the payment of the judgment entered pursuant to the 
Decree of Divorce and each of them filed Petitions with the District Court in the divorce case to 
have their rights asserted. 
5. The parties then entered into a Stipulation which resolved the competing petitions 
to modify. (A copy of the stipulation is attached). Paragraphs 1 and 3 reads: 
2 
1. Defendant [Raymond Wood] shall pay to Plaintiff [Karen Wood] the 
sum of $5,600.00 payable $2,000.00 on or before April 15, 1997 with the balance 
of $3,600.00 in monthly payments of $100.00 the first payment being due on or 
before April 30, 1997 and like payments being due on or before the end of each 
month thereafter. Monthly payments shall be made by direct deposit from 
Defendant's bank account into plaintiffs bank account and defendant shall bear all 
costs associated with the arranging of said deposits. 
3. Upon, the execution of this agreement, Plaintiff shall place with her 
attorney, Michael A.. Harrison, an original, executed Quit Claim Deed to the 
property awarded to Defendant in the parties' decree of divorce. Michael A. 
Harrison shall deliver the deed to Defendant upon payment of all sums due 
hereunder or to a title company within the event said deed is necessary to enable 
Defendant to refinance his property in order to satisfy his obligation hereunder. 
6. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Stipulation entered into by the parties in April of 
1997, it states: 
Each party hereby releases the other from any and all other obligations that may 
exist or may, in the future, exist under the terms of the parties' Decree of Divorce 
or any subsequent modification thereto. 
7. Attached to this Memorandum is a copy of the check made payable to Karen 
Woods in the amount of $2,000.00 dated April 15, 1997. 
8. Raymond Wood and Colleen Wood were married on the 26th day of August, 1998 
in Carbon County, Utah. 
9. On the 17th day of July 2000, Raymond Wood passed away. (See probate # 
003700013 EI) 
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10. Upon the death of Raymond Wood, the Defendant herein, Colleen Wood, the 
surviving spouse, was appointed the personal representative of the Estate of Raymond Wood. 
(See attached Order). 
11. A Notice to All Creditors was published in the Emery County Progress as 
provided in Section 75-3-801(1) of the Utah Code. (See probate # 003700013 EI) 
12. Karen Wood failed to file Notice of Claim against the estate of Raymond Wood. 
(See probate # 003700013 EI) 
13. Colleen Wood then filed a Motion to Deny Creditor's Claim and served notice of 
the motion on Karen Wood. (See probate # 003700013 EI) 
14. Judge Halliday ruled on the motion on the 10th of August 2001. Judge Halliday 
ordered that Karen Wood's claim be denied and ordered that the deed be recorded. (See attached 
Order) 
15. No appeal of the decision was filed. (See probate # 003700013 EI) 
16. The Plaintiff Karen Wood was aware of her right to appeal the adverse ruling of 
the probate court and consciously decided not to pursue the appeal A copy of a letter is attached 
hereto wherein Karen Wood acknowledges the time limitations on the filing of an appeal See 




PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO INHERIT FROM THE 
ESTATE OF RAYMOND WOOD AND THEREFORE HAS 
STANDING ONLY AS A POTENTIAL CREDITOR. 
Attached to this memorandum is a copy of the Decree of Divorce wherein the court 
granted Karen Wood a divorce against Raymond D. Wood. The granting of a divorce 
terminates Karen Wood's right to inherit from the estate of Raymond D. Wood where Raymond 
Wood died intestate. Utah Code Annotated Section 75-2-802 reads: 
(1) An individual who is divorced from the decedent or whose marriage to the 
decedent has been annulled is not a surviving spouse 
Section 75-2-103 Utah Code Annotated reads: 
(1) Any part of the estate not passing to the decedent's surviving spouse under 
Section 75-2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving 
spouse, passes in the following order to the individuals designated below 
who survive the decedent: 
(a) to the decedent's descendants per capita at each generation as 
defined in Subsection 75-2-106(2) 
Karen Wood and Raymond Wood had two children as issue of the marriage namely Eric 
Wood born July 2, 1975 and Amanda Wood born January 4, 1979. Any rights of inheritance 
would be shared between Colleen Wood (surviving spouse) and Raymond Wood's children. In 
any event Karen Wood would have no right to the property by way of inheritance. 
POINT n 
THE DIVORCE COURT DETERMINED THAT THE REAL 
PROPERTY WAS A MARITAL ASSET AND AWARDED 
THE PROPERTY TO RAYMOND WOOD IN THE 
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS WHICH SEVERED ANY 
RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP. 
The Divorce case involving Karen Wood vs. Raymond Wood Civil # 4882 as well as the 
Probate case In the matter of the Estate of Raymond D. Wood; Probate # 003700013 EI has fully 
litigated the issues raised in this case and based upon the law entitles The Estate of Raymond 
Wood to summary judgement precluding the claims of Karen Wood. 
In short, the divorce proceedings determined that the property which is the subject of this 
lawsuit was a marital asset and awarded the asset to Raymond Wood. The award of the property 
to Raymond Wood terminates Karen Wood's right of survivorship when the real property is 
awarded to Raymond Wood. (See attached decree of divorce) 
In the Probate Case, In the matter of the Estate of Raymond D. Wood; Probate # 
003700013 EI, Colleen Wood filed motions with the court to ascertain the obligations, if any, of 
the estate of Raymond Wood to pay Karen Wood and the court determined that the Estate of 
Raymond Wood owed no money to Karen Wood and ordered Karen Wood to transfer the 
property to the Estate of Raymond Wood. (See attached order) The decision of the probate court 
went unappealed. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals in Hoagland v. Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025 (Utah Appeals 1993) 
stated, 
Wife claims the court abused its discretion in disregarding the quit claim deed to 
find the house to be marital property. 
Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have long held that once a court has 
determined that something is marital property, the court may distribute it 
equitably, notwithstanding which party's name appears on the title. Jackson 
v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980); Naranio v. Narango. 751 P.2d 
1144, 1148-49 (Utah App. 1988). "The trial court is empowered to make such 
distributions as are just and equitable, and may compel such conveyances as are 
necessary to that end." Jackson, 617 P.2d at 340-41. 
This court addressed as similar situation in Hogue v. Hogue, 831 P.2d 120, 121 
(Utah App. 1992), where the husband had, prior to his marriage, conveyed to the 
wife a ranch as a means of protecting the property from husband's creditors. The 
couple then married and divorced. The trial court awarded husband an undivided 
one-half interest in the property. On appeal, we held that the court had not abused 
its discretion in awarding husband a one-half interest in the ranch, in part bee? ise 
the trial court had found that Husband conveyed the property to protect it from 
creditors. Id. at 122. 
Likewise, the court in this instance found that Husband conveyed the Ogden house 
to protect it from creditors of the failing business. The court also reimbursed Wife 
for the amount she contributed to the house that represented the equity from her 
premarital property. Given those findings, the court acted within its discretion in 
concluding that the house was marital property, notwithstanding the Husband's 
quit claim deed.(Emphasis Added). 
The court in the divorce proceedings ascertained that the property was a marital asset and 
as provided by law allocated the real property to Raymond Wood. As provided in the decree of 
divorce Karen Wood was granted the right to receive certain money from Raymond Wood and 
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consequently became a creditor of Raymond Wood. The right to receive money from the estate 
of Raymond Wood has likewise been adjudicated. (See attached order from the probate court) 
POINT in 
RES JUDICATA PRECLUDES THE PRESENT QUIET 
TITLE ACTION FILED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
The doctrine of res judicata precludes a party from relitigating issues that have previously 
been resolved through prior litigation. The Utah Court of Appeals in Conder v. Hunt, 1 P.3d 558 
(Ct.App. 2000) states: 
Res judicata embraces two distinct doctrines: claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion. See Madson v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). Claim 
preclusion, the branch of res judicata relied upon by defendants, operates as a 
complete bar to a second action based on a claim that was (or could have been) 
raised in a prior action. See id. Claim preclusion only bars a second action if a suit 
in which that cause of action is being asserted and the prior suit satisfied three 
requirements. First, both cases must-involve-the same parties or their privies. 
Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first 
suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. 
Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
A, Same parties. The divorce action involved Karen Wood and Raymond Wood. 
The divorce proceedings specifically addressed the issue of real property and the Court pursuant 
to the Decree of Divorce awarded the property at issue to Raymond Darrell Wood. The Claim in 
the probate case involved Karen Wood and the estate of Raymond Wood. Because Karen Wood 




B. The claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or 
must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. As set out above, the 
divorce court awarded to Raymond Wood the property in Emery County which is the same 
property at issue herein. The domestic court in its equitable powers has the ability to allocate the 
assets of the marriage as it felt equitable regardless of how the property is held or titled. 
The Decree of Divorce awarded the Emery County property (the same property at issue in 
this case) to Raymond Wood as part of the property settlement and in turn obligated Raymond 
Wood to make certain payments to Karen Wood. 
The original agreement of the parties was later modified pursuant to the Stipulation signed 
in 1997. It becomes clear that Karen Wood's right to the property was limited to her right to 
collect the judgment which equalized the equity in the properties. 
Although it is unclear whether Raymond Wood paid all of the money he was obligated to 
pay to Karen Wood, (it is clear that the most he would have owed was $3,600) Karen Wood 
was given the opportunity to present a claim against the Estate of Raymond D. Wood but rather 
choose not to make that claim as required by statute. 
Motions were filed in the probate case addressing Karen Wood's right to a claim against 
the Estate and after having an opportunity to present memorandums and evidence to the Probate 
Court, the Court then entered its ruling determining that Karen Wood was precluded from making 
a claim against the estate as a result of her failure to timely present a claim. 
9 
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Karen Wood's claim against the estate and interest in the property outlined in her Quiet 
Title action have clearly been resolved through the prior litigation. 
C. First suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. The Decree of 
Divorce certainly makes final the distribution and the termination of Karen Wood's rights in the 
marital property located in Emery County. Likewise final judgment has been rendered in the 
probate case with regard to Karen Wood's ability to make a claim against the estate of Raymond 
Wood for payment of money and further was ordered to file the deed to convey the property to 
Raymond Wood. Karen Wood, as set out in the attached correspondence, recognized that there 
were time limits for her to appeal from the decision of the Probate Court and decided not to avail 
herself of that opportunity. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant the Motion to Dismiss for failure to 
state a claim or in the alternative to enter a summary judgment in favor of the Defendants herein. 
POINT IV 
IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR THE COURT TO CONSOLIDATE THE 
CASES IN THIS MATTER IN THAT THE PROBATE CASE HAS 
ALREADY ADDRESSED THE ISSUES OF THE CLAIMS OF KAREN 
WOOD AND HAVE ENTERED RULINGS BASED THEREON. 
The parties in the Probate case are identical to the parties in this litigation and in the 
interest of judicial economy would dictate that the matters should be consolidated. 
10 
POINT V 
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER HER ATTORNEY'S 
FEES IN PURSUING THIS MATTER. 
Attached to this Memorandum is a copy of the Order of the District Court awarding to the 
Defendant's their attorney's fees in defending the claim against Karen Wood with regard to her 
Proof of Claim. The Quiet Title action in this matter is no different than an attempt to circumvent 
the ruling of the Court in the probate case and consequently, the Defendant is entitled to recover 
her attorney's fees. 
Attached to this Memorandum is an Affidavit of Attorney's fees incurred herein and 
Defendant respectfully requests this Court to grant judgment for the fees. 
DATED this day of May, 2002. 
MICHAEL K. BLACK 
Attorney for Defendant 
11 
POINT V 
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER HER ATTORNEY'S 
FEES IN PURSUING THIS MATTER. 
Attached to this Memorandum is a copy of the Order of the District Court awarding to the 
Defendant's their attorney's fees in defending the claim against Karen Wood with regard to her 
Proof of Claim. The Quiet Title action in this matter is no different than an attempt to circumvent 
the ruling of the Court in the probate case and consequently, the Defendant is entitled to recover 
her attorney's fees. 
DATED this fD day of September, 2002. 
Attorney for Defendant 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the fl) day of September, 2002,1 hand-delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Andrew B. Berry, Jr., Esq. 
62 West Main Street 
P.O. Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
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T H J U D I C W L
 DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH IN AND FOR EME3Y CO. 
APR 1 4 1987 
MAR6RET SI DWELL TAYLOR ——§RUCE_a FUNK „ ,. 
Attorney for P la in t i f f ~ - ' '• Clerk 
147 South Main S t r e e t y V ^ D " ^ 
Helper , Utah 84526 
(801) 472-5513 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN WOOD, 
Pla in t i f f , 
vs. 
RAYMOND DARRELL WOOD, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
C i v i l No. 4882 
This matter came on for hearing on the 31st day of March, 1987, 
before the Court, Judge Dennis Draney presiding. Plaintiff was personally 
present-and was represented by her counsel, MARGRET SIDWELL TAYLOR. De-
fendant was not personally present, nor was he represented by counsel. 
The Court, having heard testimony and having heretofore entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes the following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Plaintiff be awarded a Decree of Divorce from Defendant. 
2. That Plaintiff be awarded the custody of the minor children, 
namely, ERIC DARRELL WOOD, born July 2, 1975, age 11, and AMANDA JEAN, 
born January 4, 1979, age 8, subject to the right of reasonable visita-
tion to Defendant, upon proper notice to Plaintiff, and properly demean-
ing himself. 
3. That Defendant pay the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS 
($150.00) per month for the minor child, AMANDA for and as child support. 
That at the present time, and in view of Defendant's contribution directly 
to the support of the minor child, ERIC DARRELL WOOD, Defendant will not 
pay child support to Plaintiff for the minor child, ERIC DARRELL WOOD. 
,•..,, *r» i * Recorded in J M g m M Record q o 
Recorded in Judgment Docket •/#.. at N*. ;&1. * * 
4. That no alimony shall be awarded herein. 
5. That the marital assets be divided between the parties 
as follows: 
A. To Defendant: The 1974 mobilehome and the real property 
located in Orangeville, Emery County, and subject to the indebtedness 
thereon; the 1984 Daytona automobile, subject to the indebtedness there-
on; the 1975 Dodge four-wheel drive pickup truck; the 1978 fifthwheel 
camp trailer; the Century boat; the 1982 Honda ATC three-wheeler; the 
dirt bike; the snowmobile; and a portion of the furniture and furnish-
ings. 
B. To Plaintiff: The 1978 Subaru automobile; a portion of 
the furniture and furnishings; Plaintiff's personal belongings and those 
of the minor children. 
C. That Plaintiff shall and hereby is granted Judgment 
against Defendant in the amount of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00), 
the same being approximately one-half of the equity in those items out-
lined herein as being awarded to Defendant. Said Judgment shall earn 
interest at the statutory rate until paid in full. 
6. That all of the marital debts shall be paid by Defendant, 
including that debt owed to First Security Bank in the amount of-SEVEN 
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($7,900.00), with payments of TWO HUNDRED 
THIRTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($235.00) per month, which debt is to pay for the 
1984 Daytona automobile; a debt in favor of DONNA GILLIS in the amount 
of FOURTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($14,500.00), with a payment 
of TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS ($200.00) per month, for and as the mobilehome; 
a debt to DON and DONNA SMITH in the amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($1,500.00), for one (1) lot in Orangeville. That each of the 
parties pay their own debts as of the date of their separation on October 
21, 1987. 
7. That Defendant shall be required to keep and maintain 
health, accident, optical and dental insurance for and on behalf of 
the minor children, when the same is available to him through his em-
ployment. That Defendant shall be required to pay any amount reason-
ably incurred for medical for the minor children, and any amounts not 
paid by insurance. _2_ 
8. That Defendant shall reimburse to Plaintiff the total 
amount of her attorney fees and Court costs in the amount of FOUR HUN-
DRED THIRTY-TWO DOLLARS FORTY-NINE CENTS ($432.49), and that Defendant 
shall pay to Plaintiff said amount of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO DOLLARS 
FORTY-NINE CENTS ($432.49) within sixty (60) days after the Decree of 
Divorce becomes final. 
9. That the proceeds of the 1986 joint tax return shall be 
paid toward the indebtedness owed by the parties to DON and DONNA SMITH 
for the lot in Orangeville. 
DATED this Qffc day of April, 1987. 
J^^ZZ^I^L^ o C r (J^J^^Cd*/ 
DENNIS dRANEY- District Court Oddge 
-3-
MICHAEL A. HARRISON #1390 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
220 East 200 South 
Price. Utah S4501 
801-637-4524 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





RAYMOND DARRELL WOOD, ) Civil No. 4882 
)' 
Defendant. ) JUDGE. 
WHEREAS, on the 13th day of February, 1996 defendant caused 
to be filed with this court a "Petition To Modify": and 
WHEREAS, plaintiff responded to said "Petition To Modify" by 
filing a "Counter Petition" which "Counter Petition" was 
subsequently amended and by seeking an "Order to Show Cause":, and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto have subsequently entered into 
an agreement resolving the issues raised in those pleadings to 
which reference heretofore has been made: 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and 
agreements set forth herein, the parties agree as follows and 
request that said terms be incorporated into an order of the 
court: 
1. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the sum of $5,600.00 
payable $2,000,00 en or before April 15, 1997 with the balance of 
$3,600.00 in monthly payments of $100.00 the first payment being 
due on or before April 30, 1997 and like payments being due on 





lor before the end of each month thereafter. Monthly payments 
shall be made by direct deposit from defendant's bank account 
into plaintiff's bank account and defendant shall bear all costs 
I associated with the arranging of said deposits. 
2, As long as the payments herein agreed are timely made, 
no interest shall accrue on the outstanding balance due. In the 
event any payment is not timely made, interest at the annual rate 
of 12% shall be computed from the date of this agreement and 
plaintiff, upon filing of an affidavit with the court that 
[payments have not been timely made, shall be entitled to judgment 
against defendant for the balance owed, including accrued 
interest and attorney's fees incurred in the preparation and 
filing of the affidavit and judgment, Prior to filing an 
affidavit with the court as set forth in this paragraph, 
plaintiff shall give to defendant ten days advanced written 
notice of the delinquency. 
3. Upon, the execution of this agreement, Plaintiff shall 
place with her attorney, Michael A. Harrison, an original, 
executed Quit Claim Deed to the property awarded to Defendant in 
the parties' decree of divorce, Michael A. Harrison shall deliver 
the deed to Defendant upon payment of all sums due hereunder or 
to a title company within the event said deed is necessary to 
enable Defendant to refinance his property in order to satisfy 
his obligations hereunder. 
2 
4. Upon the execution of this Stipulation, defendant's 
etition To Modify and plaintiff's Counter Petition, Amended 
fcounter Petition arid Order to Show Cause should be dismissed and 
the trial date now scheduled for Friday, February 7, 1997 be 
vacated. 
5. Each party hereby releases the other from any and all 
obligations that may exists or may, in the future, exist, under 
the terms of the parties' decree of divorce or any subsequent 
modification thereto. 
DATED this flday of April, 1997. 
MICHAEL A. HARRISON 
Attorney for PlalTftTfTN 
A
' UNA °\ d&oc^ 
AKEN WOOD 
Plaintiff 
&#%&r&J? -kJzttedP &&&J J 
RAYMOND DARRELL WOOD 
Deferent 
5AVID Ml A L L R E D < 
Attorney for Defendant 
Ffi 
McKette H. Allred(#6698) ' ^ ' 
David M.AUredP.C. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
26 East Main Street 
Post Office Box 575 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513 
(435)381-5326 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the Estate of 
RAYMOND D. WOOD, 
Deceased. 
ORDER TO DENY 
CREDITOR'S ALLEGED CLAIM 
PROBATE NO. 003700013 EI 
Judge Halliday 
Based upon the foregoing Motion to Deny Creditor's Claim filed by the personal 
representative of the above entitled estate, by and through her attorney of record, McKette H. 
Alfred, and good cause appearing, the Court makes the following findings of facts and order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, JUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. Respondent's Motion for Leave to Late File a Memorandum in Opposition is denied 
due to the fact that Ms. Karen Wood has had sufficient time in which to retain an 
attorney to file an objection to the personal representative's Motion to Deny 
Creditor's Claim. 
2. The time to file an objection has run and Respondent has not filed an Objection to the 
Personal Representative's Motion. 
3. The Personal Representative filed a Notice to All Creditors in the Emery County 
Pr^ giiBSS and Ms. Karen Wood did not file a claim as required by Section 75-3-801(1) 
ofUCA. 
4, Ms. Karen Wood's alleged claim that the estate of Raymond D. Wood owes her 
money is denied. 
5. The Personal Representative is entitled lo her auonicy'.s fees. 
ov feircirWood is onleivd in \v\\v Mie.ha.ci Harrison n/k-asc \\& iiced UU^KI , -
39 
09/07/2001 10:54 4353815. DAVID M ALLRED pAGE 





As you uru aware, I have until Monday September 10 to file an appeal with the Utah Supreme 
Court. You have left me no option, I'm sorry you have chose nol to work with me or to work in 
the best interest of Colleen, this will now costs thousands. 
1also have asked that you return items thai you hid mc deliver to your home. I did not want to 
file charges against you and Mckette, but again you have kit mc no option, 
I also feel that Colleen will have a case against you, after we go to the supremo court, Iwiil be 
wi Uing lo testify ia her behalf at thai time, 
I will also be talking to the bar association, I believe that as attorneys, you have crossed the line 
several times. 
I have an appointment with my attorney, at 1:00 today, wc will be filing with the Utah supreme 
Court by Monday. If you are interested in settling this matter nowaday you can call tne before 
11:00% at the office after 1 ;00 T will be in the office of my attorney. You might want to meet 
with Colleen and let her know what is happening. 
If I do not hear Irom you by 11:001 will have my attorney call you at 3:00. 
KirenWoo4 
FILED 
OCT 3 2002 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. USB# 0309 
Attorney for Karen Wood 
62 West Main Street 
Post Office Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
Telephone: 435 436-8200 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY 





COLLEEN WOOD, individually 
and as personal representative 
the estate of RAYMOND D. WOOD. 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
FOR CONSOLIDATION 
Civil No. 0107#00169 
Assigned to: 
Honorable Bryce K. Bryner 
ooOoo 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, KAREN WOOD, respectfully 
submitting her memorandum of points and authorities in opposition 
to the Defendant's motions for summary judgment and for 
consolidation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Karen Wood and Raymond Wood were married in Carbon 
County, Utah in August, 1973, and had two (2), children as issue of 
their marriage, Eric and Amanda. They purchased a home in joint 
ac 
tenancy during their marriage and Karen Wood and Raymond Wood were 
divorce in April, 1987. The Woods stipulated in the divorce 
proceeding that the home would remain in joint tenancy until Mrs. 
Wood's interest in the real property and home was fully paid. In 
August, 1998, Raymond Wood married Colleen Wood and she moved into 
the home of Karen Wood and Raymond Wood. In July, 2000, Raymond 
Wood killed himself because his new wife, Colleen, was divorcing 
him to marry another man. Colleen married James Davis in July, 
2002, and moved from Karen Wood's home and real property to live 
with her new husband. 
The home and real property which is the subject of the 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was transferred by 
operation of law to Karen Wood upon the death of her joint tenant, 
Raymond Wood. 
Colleen Wood now seeks by her motion for summary judgment 
to deprive Karen Wood of her interest in the home and real property 
which she purchased during her marriage to Raymond Wood, and which 
remained in joint tenancy intentionally to preserve and protect 
Karen Wopd's interest in the home and real property. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
1. KAREN WOOD is the Plaintiff in this action and the 
facts which she stated in her affidavit in opposition to the 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment are based upon her 
knowledge and personal observations. Karen Wood is a resident of 
Carbon County within the State of Utah and she is competent to 
testify as to the facts which are stated in her affidavit and shall 
so testify if called as a witness in the proceeding. Karen Wood 
made her affidavit in opposition to the Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment and motion for consolidation. 
2. Karen Wood married Raymond D. Wood on the 31st day of 
August, 1973, in the County of Carbon within the State of Utah. 
3. Raymond D. Wood and Karen Wood had two (2), children 
as issue of their marriage. These children are Eric Darrell Wood, 
born the 2nd day of July, 1975, and Amanda Jean Wood, born the 4th 
day of January, 1979. 
4. Raymond D. Wood and Karen Wood purchased a home 
during their marriage situate at 255 West 200 North, Orangeville, 
Utah. Copies of the two (2), Warranty Deeds by which they acquired 
their interest in their home and real property are attached as 
Exhibits A, and B. 
5. The Warranty Deed dated September 15, 1986, from 
Donna L. Gillis, to Karen Wood and Raymond D. Wood, transferred and 
conveyed the real property to us nas joint tenants with full rights 
of survivorship and not as tenants in common." This warranty deed 
was recorded in the office of the Emery County Recorder on January 
2, 1987, as entry number 315284, in book 165, at pages 198-199. 
6. The Corrected Warranty Deed dated December 29, 1986, 
from Melba R. Shiner, to Kar,aen Wood and Raymond Darrell Wood, 
transferred and conveyed the real property to them, xvas joint 
tenants." This Corrected Warranty Deed was recorded in the office 
of the Emery County Recorder on December 30, 1986, as entry number 
315275, in book 165, at page 184. 
7. Raymond D. Wood and Karen Wood were divorced by the 
Court on the 14th day of April, 1987. 
8. The real property identified above remained in joint 
tenancy and Karen Wood retained her ownership interest in the real 
property because Raymond Wood failed to pay her equity in the 
marital residence and real property. This was pursuant to a 
written Stipulation entered in the divorce proceeding on April 28, 
1997. Karen Wood, Raymond Wood, and their respective counsel 
intended and agreed to leave the property in joint tenancy until 
Karen Wood was paid in full for her equity in the home and real 
property they had purchased during their marriage. 
9. On August 26, 1988, Raymond Wood married Coleen Wood. 
10. Colleen Wood wanted a divorce from Raymond Wood and 
he left the home. She filed for divorce and Raymond Wood committed 
89 
suicide on July 17, 2000. 
11. The Defendant does not live in the home and real 
property but now lives with her new husband, James Davis. 
12. Raymond Wood never paid to Karen Wood the equity in 
the marital residence and real property he stipulated to and was 
ordered to pay, and thus Karen Wood retained ownership of the home 
and real property and when he passed away the real property passed 
to Karen Wood by operation of law. Raymond Wood's death 
certificate was recorded immediately following his death 
transferring the home and real property to Karen Wood. 
13. Karen Wood has incurred and should be awarded her 
costs and attorney fees incurred upon my motion in the sum of One 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00), subject to amendment and 
proof upon hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT AN HEIR OF THE ESTATE 
NOR IS SHE A CREDITOR OF THE ESTATE AND 
THE PROBATE COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION 
TO DETERMINE THE PLAINT IFF' S CLAIM TO REAL PROPERTY 
The Defendant's first argument is essentially that the 
Plaintiff, Karen Wood, and Raymond Wood, were divorced by this 
Court in April, 1987, and thus Karen Wood is not entitled to 
inherit from the Raymond Wood estate but is a creditor of the 
7n 
estate. The Defendant also claims that the issue is res judicata 
because the probate court denied Karen Wood's "creditor's claim." 
The Plaintiff, Karen Wood, concedes and agrees that she 
was divorced from Raymond Wood at the time of his death and cannot 
inherit from his estate. The Defendant's assertion that this 
places the Plaintiff, Karen Wood, in the position of a creditor of 
the Raymond Wood estate is wrong and misleading. 
Karen Wood asserts in her complaint in this action that 
title to her marital residence and real property should be quieted 
in her. She does not necessarily stand in the position of a 
creditor in the estate proceeding. 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals, in 
a long-standing line of cases, has determined that a probate Court 
is without jurisdiction to hear or determine a suit to quiet title 
to real property claimed to belong to an estate, and that the 
dispute cannot be resolved by filing and processing a claim against 
the estate under the Uniform Probate Code. In Re Rogers' Estate, 
75 Utah 290, 284 P. 992 (Utah 1930); Rogers v. West, 82 Utah 525, 
25 P. 2d 971 (Utah 1933); in re Estate of Malliet, 649 P. 2d 18 (Utah 
1982). The probate court was without jurisdiction to determine the 
right of Karen Wood in her marital residence and real property and 
thus, because the claim could not be raised in the probate court, 
7! 
it is not res judicata and thi s action cannot be consolidated with 
the probate proceeding as requested by the Defendant. 
THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING DID NOT SEVER THE 
JOINT TENANCY AND THE RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP 
BUT SPECIFICALLY PRESERVED IT 
The Defendant arguse that the divorce proceeding severed 
and terminated the parties joint tenancy and the rigiit of 
survivorship. The Plaintiff, Karen Wood, in her affidavit filed 
herein, disputes the Defendant's facts arid claim and offered proof 
to the contrary. On April 25, 1997, Raymond Wood and Karen Wood, 
and their respective counsel, entered into a written Stipulation in 
the divorce action which is attached hereto. Pursuant to the 
written stipulation the real property was to remain in joint 
tenancy until Raymond Wood paid Karen Wood in full for her interest 
in her marital residence and real property. A quit claim deed was 
placed with Karen Wood's counsel, Michael A. Harrison, to be 
delivered to Raymond Wood upon the payment of all sums due under 
the Stipulation. Stipulation paragraph 3. The parties to the 
divorce, Karen Wood and Raymond Wood, and their respective counsel 
intentionally kept the marital residence and real property in joint 
tenancy to secure the payment of Karen Wood's equity to her. 
Raymond Wood, n-i/ deceased, never paid Karen Wood the monies for 
her share of the marital residence and real property. In July, 
4 4J 
2000, Raymond Wood committed suicide because the Defendant, Colleen 
(Wood) Davis was divorcing him. The quit claim deed was never 
delivered to Raymond Wood because he did not pay all sums due Karen 
Wood as had been stipulated to in the divorce action. A deed, to 
be operative as a transfer of ownership of land, or an interest or 
estate therein, must be delivered. Wiggill v. Cheney, 597 P.2d 1351 
(Utah 1979). The deed could not be delivered after Raymond Wood's 
death, and if it had been it would not convey title to the 
property, or any part thereof. Id. The main object in construing 
a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties, especially 
that of the grantor. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979). 
In the present action the grantor, Karen Wood, did not intend to 
deliver the quit claim deed to Raymond Wood until he had paid her 
for her equity in her marital residence and real property and the 
deed was never delivered to Raymond Wood because he had not paid 
Karen for her interest in the home. Delivery of a deed, or the 
absence of delivery is a question of fact. Horton v. Horton, 695 
P.2d 102 (Utah 1984). In the instant case, the facts are disputed 
as to the intention of the parties to the divorce upon the question 
of whether the Plaintiff was divested of her interest in the real 
property and her home. The Plaintiff did not deliver the quit 
claim deed because she had not been paid for her equity. Nelson v. 
Davis, 592 P.2d 594 (Utah 1979); Poulsen v Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97 
(Utah 1983). 
The marital home and real property of the Plaintiff, 
Karen Wood, and her former husband, Raymond Wood, remained in the 
names of both parties "as joint tenants with full rights of 
survivorship and i iot as tenants in commoi I, /" i inti ] the death of 
Raymond Wood. At the time of Raymond Wood's death the marital home 
and real property became the sole and exclusive property of the 
Plaintiff, Karen Wood, because she held the right of survivorship. 
The Plaintiff, Karen Wood, should be granted summary judgment in 
this quiet title action and declared to be the sole, undisputed 
owner of the subject marital residence and real property because 
the real property transferred to her by operation of 1 aw upoi i the 
death of Raymond Wood. 
THE DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVITS ARE DEFECTIVE 
BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT MADE UPON HER PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 
Rule 56(e), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that affidavits made in support of a motion for summary judgment 
shall be made upon the personal knowledge c )f t:l le affianl , sik.il ! set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify as to the 
matters set forth therein. 
The affidavits of the Defendant, offered in support of 
her motion for summary judgment, are fatally defective. The 
Defendant has not made and there is no showing that the affidavits 
are based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant/defendant. A 
supporting affidavit must be based upon the affiant's personal 
knowledge, and an affidavit based merely on unsubstantiated 
opinions and beliefs is insufficient. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 
P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). The Defendant's affidavits are wholly 
insufficient because they are not based upon her personal knowledge 
and do not demonstrate her competence to testify as to the facts 
she asserts therein. The Defendant was not a party to the divorce 
action, nor does she assert personal knowledge of the facts in the 
divorce action giving rise to her argument that she should be 
awarded by summary judgment the home and real property of the 
Plaintiff, Karen Wood. The Defendant cannot be competent to testify 
as to the facts of the divorce between the Plaintiff and Raymond 
Wood. She was not present to personally observe the proceedings 
nor was she a party to the divorce action. The affidavits of the 
Defendant are fatally defective and should not be considered by the 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's motions for summary judgment and for 
consolicatirwi with tho probate action should be denied. The 
Plaintiff, Karen Wood, should be awarded summary judgment in her 
favor and Ulis Honorable Court should declare the Karen Woodf s 
marital home and real property her sole and exclusive property 
because she was a joint tenant with the full right of survivorship 
at the time of Raymond Wood's death. 
• The Plaintiff, Karen Wood, should be awarded her attorney 
fees incurred defending the Defendant's frivolous motion for 
summary judgment and for consolidation. Clearly, the motions are 
not supported by the law and the Defendant does not cite case 
authority which lends any support whatsoever to the Defendant's 
position and request for summary judgment. The case law cited by 
the Defendant is inapplicable to the issues raised by the motions. 
The affidavits of the Defendant do not comply with the mandatory 
requirements of Rule 56(e), and are fatally defective. The 
Plaintiff, Karen Wood, should be awarded her real property and. her 
attorney fees incurred herein. 
DATED this / 'C&ay o f October7N2002. 
—-jftlDREW B. BERRY, 
Attorney for 
n n> 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this^Z.^ • day of October, 2002, I 
served upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class mail, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Memeorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and for Consolidation to: 
Michael K. Black, 
Attorney for Colleen Wood 
101 East 200 South, 




DONNA L. GILLIS, also known as DONNA L. JOBNSON, a woman in 
her own r i g h t , of Chal l i s , State of Idaho, GRANTOR, hereby 
CONVEYS AND WARRANTS to 
RAYMOND D. WOOD (also known as DARRELL WOOD) and KAREN J. 
WOODr husband and wife , of Orangevil le , Utah, as j o i n t tenants 
with f u l l r ights of survivorship and not as tenants in common, 
GRANTEES, for good and valuable consideration, receipt of which 
i s hereby acknowledged, the fol lowing described t r a c t of land i n 
Emery County, State of Utah, t o - w i t : 
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of Lot 2 , Block 2, 
Christ iansen's Subdivision of the Orangeville Townsite 
Survey y thence South 100 feet f thence West 80 f e e t i 
thence North 100 fee t ; thence East 80 f ee t to the point 
of beginning. 
TOGETHER WITH a l l improvements 
appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
thereon and 
ALSO* INCLUDING the fol lowing described mobile home 
which has been attached t o ^ h e S t ^ a l e s t a t e and ior nit 
intents | |ui5 i purposes o j i i i l i i e s a part ther eof , 
to^wit: ^Oiie double-width .1991 Blltmore mobile home i n 
two s e c t i o n s , with VIN Numbers 413127X and 4131270 
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MELBA R. SHINER 
grantor of PRICE, County of EMERY, State of Utah, hereby convey 
and warrant to 
RAYMOND DARRELL WOOD AND AND KAREN J. WOOD, HUSBAND 
AND WIFE AS JOINT TENANTS. 
of P.O. Box 427, Orangevllle, Utah 84537 for the sum of $10.00 and 
other adequate considerations, the following described tract of 
land in Emery County, State of Utah: 
BEGINNING 84.5 feet East of the Northwest corner of Lot 
2, Block 2, Christeansen Subdivision, Orangevllle Townsite Survey 
and running thence East 50 feet; thence South 134.5 feet; thence 
West 50 feet; thence North 134.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
THIS CORRECTED WARRANTY DEED IS GIVEN TO CORRECT THAT CERTAIN 
WARRANTY DEED RECORDED IN BOOK 162, PAGE 483 AS ENTRY NO. 31441 
WHEREIN THE BEGINNING POINT OF THE DESCRIPTION WAS IN ERROR. 
WITNESS the hands of said grantor, this * S ^ day 
of December, 1986. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF EMERY ) 
On the }Zf% day of DECEMBER, 1986, personally 
appearded before me _MELBA R» SHINER * 
the signer of the foregoing instrument,, who duly acknowledged to 
me that She executed the same. ^ ^ * *_ 
My commission expires i&rf? ~ &¥* 
NOTARY PUBLIC. 
Address 
MICHAEL A. HARRISON #1390 
ATTORNEY ATLAW 
220 East 200 South 
Price. Utah 84501 
801-637-4524 
1 \S t'vi 
I '•.*'" 1 _• 
FILED 
APR 2 8J997 
j k , . SEVENTH DISTRICT 
1 ^ ^ COURT/EMERY 
--
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




RAYMOND DARRELL WOOD, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. 4882 
JUDGE 
WHEREAS, on the 13th day of February, 1996 defendant caused 
to b#" filed with this court a "Petition To Modify": and 
WHEREAS, plaintiff responded to said "Petition To Modify'1 by 
filing a "Counter Petition" which "Counter Petition" was 
subsequently amended and by seeking an "Order to Show Cause": and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto have subsequently entered into 
an agreement resolving the issues raised in those pleadings to 
which reference heretofore has been made; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration.of the mutual covenants and 
agreements set forth herein, the parties agree as follows and 
request that said terms be incorporated into an order of the 
court: 
1. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the sum of $5,600.00 
payable $2,000.00 on or before April 15, 1997 with the balance of 
$3,600.00 in monthly payments-of $100.00. the first payment..being 
due on or .before April 30, 1997 and like payments being due on 
o 80 
or before the end of each month thereafter. Monthly payments 
shall be made by direct deposit from defendant's bank account 
into plaintiff's bank account and defendant shall bear all costs 
associated with the arranging of said deposits. 
2. As long as the payments herein agreed are timely made, 
no interest shall accrue on the outstanding balance due. In the 
event any payment is not timely made, interest at the annual rate 
of 12% shall be computed from the date of this agreement and 
plaintiff, upon filing of an affidavit with the court that 
payments have not been timely made, shall be entitled to judgment 
against defendant for the balance owed, including accrued 
interest and attorney's fees incurred in the preparation and 
filing of the affidavit and judgment. Prior to filing an 
affidavit with the court as set forth in this paragraph, 
plaintiff shall give to defendant ten days advanced written 
notice of the delinquency. 
3. Upon, the execution of this agreement. Plaintiff shall 
place with her attorney, Michael A. Harrison, an original, 
executed Quit Claim Deed to the property awarded to Defendant in 
the parties5 decree of divorce, Michael A. Harrison shall deliver 
the deed to Defendant upon payment of all sums due hereunder or 
to a title company within, the•event said deed is necessary to 
enable Defendant to refinance his property in order to-satisfy 
his obligations hereunder. 
2 
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4. Upon the execution of this Stipulation, defendant's 
(petition To Modify and plaintiff's Counter Petition, Amended 
Counter Petition and Order to Show. Cause should be dismissed and 
the trial date now scheduled for Friday, February 7, 1997 be 
Ivacated. 
5. Each party hereby releases the other from any and all 
iobligationsthat may exists or may, in the future, exist, under 
the terms of the parties' decree of divorce or any subsequent 
modification thereto. 
DATED this ZffiKday of April, 1997. 
MICHAEL A. HARRISON 
Forney for PI 
>ONA V I 1
WOOD 
Plaintiff 
7^W^.w? JU&t&& .4&*4.-} 
RAYMOND DARRELL WOOD 
Defendant 
<X-//ff. 
.JAVID M. ALLRED 
A t to rney f o r Defendant 
3 
_ . „ _ „ CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF EMERY )ss. 
I, the undersigned Hecorder., In and tor Emory Coi f * 
Stoe of Utah, do hereby certify thai me a S h S 
8^  u 
A F F I D A V I 
Date 25-AUG-2000 4:27pi» 
Fee: 13.00 Charge 
DIXIE SWASEY, Recorder 
Filed By SUE 
For EMERY COUNTY ABSTRACT & TITLE 
TEMERY COUNTY CORPORATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF EMERY ) 
Karen J. Wood being first duly sworn, on oath 
deposes and says: 
That She is the surviving joint tenant of Raymond 
D. Wood, Aka Darrell Wood, deceased, who died at Clawson, 
County of EMERY, State of Utah, on the 17th day of July, 
2000. That Affiant, Karen J. Wood and said decedent were 
the owners as joint tenants, of the following described land 
situate in EMERY County, State of Utah: 
TAX ID NO. 1-256-9 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 2, Block 2, 
Christiansen's Subdivision of the Orangeville Townsite 
Survey; thence South 100 feet;thence -West 80 feet; thence 
North 100 feet; thence East 80 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
- TAX ID. NO. 01-0256-0015 
Beginning 84.5 feet East of the Northwest corner.of Lot 2, 
Block 2, Christeansen Subdivision, Orangeville Townsite 
Survey; thence East 50 feet; thence South 134.5 feet; thence 
West 50 feet; thence North 134.5 feet to beginning. 
That Raymond D. Wood named as one of the grantees 
in that certain WARRANTY DEED , was one and the same person 
as Raymond Darrell Wood the decedent in the certificate of 
Death, a certified copy of which is hereto annexed and made 
a part hereof, and said Raymond D. Wood being now deceased 
the Affiant, Karen J. Wood is now the surviving tenant in 
and to all of the property hereinabove described. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 25th DAY OF August, 
2000. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY EMERY ) 
ON THE 26TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2000, PERSONALLY APPEARED 
BEFORE ME KAREN J. WOOD THE SIGNER OF THE FOREGOING 
INSTRUMENT, WHO DULY ACKNOWLEDGE TO ME. THAT ^liE^XECUTED 
THE SAME. 
aiding at CASTLE DALE, UTAH 
NOTARY PUBLIC 1 
STATE OF UTAH I 
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DIRECTOR OF VITAL RECORPS 
a b 
. 1 Ya» ?""} 2. No " 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. USB# 0309 
Attorney for Karen Wood 
62 West Main Street 
Post Office Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
Telephone: 435 436-8200 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY 





COLLEEN .WOOD, individually 
and as personal representative 
the es-tHte of RAYMOND D. WOOD. 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KAREN WOOD 
Civil No. 0107700169 
Assigned to: 
Honorable Bryce K. Bryner 
ooOoo 
KAREN WOOD, after being first duly sworn upon her oath 
deposes and states: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in this action and the facts which 
I state herein are based upon my knowledge and personal 
observations. I am a resident of Carbon County within the State of 
Utah and I am competent to testify as to the facts which I state 
herein and shall so testify if called as a witness in the 
proceeding. I make this affidavit in opposition to the Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment and motion for consolidation. 
Ai 
2. I married Raymond D. Wood on the 31st day of August, 
1973, in the County of Carbon within the State of Utah. 
3. Raymond D. Wood and I had two (2), children as issue 
of our marriage. These children are Eric Darrell Wood, born the 
2nd day of July, 1975, and Amanda Jean Wood, born the 4th day of 
January, 1979. 
4. Raymond D. Wood and I purchased a home during our 
marriage situate at 255 West 200 North, Orangeville, Utah. Copies 
of the two (2), Warranty Deeds by which we acquired our interest in 
our real property are attached hereto as Exhibits A, and B. 
5. The Warranty Deed dated September 15, 198 6, from 
Donna L. Gillis, to me and Raymond D. Wood, transferred and 
conveyed the real property to us "as joint tenants with full rights 
of survivorship and not as tenants in common." This warranty deed 
was recorded in the office of the Emery County Recorder on January 
2, 1987, as entry number 315284, in book 165, at pages 198-199. 
6. The Corrected Warranty Deed dated December 29, 1986, 
from Melba R. Shiner, to me and Raymond Darrell Wood, transferred 
and conveyed the real property to us, "as joint tenants." This 
Corrected Warranty Deed was recorded in the office of the Emery 
County Recorder on December 30, 1986, as entry number 315275, in 
book 165, at page 184. 
7. Raymond D. Wood and I were divorced by the Court on 
the 14th day of April, 1987. Raymond Wood and I have two (2), 
children as issue of our marriage. 
8. The real property identified above remained in joint 
tenancy and I retained my ownership interest in the real property 
throughout the divorce proceeding and thereafter because Raymond 
Wood failed to pay me my equity in the marital residence and real 
property. This was pursuant to a written Stipulation entered in 
the divorce proceeding on April 28, 1997. Mr. Wood, me and our 
respective counsel intended and agreed to leave the property in 
joint tenancy until I was paid in full for my equity in the home. 
9. On August 26, 1988, Raymond Wood married Coleen Wood. 
10. Raymond Wood told me that Colleen Wood began having 
an extra-marital affairs, and Raymond Wood moved out of our home 
leaving her living in the home. Colleen Wood filed for divorce and 
Raymond Wood committed suicide on July 17, 2000. 
11. The Defendant does not live in my home but now lives 
with her new husband, James Davis. Colleen (Wood) Davis never 
obtained an interest in my home. 
12. Raymond Wood never paid to me the equity in the 
marital residence and real property he stipulated to and was 
ordered to pay, and thus the real property remained in joint 
tenancy. I retained ownership of my home and real property and 
when he passed away the real property passed to me by operation of 
law because the real property remained in joint tenancy. After 
Raymond Woods death my home was transferred into my name alone. 
13. I have incurred and should be awarded my costs and 
attorney fees incurred upon my motion in the sum of One Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00), subject to amendment and proof 
upon hearing. 
DATED this j- day of 
LORRIE D. DENISON , 
,i MTARYPUBLIC-STATE of UTAH A 
') 85 W. CENTER STREET POB126L 
' HUNTINGTON, UT 8 4 5 2 8 1 
^ COMM. EXP. 10-24-2005 
2002 
A/V. c < LOinr 
EN WOOD, Plaintiff 
Cti" SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this __/ day of 
flbpLttiubuL, 2002, by KAREN WOOD, who is personally known to me and 
who acknowledged to me that.she signed the foregoing Affidavit 
voluntarily for the purposes stated therein. 
My Commission Expires: 
QA/IJ o *UA.AA-&^ 
TOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Sanpelg County, 
State of Utah B'tyyp^ 
A A 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING 
HEREBY CERTIFY that on this *7K/ day of September, 2002, I 
served upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class mail, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Karen Wood to: 
Michael K. Black, 
Attorney for Colleen Wood 
101 East 200 South, 
Springville, Utah 84663 
MICHAEL K. BLACK (#5038) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Respondents 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 489-3294 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN WOOD ; 
Plaintiff, " 
vs. ] 
COLLEN WOOD, individually ; 
and as personal representative ] 
of the estate of RAYMOND WOOD ; 
Defendants. ] 
) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND IN 
) SUPPORT OF CONSOLIDATION 
) Case No. 0107700169 
I Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
Defendant submits the following memorandum in reply to the memorandum submitted by 
Plaintiff. 
Defendant responds to Plaintiffs statement of facts as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
1. The memorandum received by Plaintiff did not have a paragraph numbered 1. 
2. Undisputed 
FILED 
OCT 1 6 2002 







8. Disputed-The assertion is directly contrary to the language in the Decree of Divorce and 
the stipulation. There in no mention of any intent to preserve the right of survivorship. On the 
contrary the Decree awards the property to Raymond Wood without any language reserving any right 
in the property to Plaintiff. 
9. Undisputed 
10. Object-Karen Wood does not have personal knowledge of the reasons why Raymond 
Wood committed suicide. 
11. Undisputed 
12. Disputed-Karen Wood does not offer the amount she claims that is owed to her but 
at the same time she has been precluded in the Protoite case from asserting any further claim against 






PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP TERMINATED WITH THE 
ENTRY OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The decree of divorce awards Raymond Wood the home located in Orangeville, Utah and 
grants to Karen Wood a judgement in the amount of $ 10,000. (See citations in Defendant's original 
memorandum.) Although the parties are calling upon the court to interpret the language of the 
decree it seems apparent to the Defendant that the survivorship provisions terminated with the entry 
of the decree of divorce. 
In other words had Raymond Woods written a check to Karen Woods for $10,000 the day 
after the entry of the decree of divorce there would little disagreement that Karen Woods would have 
no further claim. If one buys into the argument raised by Plaintiff it would make little difference 
whether the debt to Karen Wood is paid or not her position would still be that she was entitled to the 
property through a right of survivorship regardless of whether she has been paid. 
The issue of whether Karen Wood is entitled to any more money from Raymond Wood or 
his estate has already been resolved in the probate court and for which the court has determined that 
Karen Wood is not entitled to receive any more money from the estate of Raymond Wood. I does 
not make a difference whether the court determined that all monies owed were actually paid or that 
Karen Wood failed to properly assert her claim the result is the same that Karen Wood is not entitled 
to any further money. The probate court's decision went unappealed. 
3 
Pursuant to the stipulation in the divorce proceedings between Karen Wood and Raymond 
Wood it states: 
2. As long as the payments herein agreed are timely made, no interest shall accrue 
on the outstanding balance due. In the event any payment is not timely made, 
interest at the annual rate of 12% shall be computed from the date of this agreement 
and plaintiff, upon filing of an affidavit with the court that payments have not been 
timely made, shall be entitled to judgement against defendant for the balance owed, 
including accrued interest and attorney's fees included in the preparation and filing 
of the affidavit and judgement. Prior to filing and affidavit with the court as set forth 
in this paragraph, shall give to defendant ten days advanced written notice of the 
delinquency. 
3. Upon, the execution of this agreement, Plaintiff shall place with her attorney, 
Michael A. Harrison, an original, executed Quit Claim Deed to the property awarded 
to Defendant in the parties decree of divorce, Michael A. Harrison shall deliver the 
deed to Defendant upon payment of all sums due hereunder or to a title company 
within the event said deed is necessary to enable Defendant to refinance his property 
in order to satisfy his obligation hereunder. 
5. Each party hereby releases the other from any and all obligations that may exists 
or may, in the future, exist under the terms of the parties' decree of divorce or any 
subsequent modification thereto. 
There is no mention of an intent to preserve a right of survivorship, in fact Karen Wood 
specifically waived her right except for the right to obtain a judgement in the event of non-payment. 
Ms. Wood makes no mention of notice of delinquency as required above let alone there is no 
mention of how much is owed to her. 
Utah Code also precludes the Plaintiff from any right of survivorship: 
4 
75-2-804. Definitions - Revocation of probate and nonprobate transfers by 
divorce - Effect of severance - Revival - Protection of payors, third parties, and 
bona fide purchasers - Personal liability of recipient - No revocation by other 
changes of circumstances. 
(2) Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, 
or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced 
individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment, the divorce or 
annulment of a marriage: 
(b) severs the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at the time of 
the divorce or annulment as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, transforming 
the interests of the former spouses into tenancies in common. 
POINT II 
THE PROBATE COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO 
DETERMINE THE ISSUES AT HAND. 
Plaintiff asserts that the probate court does not have jurisdiction to address the issues raised 
by Plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff asserts that her claims are a claim of Quiet Title which 
mischaracterizes her claim against Raymond Wood. The Decree of Divorce and its amendment 
clearly identifies that Karen Wood was to receive something less than $3,600.00 in monthly 
payments of $100.00 per month. At best, Karen Wood would have a lien against the property to 
secure the payment of the debt. Karen Wood has had the ability to adjudicate the amount of money, 
if any, that is owed to her in the probate court which certainly has the jurisdiction to determine her 
5 
A f V 
claim against the Estate. The Plaintiff after having the opportunity to adjudicate that issue in the 
probate court which ruled in favor of the Estate of Raymond D. Wood and determined that Plaintiff 
Karen Wood did not have a claim against the Estate, now attempts to circumvent the ruling of the 
Court by filing her action in Quiet Title. 
The same court and/or Judge of the Seventh Judicial District Court has jurisdiction not only 
to hear the divorce proceedings; the probate proceedings as well as any issues relating to a Quiet 
Title action. 
Plaintiff cites case law asserting that the probate court does not have jurisdiction to hear a 
Quiet Title action in a probate matter. 
First of all, Plaintiffs claims against the Estate of Raymond Wood are no1 a claim for Quiet 
Title, but at best a claim for payment of money. 
Secondly, the Utah Supreme Court In Re McLaureifs Estate, McLauren v. McLauren, et aL 
106 P.2d 766 (Utah 1940) ruled that when a matter is adjudicated before a judge which would have 
jurisdiction over not only the probate matter but the contested matter (i.e. in this case Quiet Title 
action) and the matter is adjudicated that a party cannot later challenge the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Specifically the Court stared: 
The matter of transferring a cause from the probate calendar to a civil 
calendar in the same court is not a matter of jurisdiction but one of 
procedure. The relief and the rights which may be involved or to 
which the parties may be entitled are based upon and measured by the 
established rules of procedure. Had the appellants claimed that they 
had not been properly served or had they appeared for special purpose 
6 
or had they claimed the issues were not properly before the court, or 
that they were hastily summons or were unprepared for the trial, or 
had they indicated that they desired a jury trial upon the issues or 
assigned any other pertinent reasons for obj ecting to proceeding other 
than that of jurisdiction, the court would or should have continued the 
case to be tried at a time and according to the requirements of the 
code of civil procedure. 
Except as indicated no request was made. No heir is assigned or 
argued with respect to the overruling of the objection to the 
introduction of the evidence. Proceeding to hear the case without 
objection after consultation with the court is deemed waiver of the 
objection to the hearing. The proceedings were apparently regular. 
There is no suggestion that anyone's rights were effected or anyone 
prejudiced, because the court proceeded to hear the causes that it did. 
The Plaintiff had fair opportunity to assert her claims against the Estate in the probate matter 
and sought not to take the matter up on appeal and consequently has waived any claims that she has 
that the proceedings were irregular at this late date. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF MISTAKENLY ASSERTS THAT THE 
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS DID NOT TERMINATE THE 
JOINT TENANCY AND THE RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP. 
Specifically addressed above are the statutory provisions which in fact do terminate a right 
of survivorship when parties are divorced. 
In Plaintiffs Memorandum they asserts: 
Pursuant to the written stipulation, the real property was to remain in 
joint tenancy until Raymond Wood paid Karen Wood in full for her 
7 
interest in her marital residence and real property. A Quit Claim 
Deed was placed with Karen Wood's counsel, Michael A. Harrison, 
to be delivered to Raymond Wood upon the payment of all sums due 
under the stipulation. 
Plaintiff is mistaken as to the effect of placing the deed with Michael Harrison to secure 
payment of the debt. There is no mention in the stipulation of an intent to retain a right of 
survivorship or to maintain a joint tenancy in the pioperty. The clear language of Ihe stipulation was 
at best away of securing the payment of the debt as a lien against the property. Karen Wood's 
recourse, had the payments not been made, would be to proceed with a foreclosure on the property, 
have it sold and have any money owed to her be made out of the sales proceeds. The remainder of 
the sales proceeds would be paid to the Estate of Raymond Wood. The flaw in Plaintiffs reasoning 
is that she failed to preserve claims, if any, that she had for payment of the money through the 
probate proceedings and therefore, has lost her right to any payments. 
Plaintiff also asserts that under Wiggill v. Cheney, 597 P.2d 13 51 (Utah 1979) that there was 
no delivery of the deed. On the contrary, the delivery of the Quit Claim Deed to her attorney 
Michael Harrison to hold until payments have been made do in fact constitute delivery. The court 
in Wiggill v. Cheney stated: 
The rule is well settled that a deed, to be operative as a transfer of the 
ownership of land, or an interest or estate therein, must be delivered. 
It was equally settled in this and the vast majority of jurisdiction that 
a valid delivery of a deed requires it past beyond the control or 
domain of the grantor. The requisite relinquishment of control or 
dominion over the deed must be established, not withstanding the fact 
the deed is in possession of the grantor at her death, by proof of facts 
which tend to show delivery had been made with the intention to past 
title and to explain the grantors subsequent possession. However, in 
order for delivery effectively to transfer title, the grantor must part 
with possession of the deed or the right to retain it. 
The delivery of the deed to Michael Harrison to be held to secure the payments constitutes 
delivery of the deed. 
Plaintiff also misconstrued the law in its assertion in its Memorandum which reads as 
follows: 
The deed could not be delivered after Raymond Woods death and if 
it had been, it would not convey title to the property or any part 
thereof. 
Plaintiff misconstrues the law set out in Wiggle v. Cheney. Perhaps if Raymond Wood had 
been the grantor and not delivered a deed prior to his death, the assertion made by Plaintiff would 
be accurate. On the other hand, it is Karen Wood who is the grantor who placed the deed out of her 
possession with Michael Harrison and certainly the deed can be delivered and held in the name of 
the Estate of Raymond Wood. 
POINT IV 
THE ARGUMENTS MADE BY COUNSEL FOR BOTH 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT FURTHER DICTATE WHY 
THIS MATTER SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED. 
The potential that there could be inconsistent rulings between all of the cases involving the 
same parties necessitates the consolidation of the cases into one proceeding. The divorce 
9 
proceedings have certain agreements and rulings from the court. The probate court has ordered that 
Karen Wood instruct Michael Harrison to release the deed which has the potential of creating an 
inconsistent determination from what potentially could be resolved by Judge Bryner in the Quiet 
Title action. 
In order to create consistency among all of the cases and to have it resolved in one proceeding 
necessitates the consolidation of all of the cases. 
DATED this _ / $ _ day of \ j ^ t / 2002. 
ffCHAEL K. BLACK MI 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Andrew B. Berry, Jr., Esq. 
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P.O. Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 JkUt jj/ito 
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Ms. Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State, 5th Floor 
P. O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Dear Ms. Stagg: 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR242004 
Re: State v. Montiel 
Case No. 20030310-CA 
Defense counsel submits this letter to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to rule 24(i) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In his reply brief, Montiel cites this Court's 
decision in State v. Geukgeuzian for the proposition that the invited error doctrine only 
applies if the defendant affirmatively led the trial court into error. See Rply. Br. at 22 
(citing Geukgeuzian, 2002 UT App 130, ^ 10, 54 P.3d 640 (holding defendant did not 
invite error by proposing '"elements instruction containing the very omission he 
complains of on appeal'" because he did not "actually l[ead] the trial court into its 
erroneous action"), cert, granted, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002)). On February 24, 2004, the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed this Court's decision, but agreed the invited error doctrine 
only applies where the defendant "affirmatively" leads the trial court into error. State v. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,1J12, 2004 Utah LEXIS 26 (reversing court of appeals' 
decision, even though defendant's "failure to include a separate mens rea element in his 
proposed instruction was most likely inadvertent," because defendant "did not simply 
omit a mens rea element; rather, he affirmatively purported to list all 'essential elements' 
Ms. Paulette Stagg 
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needed to prove that an individual tampered with a witness'1). Because the supreme court 
agreed the invited error doctrine only applies where the defendant affirmatively leads the 
trial court into error, the supreme court's reversal does not affect this case. See Rply. Br. 
at 22. 
This Court's and the supreme court's decisions in Geukgeuzian are attached. 
Sincerely, 
sp * ^ 




cc (w/attachment): Karen A. Klucznik 
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010219-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2002 UTApp 130; 54 PJd 640; 446 Utah Adv. Rep. 9; 2002 Utah App. LEXIS 37 
April 25, 2002, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Rehearing denied by, 
05/14/2002 
Writ of certiorari granted State v. Geukgeuzian, 59 P. 3d 
603', 2002 Utah LEXIS 186 (Utah, 2002) 
Reversed by, Remanded by State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 
16, 2004 Utah LEXIS 26 (2004) 
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Second District, Farmington 
Department. The Honorable Michael G. Allphin. 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
remanded. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Second District Court, 
Farmington Department, Utah, convicted defendant of 
tampering with witness, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
508(1) (Supp. 2001), and making a written false statement, 
a class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
504(2) (1999). Defendant appealed. 
OVERVIEW: Defendant argued the trial court failed to 
properly instruct the jury on the elements of both offenses. 
Defendant also argued that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The appellate court found that the 
trial court gave an elements instruction to the jury that 
closely tracked the language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
508, but omitted the language referring to the required 
mental state. The instruction given did not specify the 
culpable mental state required for attempting or inducing 
a person as described in the statute. It was manifest 
injustice in the trial court's failure to include the mental 
state required for tampering with a witness. Defendant 
failed to demonstrate error as to the instruction concerning 
the elements of making a written false statement. There 
was little distinction between defendant submitting or 
inviting reliance on a writing which he did not believe to be 
true and one which he knew lacked in authenticity, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504(2)(c). Evidence 
established defendant's personal knowledge regarding 
whether defendant was aware the witness was around when 
defendant allegedly made threatening statements about his 
wife. 
OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed as to the 
tampering with a witness conviction and affirmed as to 
defendant's conviction for making a written false statement. 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts: 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Substantial Evidence Review 
[HN1 ] The appellate court views the facts in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict and recites them accordingly. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Plain Error 
[HN2] Manifest injustice under Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) is 
determined using the plain error standard. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Plain Error 
[HN3] To demonstrate plain error, defendant must 
establish the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful. In order to show that the error is harmful, 
defendant must demonstrate that absent the error, there is 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective 
Assistance > Tests 
[HN4] In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim the appellate court applies the two-part test of 
Strickland. To satisfy that test, the defendant must show: 
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(1) that counsel's performance was deficient below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. If 
a defendant fails to establish either of the two parts of the 
Strickland test, counsel's assistance was constitutionally 
sufficient, and the appellate court need not address the 
other part of the test. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > 
Miscellaneous Offenses > Witness Tampering 
[HN5] See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1) (Supp. 2001). 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > 
Miscellaneous Offenses > Witness TamperingCriminal 
Law & Procedure > Scienter > Specific Intent 
[HN6] Because Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 specifies no 
mens rea for the attempt or inducement element, the 
required mental state is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-102 (1999). That section states that every offense not 
involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the offense does not 
specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not 
involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness 
shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1999). 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Scienter > Specific 
IntentCriminal Law & Procedure > Jury Instructions > 
Particular InstructionsCriminal Law & Procedure > 
Appeals > Reversible Error 
[HN7] To avoid manifest injustice, an elements instruction 
that fails to include the mens rea constitutes reversible 
error. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Harmless & Invited Errors 
[HN8] Where invited error butts up against manifest 
injustice, the invited error rule prevails. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Fraud 
> False Statements 
[HN9] See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504(2) (1999). 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Fraud 
> False Statements 
[HN10] Whether a defendant knows a writing lacked 
authenticity turns on whether he was aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-103(2) (\999). 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective 
Assistance > Tests 
[HN11] Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot 
be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality. 
Evidence > Witnesses > Personal Knowledge 
[HN12] See Utah R. Evid. 602. 
COUNSEL: Jerald V. Hale and Kendall Peterson, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and J. Frederic Voros Jr., Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee. 
JUDGES: Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Davis. 
DAVIS, Judge concurring and dissenting. 
OPINIONBY: Norman H. Jackson 
OPINION: [**642] 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
[*P1] Defendant appeals his convictions for Tampering 
with witness, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-508(1) (Supp. 2001), and making a Written false 
statement, a class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-504(2) (1999). He argues the trial court failed to 
properly instruct the jury on the elements of both offenses. 
Further, he contends that he received ineffective assistance 
of counsel. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] [HN1] "We view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict and recite them accordingly." 
State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, P2, 994 P.2d 1237. 
[*P3] Defendant [***2] supervised Airman Jason Lyon, 
who often overheard Defendant making threats of violence 
against Defendant's wife when he and Defendant were 
driving together in a vehicle or working together in a 
"small area." nl On May 5, 2000, Lyon signed a sworn 
statement regarding the threats he had overheard. After she 
learned of Defendant's threats, Defendant's ex-wife, Tatilia 
Geukgeuzian, filed a petition for a protective order. 
nl . Because he was in close proximity to 
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Defendant during these conversations and 
participated in them, Lyon testified at trial that in 
his view Defendant must have been aware that 
Lyon had heard Defendant's threats. 
[*P4] Defendant then took Lyon into a back room and 
requested that he make a statement "for his court case" 
suggesting that Lyon had never overheard Defendant 
threaten his ex-wife. Lyon complied with Defendant's 
request. A short time later, Defendant presented Lyon with 
a similar typed statement that Defendant had written for 
Lyon to sign. Lyon signed that statement also. [***3] At 
trial, Lyon testified, in effect, that he signed these two 
statements because he felt intimidated by Defendant, and 
because Defendant was his supervisor and could punish 
him at work. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[*P5] Defendant presents three challenges to the jury 
instructions. Because Defendant failed to object to the 
challenged jury instructions at trial, we review those 
instructions only upon a showing of manifest injustice. See 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Casey, 2001 UT App 205, 
P26, 29 P.3d 25. [HN2] "Manifest injustice under Rule 
19(c) [of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] . . . is 
determined using the plain error standard." State v. Irwin, 
924 P.2d 5, 10 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
[HN3] To demonstrate plain error, 
defendant must establish the following: "(i) 
An error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful...." In order to show that 
the error is harmful, defendant must 
demonstrate that "absent the error, there is 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant. 
State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, PI8 34 P.3d 187 
[***4] (citation omitted). 
[*P6] Defendant also challenges his conviction on the 
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
[HN4] In reviewing an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim we apply the 
two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 
2052 (1984). To satisfy that test, the 
defendant must show: "(1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient below an 
objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and (2) counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant." If 
a defendant fails to establish either of the 
two parts of the Strickland test, counsel's 
assistance was constitutionally sufficient, 
and we need not address the other part of 
the test. 
Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79 at P14 (citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Jury Instructions 
[*P7] Defendant argues the trial court improperly 
instructed the jury in three ways. [**643] First, he 
contends the trial court committed reversible error when it 
failed to instruct the jury on an element of tampering with 
a witness. We agree. 
[*P8] [HN5] "A person is guilty of a third degree felony 
if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation 
[***5] is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to 
induce or otherwise cause a person to: (a) testify or inform 
falsely; [or] (b) withhold any testimony, information, 
document, or item; " Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1) 
(Supp. 2001). [HN6] Because section 76-8-508 specifies 
no mens rea for the attempt or inducement element, the 
required mental state is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-102 (1999). That section states, "Every offense not 
involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the offense does not 
specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not 
involve strict liability, 'intent, knowledge, or recklessness 
shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-102(1999). 
[*P9] Here, "the trial court gave an elements instruction 
to the jury that closely tracked the language of [section 76-
8-508] but omitted the language referring to the required 
mental state. The instruction given thus does not specify 
the culpable mental state required for" attempting or 
inducing a person as described in the statute. [***6] State 
v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, P53, 989 P.2d 1091 
(footnote omitted). [HN7] "To avoid manifest injustice, an 
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elements instruction that fails to include the mens rea 
constitutes reversible error." Id. at P54. Thus, as a matter 
of law the trial court's failure to include the mental state 
required for tampering with a witness is manifest injustice. 
[*P10] The State argues that because "Defendant actually 
proposed an elements instruction containing the very 
omission he complains of on appeal," he invited the trial 
court's error. n2 The State cites Chaney for the proposition 
that Defendant is thus precluded from benefitting by the 
manifest injustice exception; however, Chaney is 
distinguishable from the present case. Although Chaney 
involved a similar fact pattern, we determined that the 
defendant in that case invited the error complained of 
because he objected to and rejected the trial court's correct 
jury instruction and pressed "his theory that the accomplice 
statute requires intent." Id. at P55. Chaney's conduct led 
the trial court to commit error. See id. at PP54-55. Here, 
the State has not shown that Defendant's conduct actually 
led the [***7] trial court into its erroneous action. Thus, 
the invited error doctrine does not apply in this case. See 
id. at P54 ("[A] party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error." (quoting State v. Anderson, 929 
P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (Emphasis added)). 
Accordingly, we reverse Defendant's conviction for 
tampering with a witness and remand for a new trial on the 
tampering with a witness charge. n3 
n2 . [HN8] "Where invited error butts up 
against manifest injustice, the invited error rule 
prevails." State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); accord State v. Chaney, 
1999 UTApp 309, P54, 989 P.2d 1091. 
n3 . In light of this decision, we do not address 
Defendant's challenge based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel to his conviction for witness 
tampering. 
[HN9] 
[*P11] Next, Defendant argues the trial court improperly 
instructed thejury regarding the elements of making [***8] 
a written false statement. A defendant is guilty of making 
a written false statement if "with intent to deceive a public 
servant in the performance of his official function, he: (a) 
Makes any written false statement which he does not 
believe to be true; o r . . . (c) Submits or invites reliance on 
any writing which he knows to be lacking in authenticity." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504(2) (1999). The trial court's 
elements instruction for this offense states that Defendant 
was guilty of false written statement if "intending to 
deceive a public servant in the performance of his official 
function [he]; a. Made or caused to be made a written false 
statement which [he] did not believe to be true; or b. 
Submitted or invited reliance upon a writing which [he] 
knew to be lacking in authenticity." (Emphasis added.) 
[*P12] Defendant contends the language "or caused to be 
made" "impermissibly expands [**644] the scope of the 
statute by inferring that [section] 76-8-504(2)(a) would 
include a written false statement of a third party which was 
made at" Defendant's request. Further, Defendant argues 
this language creates a hybrid between section 76-8-
504(2)(a) [***9] and section 76-8-504(2)(c), which 
invited thejury to substitute the "knowing" mental state of 
section 76-8-504(2)(c) with the "believing" mental state of 
section 76-8-504(2)(a). The State counters, arguing that 
because the added language "criminalizes no conduct that 
is not already criminalized by subsection (2)(c)," we can 
determine that the jury found all the elements of the 
offense. Thus, the State argues, Defendant cannot meet his 
burden of showing manifest injustice because he cannot 
show the error was prejudicial. 
[*P13] We agree with the State. As applied to Defendant, 
the language "or caused to be made" makes illegal no 
conduct that section 76-8-504(2)(c), on which thejury was 
instructed, did not already "criminalize." Put differently, 
we conclude on the facts of this case that if Defendant 
"caused to be made a written false statement which [he] did 
not believe to be true," he necessarily either "submitted] 
or invited reliance on [a] writing which he [knew] to be 
lacking in authenticity." n4 Id. In the present case we find 
little distinction between Defendant submitting or inviting 
reliance on a writing which he did "not believe to be true" 
and one [***10] "which he knows to be lacking in 
authenticity." Id. "Although the general verdict in this case 
gave no indication of which variation of [making a written 
false statement] thejury relied upon in its conviction, the 
record contains abundant evidence-both eyewitness 
testimony and physical evidence—from which the jury 
could conclude that Defendant" was guilty of making a 
written false statement. State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 
1048 (Utah 1984). Thus, we cannot say Defendant has 
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"demonstrated that 'absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for'" Defendant. 
State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, PI8, 34 P. 3d 187 
(citation omitted). As a result, Defendant fails to 
demonstrate plain error or manifest injustice. Accordingly, 
we reject this challenge to the trial court's false statement 
jury instructions. 
n4 . However, we note that one can meet the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
504(2)(c){\999) other than by causing a written 
false statement to be made as described above. 
[HN10] 
[***11] 
[*P 14] Defendant finally argues the trial court improperly 
instructed the jury regarding the elements of making a 
written false statement because it "failed to define the 
mental state of 'knows'" contained in section 76-8-
504(2)(c). However, he has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice. Whether Defendant "knew" a writing lacked 
authenticity turns on whether he was "aware of the nature 
of his conduct or the existing circumstances." Utah Code 
Ann.§ 76-2-103(2) (1999). Defendant fails to demonstrate 
that an instruction defining knowledge in this manner 
would result in "'a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for'" him. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT79 
at PI8 (citation omitted). Thus, this challenge to the jury 
instructions also fails. 
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
[*P15] Defendant also challenges his conviction for 
making a written false statement based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel. [HN11] "Proof of ineffective 
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but 
must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 
P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). 
[*P16] Defendant argues that his [*** 12] trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to a 
certain line of questioning the prosecutor put to Lyon. He 
asserts the prosecutor's questions to Lyon, regarding 
Defendant's knowledge of the truthfulness of the writing 
Defendant requested Lyon to submit, were objectionable 
under Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. n5 
Defendant claims he was prejudiced because, the jury was 
allowed to hear and consider without a curative instruction, 
a statement attributing a state of mind to defendant, which 
was supported by no other evidence before the court. . . . 
No evidence was introduced [**645] to support a 
contention to the effect that A irman Lyon had any personal 
knowledge whatsoever regarding whether [Defendant] was 
aware Airman Lyon was around when [Defendant] 
allegedly made threatening statements about his wife. Nor 
was there any evidence introduced to . . . establish the 
personal knowledge of Airman Lyon that Appellant was 
asking him to "write something that was false." 
n5 . [HN12] "A witness may not testify to a 
matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that the witness has personal 
knowledge of the matter." Utah R. Evid. 602. 
r*** 13] 
[*P17] However, our review of the record reveals that 
abundant evidence was presented to establish Lyon's 
personal knowledge "regarding whether [Defendant] was 
aware Lyon was around when [Defendant] allegedly made 
threatening statements about his wife." Thus, Defendant 
failed to establish the reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome at trial, and thereby failed to establish 
prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant's conviction 
for making a written false statement. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P 18] Because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on 
the mental state required for tampering with a witness, we 
reverse his conviction on that charge and remand for a new 
trial on that charge. Otherwise, we affirm. 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
[*P19] I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
CONCURBY: James Z. Davis (In Part) 
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DISSENTBY: James Z. Davis (In Part) 
DISSENT: DAVIS, Judge (concurring and dissenting): 
[*P20] I concur in the majority's analysis of the tampering 
with a witness conviction. 
[*P21 ] I do not, however, share the majority's analysis or 
result respecting the written false statement conviction. 
Since [***14] the indisputedly erroneous instruction 
added language to the statute that made it uniquely 
applicable to the evidence in this case, suggesting that the 
jury could have found Defendant guilty under another 
section is a stretch that I cannot in good conscience make. 
[*P22] When tailoring a statute to fit the evidence is 
coupled with a failure to define the mental state required 
for conviction, I believe the Defendant has clearly 
established plain error, and his conviction for written false 
statement should also be reversed. James Z. Davis, Judge 
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
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NOTICE: [**1] THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO 
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OFFICIAL REPORTER. 
PRIOR HISTORY: On Certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. State v. Geukgeuzian, 54 P. 3d640, 2002 UTApp 
130, 2002 Utah App. LEXIS 37 (2002) 
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded for further 
consideration consistent with this opinion. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Utah Court of Appeals 
reversed defendant's conviction of tampering with a 
witness, reasoning that the trial court's failure to include a 
mens rea element in its jury instruction resulted in manifest 
injustice. The State appealed. 
OVERVIEW: The court of appeals rejected the State's 
contention that defendant invited the error by omitting the 
challenged element in his own proposed instruction. The 
State argued that defendant's failure to include a mens rea 
element in his proposed jury instruction was invited error. 
The supreme court found that defendant's failure to include 
a separate mens rea element in his proposed instruction 
was most likely inadvertent and not a conscious attempt to 
mislead the trial court. However, his proposed jury 
instruction effectively led the trial court into adopting an 
erroneous jury instruction that he now challenged on 
appeal. Defendant did not simply omit a mens rea element, 
he affirmatively purported to list all essential elements 
needed to prove that an individual tampered with a witness. 
The supreme court also remanded for further consideration 
of whether defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed and remanded. 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts: 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Substantial Evidence Review 
[HN1 ] The appellate court recites the facts from the record 
in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > 
Miscellaneous Offenses > Witness Tampering 
[HN2] See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1). 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Scienter > Specific Intent 
[HN3] Utah Code Ann. § 7-6-102 (1999) provides that 
every offense not involving strict liability shall require a 
culpable mental state, and when the definition of the 
offense does not specify a culpable mental state and the 
offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge 
or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > De Novo Review 
[HN4] On certiorari, the supreme court reviews the court 
of appeals' decision for correctness, giving its conclusions 
of law no deference. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Harmless & Invited ErrorsCriminal Law & 
Procedure > Jury Instructions > Objections 
[HN5] While a party who fails to object to or give an 
instruction may have an instruction assigned as error under 
the manifest injustice exception, Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e), a 
party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial 
when that party led the trial court into committing the error. 
Accordingly, a jury instruction may not be assigned as 
error even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice 
if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively 
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to 
the jury instruction. 
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Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Harmless & Invited Errors 
[HN6] While the invited error doctrine is crafted to 
discourage parties from intentionally misleading the trial 
court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on 
appeal, it is also intended to give the trial court the first 
opportunity to address the claim of error. 
COUNSEL: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., J. Frederic 
Voros, Jr., Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Kendall S. Peterson, Jerald V. Hale, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant. 
JUDGES: DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice. Chief 
Justice Durham, Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish, and 
Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Durrant's 
opinion. 
OPINIONBY: DURRANT 
OPINION: DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: 
[*P1] Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian was 
convicted of tampering with a witness. The court of 
appeals reversed his conviction, reasoning that the trial 
court's failure to include a mens rea element in its jury 
instruction resulted in manifest injustice. We conclude that 
defendant invited the error when he proposed a jury 
instruction that purported to include all the essential 
elements of the offense but, like the trial court's instruction 
he challenges on appeal, failed to include a mens rea 
element. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] [HN1] "We recite the facts from the record . 
. . in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. [**2] " 
State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, P2, 82 P. 3d 1106 (quotation 
omitted). 
[*P3] In May 2000, Geukgeuzian was charged with 
tampering with a witness in violation of Utah Code section 
76-8-508(1), nl and with making a false written statement 
in violation of Utah Code section 76-8-504(2). During his 
trial, Geukgeuzian proposed a jury instruction that recited 
almost verbatim the elements listed in the witness 
tampering statute. H is proposed instruction concluded with 
the following: 
If you find the evidence has failed to prove any one or 
more of these essential elements to your satisfaction 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then it would be your duty to 
find the defendant not guilty of TAMPERING WITH A 
WITNESS, a Third Degree Felony, as charged in the 
Information. On the other hand, if you find from the 
evidence received during the trial that the State has proven 
each and every one of those essential elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it would be your duty to find the 
defendant guilty of the offense of TAMPERING WITH A 
WITNESS, a Third Degree Felony. 
nl Section 76-8-508(1) provides as follows: 
[HN2] (1) A person is guilty of a third degree 
felony if, believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he 
attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, 
document, [or] item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to 
provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or 
investigation to which he has been summoned. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1) (1999). 
[**3] 
[*P4] The State proposed an instruction that also 
tracked the statutory elements of tampering with a witness. 
Neither set of proposed instructions contained direct 
reference to a separate culpable mental state apart from the 
language of the statute requiring that a defendant act 
"believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted." See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-508(1). Relying on the proposed instructions 
submitted by both parties, the trial court gave a jury 
instruction very similar to that proposed by both 
Geukgeuzian and the State with no separate mens rea 
requirement. n2 Geukgeuzian entered no objection to the 
court's instruction and was subsequently found guilty of 
tampering with a witness. He moved for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court denied. 
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n2 The instruction given to the jury was as 
follows: 
Before you can convict defendant, Stephen 
Lamar Geukgeuzian, of TAMPERING WITH A 
WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the 
Information, you must find from the evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of the crime: 
1. That on or about May 15, 2000, in Davis 
County, State of Utah[;] 
2. The Defendant Stephen Lamar 
Geukgeuzian, believing that an official proceeding 
or investigation is pending or about to be instituted; 
3. Attempted to induce or other [sic] cause a 
person to: 
(a) Testify or inform falsely; or 
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, 
document, or item. 
If, after careful consideration of all the 
evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, 
guilty of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, as 
charged in Count 1 of the Information. 
If, on the other hand, after careful 
consideration of all of the evidence in this case, 
you are not convinced of each and every one of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then you must find the defendant, Stephen Lamar 
Geukgeuzian, not guilty of TAMPERING WITH A 
WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the 
Information. 
[**4] 
[*P5] Geukgeuzian appealed his conviction, arguing 
that the trial court erred by failing to include in its jury 
instructions the mens rea needed to establish that a 
defendant tampered with a witness. The court of appeals 
agreed, reasoning that because the witness tampering 
statute specifies no mens rea for the attempt or inducement 
element, the trial court was required to include in its 
instruction the requirement that Geukgeuzian must have 
acted with intent, knowledge, or recklessness as specified 
in Utah Code section 76-2-102. n3 The court of appeals 
rejected the State's contention that Geukgeuzian invited the 
error by omitting the challenged element in his own 
proposed instructions. The court cited to its prior decision 
in State v. Chaney, 1999 UTApp 309, P53t 989 P. 2d 1091, 
and reasoned that, unlike in Chaney, the State had failed to 
show that "[Geukgeuzian]'s conduct actually led the trial 
court into its erroneous action." 
n3 Section 76-2-102 [HN3] provides that 
"every offense not involving strict liability shall 
require a culpable mental state, and when the 
definition of the offense does not specify a 
culpable mental state and the offense does not 
involve strict liability, intent, knowledge or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 
(1999). 
[**5] 
[*P6] The State appeals the court of appeals' 
decision, arguing that Geukgeuzian's failure to include a 
mens rea element in his proposed jury instruction was 
invited error. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code section 78-2-2(3) (a) (2002). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P7] [HN4] "On certiorari, we review the court of 
appeals' decision for correctness, giving its conclusions of 
law no deference." State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, P10, 82 
P.3dll06(c\tmgStatev. James, 2000 UT80, P8, 13 PJd 
576) (further citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
[*P8] The State argues that the court of appeals erred 
in reversing Geukgeuzian's conviction because he invited 
the error by proposing a jury instruction that contained the 
same error as the instruction he attacks on appeal. n4 
Geukgeuzian counters that to constitute invited error, a 
defendant must have engaged in a conscious and 
affirmative act that led the trial court to commit the 
instructional error. He asserts that because his proposed 
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jury instruction simply provided an accurate recitation of 
the statutory elements, his failure to include a culpable 
mental state was an [* *6] inadvertent omission, not invited 
error. 
n4 The court of appeals determined that the 
trial court's failure to include a separate culpable 
mental state apart from the language in the witness 
tampering statute resulted in manifest injustice as 
a matter of law and reversed Geukgeuzian's 
conviction. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2002 UT App 
130, P9, 54 P.3d640. Because we denied certiorari 
on this issue, we express no opinion as to whether 
the court of appeals was correct in requiring a 
separate mens rea element. We consider only 
whether the court of appeals' reversal of 
Geukgeuzian's conviction under the manifest 
injustice exception is precluded by his invited 
error. 
[*P9] [HN5] While a party who fails to object to or 
give an instruction may have an instruction assigned as 
error under the manifest injustice exception, Utah R. Crim. 
P. 19(e), "a party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error," State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d J107, 
1109 (Utah 1996) [**7] (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)) (internal quotation omitted). 
Accordingly, a jury instruction may not be assigned as 
error even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice 
"if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively 
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to 
the jury instruction." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT22, P54, 
70P.3dlll. 
[*P10] We have recognized a number of ways in 
which a defendant has led a trial court into committing 
error. In Hamilton, for instance, a defendant invited error 
where his counsel confirmed on the record that the defense 
had no objection to the instructions given by the trial court. 
Id. atP55. In Anderson, a defendant likewise invited error 
when he failed to object to an instruction when specifically 
queried by the court. 929P.2dat 1108-09. Finally, in State 
v. Medina, a defendant invited error when his counsel 
actively represented to the trial court that she had read the 
instruction and had no objection to it. 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 
(Utah 1987). 
[*P11] The court of appeals has also addressed 
situations [**8] in which a defendant affirmatively 
endorsed an instruction before the court. For example, in 
State v. Chaney, a defendant invited error when he 
objected to the trial court's use of a correct jury instruction 
and later challenged the substituted erroneous jury 
instruction on appeal. 1999 UT App 309, P55, 989 P.2d 
1091. And in State v. Perdue, a defendant invited error 
when he challenged an instruction that he had submitted to 
the trial court. 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
[*P12] [HN6] While the invited error doctrine is 
crafted to '"discourage[] parties from intentionally 
misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground 
for reversal on appeal,'" it is also intended to give the trial 
court the first opportunity to address the claim of error. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT22 atP54 (quoting Anderson, 929 P.2d 
at 1109) (further citation omitted). We acknowledge that 
Geukgeuzian's failure to include a separate mens rea 
element in his proposed instruction was most likely 
inadvertent and not a conscious attempt to mislead the trial 
court. Nevertheless, we believe that, like those cases 
discussed above, his [**9] proposed jury instruction 
effectively led the trial court into adopting the erroneous 
jury instruction that he now challenges on appeal. Contrary 
to his assertions before this court, Geukgeuzian did not 
simply omit a mens rea element; rather, he affirmatively 
purported to list all "essential elements" needed to prove 
that an individual tampered with a witness. Accordingly, 
we find that Geukgeuzian invited the trial court's erroneous 
jury instruction and reverse the court of appeals' decision 
below. 
[*P13] We note that Geukgeuzian raised an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal, which 
the court of appeals found unnecessary to reach in light of 
its reversal of his conviction. Because we did not grant 
certiorari and neither party has briefed this issue, we 
remand for further consideration of whether Geukgeuzian 
received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P14] Because Geukgeuzian purported to include in 
his proposed jury instruction all the necessary elements 
needed to prove that a defendant tampered with a witness 
but omitted a separate mens rea element, we hold that he 
led the trial court into its omission of a separate culpable 
mental [**10] state in its jury instruction. Therefore, his 
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conviction may not be reversed even if the trial court's 
instruction resulted in manifest injustice. We reverse and 
remand for further consideration consistent with this 
opinion. 
[*P15] Chief Justice Durham, Justice Wilkins, 
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Associate 
Chief Justice Durrant's opinion. 
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THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF UTAH COUNTY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960400821 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court for hearing on 
May 14, 2002. Samuel D. McVey appeared for the Plaintiff and Craig V. Wentz appeared for the 
Defendant. Upon reviewing the Motion and memoranda filed by the parties, hearing the 
arguments of counsel, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, 
enters the following Order and Judgment. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
7/31^ Mtf\
 r )g ! l t l t y 
I. BACKGROUND 
The matter before the Court concerns real property known as the Ironton Plat and 
Ordinance 1996-20 affecting such plat which the Board of Utah County Commissioners adopted. 
Ordinance 1996-20 vacated certain streets of the plat and Plaintiffs purported ownership of a 
private right-of-way over the property. In February 1926, Knight Investment Company recorded 
the Ironton Plat and dedicated for public use Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Walnut, Naples, Dupont 
and Pine streets. In 1935 Utah County and the Colorado Development Company conveyed land 
each owned near or within the Ironton Plat to the State of Utah to be included in the development 
of the newly aligned Highway 89 between Provo City to the north and Springville City to the 
south. Subsequently, On July 9, 1983, the R.L. Bird Company delivered a quit claim deed to 
Utah County that conveyed lots it owned within the Ironton Plat to accommodate the County's 
construction of a public works building and a strip of land on the south boundary of the plat. 
This quit claim deed contained a reservation which is the subject of Defendant's Motion that 
states: 
RESERVING to the grantor the public use and right-of-way over and into Pine 
Street from the State Highway and a 56' wide right-of-way over and across the 
last described parcel of land, from Pine Street to connect with grantor's remaining 
property over which Utah County agrees to build a good gravel road within 90 
days of the date of this instrument, to provide access to grantor's remaining land. 
On November 27, 1995, R.L. Bird Company conveyed another portion of its property 
located to the south and east of the Ironton Plat to Jamie Evans and Terry Evans (hereinafter 
"Plaintiff). In January 1986, the County completed the construction of a public works facility 
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that included a building, a service station, and a parking lot within the Ironton Plat. During 
construction a substantial amount of material was removed from the hillside located on the west 
end of the Pine Street right-of-way. On October 29, 1996, the Board of Utah County 
Commissioners (hereinafter "Defendant") adopted Ordinance 1996-20 (hereinafter "UCO 1996-
20"), that vacated the platted Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets. The vacating ordinance UCO 
1996-20 as adopted did not vacate platted Yale and Pine Streets or Columbia Avenue. 
Seeking to challenge the vacating ordinance Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on 
February 7, 1997. Defendant filed its Answer on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, on November 21, 
2001, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment to which Plaintiff filed his Opposition 
on April 2, 2002, and which was followed by Defendant's Reply on May 8, 2002. Subsequently, 
the Court heard oral argument on the Motion on May 14, 2002 and took the Motion under 
advisement. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "a judgment shall be rendered 
upon a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact." Defendant asserts that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact because Plaintiffs causes of action are barred under the law. By 
its Motion Defendant asserts that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the ordinance; and 
notwithstanding a lack of standing, the ordinance is not arbitrary, capricious or illegal under 
U.C.A. 17-27-1001; that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim fails because there is no violation of Plaintiff s 
right to due process; that Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action is barred by the statute of 
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limitations; that Plaintiffs reservation of aright-a-way is void; that Plaintiff failed to file a notice 
of claim with the County; and Plaintiffs request for Declaratory Judgment is a redundant cause 
of action. Plaintiff denies that Defendant's assertions are a valid bar of his causes of action, but 
concedes that his third cause of action for breach of contract is barred by the statute of 
limitations. Further, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs wife Mrs. Terry Evans must be added to 
the lawsuit because the quit-claim deeds of 1995 and 2001 both contain her name, and, therefore, 
she is an indispensable party. As communicated at oral argument, ihe Court notes that Mrs. 
Evans' name does appear on the deeds, and as such the Court would grant Plaintiffs request for 
leave to join her as a Plaintiff. Her joinder therefore is not material for the outcome of this 
Ruling. 
The Court begins its analysis with Plaintiffs claim requesting the Court declare Utah 
County Ordinance 1996-20 void pursuant to Utah Code § 17-27-1001, as an arbitrary and 
capricious action. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this claim under 
U.C.A. § 17-27-1001. Plaintiff, however, contends that his action can be brought under either 
under UCA § 17-27-1001 or U.C.A. § 17-27-1002 which does not require standing to enforce a 
claim. U.C.A. § 17-27-1001, states in part: 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land use decisions made 
under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this chapter 
until that person has exhausted all administrative remedies. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in exercise of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the 
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered. . . . 
(3) (a) The Court shall: 
(i) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
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(ii) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal, 
(b) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision 
violates a statute, ordinance, or existing law. 
U.C.A. § 17-27-1002, states in pertinent part: 
(1) (a) A county, county attorney, or any owner of real estate within the county in 
which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority of this 
chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other remedies provided by 
law, institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful building, 
use, or act. . . . 
Plaintiff asserts that U.C.A. § 17-27-1002 only requires a person own property within the 
county. Further, Plaintiff contends that he also has standing to satisfy section 1001 because his 
property abuts the subject Naples, Dupont and Pine streets. Defendant, however, asserts that 
Plaintiffs arguments fail because he initially brought his action under U.C.A. § 17-27-1001 not 
U.C.A. § 17-27-1002; that he is challenging the County's land use decision rather than seeking to 
enforce provisions of the Land Use Act or the ordinance that the County enacted under its 
authority; and he has failed to allege facts that would trigger the application of U.C.A. § 17-27-
1002. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the distinction between section 1001 and section 1002 
as: 
Section 1001 applies only when a party desires to challenge a land use decision. 
Plaintiffs do not challenge any decisions made under the Land Use Act, but 
instead seek enforcement of decisions made pursuant to it.... Enforcement of the 
act and ordinances made pursuant to it is addressed in 1002.... 
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Culhertson v Board o,f County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 437 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
2001). 
The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument. After review of the presented 
authorities the Court concludes that Plaintiffs claim is contained within section 1001. The Court 
notes, however, Plaintiff fails to maintain a claim under section 1002 because he fails to assert 
that Defendant violated UCO 1996-20 and fails to seek a remedy of enforcement against 
Defendant to follow its adoption of UCO 1996-20 as required under section 1002. Therefore, as 
the case authorities suggest, if Plaintiff challenges a land use decision under section 1001, he is 
required to have standing to challenge the ordinance. 
Plaintiff asserts that he has standing because he owns property that abuts the platted 
Naples and Dupont streets through Columbia Avenue. Defendant contends, however, that 
Plaintiff lacks standing because his property fails to actually and legally abut the vacated streets 
of Naples and Dupont. Defendant asserts that the Supreme Court of Utah requires abutting 
properties to obtain standing by stating, "Plaintiffs have no standing to challenge a street 
vacation because their lots did not abut the vacated streets." Sears v. Ogden City, 572 P.2d 1359, 
1362. Plaintiff contends his property abuts Naples and Dupont streets because each street 
intersects Columbia Avenue on its west side and such streets continue through Columbia to abut 
his property on the east side. Defendant disagrees with this argument and asserts that Columbia 
Avenue is a collector street that serves the function to accept traffic from the access streets of 
Dupont and Naples and distribute the traffic into the street circulation system. The Court is 
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persuaded by Defendant's argument. After review of Defendant's authorities the Court 
concludes that Dupont and Naples streets merely connect into Columbia Avenue. The streets of 
Dupont and Naples end at Columbia Avenue and do not cross through Columbia to abut 
Plaintiffs property. Plaintiffs property, therefore, fails to abut any vacated street within the 
Ironton Plat, and, as such, Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge UCO 1996-20. 
Notwithstanding a lack of standing, for purposes of making a record decision of each of 
the issues the Court will next examine whether UCO 1996-20 is arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
The parties are in disagreement of whether UCO 1996-20's vacation of Walnut, Naples and 
Dupont streets was a legislative or administrative act. Both parties agree that if the vacation of 
streets is a legislative act then it would be viewed deferentially by the courts under the reasonable 
debatable standard. However, it is Plaintiffs assertion that the act of vacation is administrative 
in nature; and, therefore, should be reviewed utilizing substantial evidence to support the 
arbitrary, capricious and illegal standard. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the case authorities 
cited by Defendant are not unanimous; that the case of Bradley v Payson City Corp, 17 P.3d 
1160 (Utah Ct. App. 200 \), regarding the existence of a difference in standards of review for 
legislative and administrative acts, has been granted writ of certiorari of review by the Utah 
Supreme Court; and the County Enabling Act designates plat vacation as a administrative act. 
The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs first and second arguments. While the Court recognizes 
there is a split of opinion of the appellate decision, it must nonetheless accept the authority for its 
present application to the case. 
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The Court will next examine the Defendant's authorities to determine whether the 
vacating of an ordinance is a legislative or administrative act. Defendant asserts that the 
Supreme Court of Utah states that "the authority to vacate streets, when exercised in the general 
public interest, is a legislative power vested in municipal corporations." Sears v. Ogden City, 
572 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). Plaintiff; however, asserts that U.C.A. § 17-27-808 and 810 
implicate that plat vacation is an administrative function that post-dates the Sears case 
invalidating its authority. The Court concludes that § 808 and § 810 do not invalidate the Sears 
case. The facts of the present case indicate that the Utah County Board of County 
Commissioners, a legislative body, vacated the streets by legislative act, adopting UCO 1996-20. 
The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument that § 17-27-810 codifies the requirements that 
are part of a legislative decision. U.C.A. § 17-27-810(1 )(b) states, 
If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither the public nor any person 
will be materially injured by the proposed vacation, alteration, or amendment, and 
that there is good cause for the vacation, alteration, or amendment, the legislative 
body, by ordinance, may vacate, alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, 
or any street or lot. 
The Court notes the statute specifically states "the legislative body" and "by ordinance." The 
statutory characterization of the body communicates that an ordinance vacating a plat is the 
product of legislative action. Such action is a legislative action as further interpreted in Harmon 
City, Inc., wherein the court stated, "The legislative process is inherently political in nature and 
requires a legislative body to broadly weigh the interest of all concerned in furtherance of the 
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general welfare." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 P.2d. 321 (Utah 2000). The Harmon 
City case also states "it is a legislative body's prerogative to determine public policy, ... and an 
administrative body's job to enforce the policy." The Utah Court of Appeals concludes that "the 
enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act." Id Further, 
the Court of Appeals has stated, "unlike administrative proceedings which turn almost 
exclusively on evidence presented, zoning decisions require municipalities to weigh competing 
interests and conflicting concerns to arrive at a decision that serves the general welfare." Bradley 
v Payson City Corp., 17 P.2d. 1160 (Utah 2001). 
After review of these authorities, the Court concludes that the vacation of streets in UCO 
1996-20 is fundamentally a legislative act; and, therefore, is to be reviewed using the reasonably 
debatable standard applicable to the arbitrary, capricious, or illegal analysis of U.C.A. § 
17-27-1001. As to the "reasonably debatable standard," the Court notes that the Utah Court of 
Appeals has stated, "So long as it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general 
welfare ...the court will uphold the ... zoning decision." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 
P.2d 321 (Utah 2000). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was present at the Utah County 
hearing held on October 29, 1996. Plaintiff voiced his concern over the proposed street vacation 
because of his claim to an applicable reservation over Pine Street and Columbia Avenue, and as 
such, the Commissioners, uncertain about Plaintiffs contention, determined to exclude Pine 
Street and Columbia Avenue. The vacated streets were only dedicated streets. There existed no 
physical nor historical general public use of any of the dedicated streets. The Court concludes 
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that the public possessed no interest in the streets. The Utah County Commissioners also finding 
that there was no public interest in the streets, concluded that it was beneficial to vacate the 
streets. The Court concludes that there exists sufficient basis in the record to support the Board 
of Utah County Commissioners, adopting of UCO 1996-20 with its vacating of Walnut, Naples, 
and Dupont streets. As such, the Court does not find that the Utah County Commissioner's 
action was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
Next, the Court examines Plaintiffs claim of violation of his right of due process. 
Plaintiff asserts that his procedural and substantive rights of due process to access his property 
have been violated with Defendant's adoption of UCO 1996-20. Plaintiff argues that his 
property interests have been diminished with the vacated Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets 
because he owns a reserved right-of-way conveyed to him by the R.L. Bird Company that 
undeterminably runs over Pine Street to his property. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant's 
actions have created questions of fact and violate its general police power. Defendant counters 
however, that Plaintiffs argument impermissibly expands the scope of his claim. The Court 
notes that Plaintiffs claim is based solely on UCO 1996-20, and also that the vacating ordinance 
did not include Pine Street and Columbia Avenue. The Court is persuaded by Defendant's 
arguments. Plaintiff has based his § 1983 claim upon UCO 1996-20. TheUCO 1996-20 vacated 
Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets but did not include Columbia Avenue and Pine Street, for 
reasons previously stated. The Court concludes that while Plaintiff challenges UCO 1996-20, it 
did not include Pine Street, and as such, Plaintiffs alleged reservation is irrelevant to this claim. 
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Further, the Court has previously discussed the issue of Plaintiff s property allegedly abutting 
Naples and Dupont Streets across Columbia Avenue and determined that Plaintiffs property 
does not abut those streets. The Court also notes that Plaintiff cites a United States Supreme 
Court decision which states, "land use ordinances that do not substantially advance a legitimate 
public interest constitutes a denial of due process." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 
U.S. 687 (1998). Further, Plaintiff asserts that in not paying for its actions, Defendant has 
surpassed the scope of its police powers. However, after review of Plaintiff s authorities, the 
Court concludes that the cited cases refer to separate and distinct land use "takings" that Plaintiff 
has not raised in his Complaint and Plaintiff cannot raise new claims or theories of recovery 
through his Memorandum in Opposition. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed 
to demonstrate that UCO 1996-20 had no rational relationship to Defendant's legitimate police 
power objectives. Plaintiff cannot identify a protectible property interest or controvert 
Defendant's evidence that it complied with the procedural requirements for passing UCO 
1996-20. Plaintiffs claims for due process fail and there exists no issue of material fact 
regarding the § 1983 claim. 
Next, the Court will examine the validity of the Plaintiffs alleged easement reservation. 
Plaintiff asserts that the reservation deeded to him by the R.L. Bird Company in 1995 is a valid 
easement and one that may be precisely fixed by the Court. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs 
reservation is void because Pine Street was not physically established as a public road; because 
the Court is without authority to fix the location of the easement without physical markings and 
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use; and because the description of the reservation is vague and violative of the statute of frauds. 
Citing the Supreme Court of Utah, "it is manifest," however, "that a grantee may receive only 
what the grantor has to give" Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952); Defendant argues that 
R.L. Bird Company did not have a private easement in Pine Street and could not reserve or 
convey what it did not own. Plaintiff counters that R.L. Bird Company originally owned all of 
the adjacent property and owned the easement rights over Pine Street as an abutting property 
owner when it reserved the right-of-way in 1983. It is undisputed by the parties that presently 
Pine Street remains only a dedicated plat street. However, the Supreme Court of Utah has 
established that private easements over public ways are created only when those public ways 
physically existed at the time the landowner acquired the property. Carrier v. Lindquist, 37 P.3d 
1112 (Utah 2001). Defendant's additional authorities support this establishment; and, therefore, 
Pine Street though it exists on paper as a dedicated street, it has no physical existence or 
historical use. Plaintiff, therefore, does not own a private easement over a public right-of-way. 
Regardless of the public/private distinction discussed above, there is the added problem 
in this case of determining the actual location of the alleged, reserved easement. Plaintiff 
contends that the Court possesses the authority to fix the location of the easement. Defendant 
asserts that Plaintiff misinterprets the case authoiities because in each cited case there was some 
physical improvement or fixture from which the easement could be associated. While the Court 
is persuaded by Plaintiffs authorities which suggest the Court is generally empowered to 
designate an easement location in some instances, the Court concludes that these authorities are 
12 
distinguishable from the instant case. In the case of Woodv Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952), 
the parties constructed a fence and gate allowing use of the property between the servient and 
dominant parcels. The Supreme Court of Utah concluded in that case, that because there was an 
existing fence and gate, the trial court was adequately assisted to reasonably locate the easement 
consistent with an existing physical improvement. Id. Further, in Salt Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. 
Walker Inc., 253 P.2d 365 (Utah 1953), the location of the right-of-way was fixed because there 
existed a conduit to transport water and the only question remaining for the court was to decide 
the appropriate width of the easement. Having reviewed the parties' authorities, the Court 
concludes that this case is distinguishable because there exists no physical improvement, fixture, 
or use of Pine Street occurring since the dedication of the Ironton Subdivision Plat 75 years ago. 
Therefore, the Court is unable to discern from the deed a location for an easement and cannot 
reasonably discern a proper place to fix the location of the easement by virtue of existing 
fixtures. 
Defendant also asserts that beyond the lack of specificity of the place of fixation for the 
easement, the reservation as a whole is vague and violative of the statute of frauds. Defendant 
cites the cases of Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P. 2d 533 (Utah 1999), and Southland Corp. v. Potter, 
760 P.2d 320 (Utah 1988), in which the trial courts determined that the documents the parties 
relied upon to reserve a right-of-way failed to establish the existence of an agreement needed to 
create an express easement. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's reliance upon these authorities is 
misfounded because each contained a stranger to the deed requiring the courts to ultimately 
13 
decide the cases. Defendant asserts however, that while the cases discussed the issue of a 
stranger to the deed, the courts nonetheless determined that the reservations were void because of 
vagueness. The Court has reviewed Defendant's authorities and finds the argument persuasive. 
Each case analyzes the issue of a possible express reservation and concludes that there was no 
such reservation because of vagueness. In each case the stranger to the deed issue was treated 
separately and distinctly in the discussion. 
Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of claim for his 
breach of contract cause of action and his declaratory judgment claim is redundant. Defendant 
asserts that Plaintiff must file a notice of claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Plaintiff asserts that his previous counsel filed the notice of claim three months after he filed his 
Amended Complaint. Defendant contends that, "No suit against the state may be maintained if 
notice is not given." Madsen v. Bortnick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988); and as such, Plaintiffs 
filing the notice of claim three months after his filing of the Amended Complaint is untimely and 
fails to provide proper notice. The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument. The Court 
concludes that notice given after the Complaint or Amended Complaint is untimely, and, 
therefore, the cause of action may not be maintained because of a lack of notice of a claim 
against Utah County. Further, the Court notes that Plaintiff conceded his breach of contract 
claim as untimely under the statute of limitations Therefore, Plaintiff only has the remaining 
prayer for relief for $50,000 in damages in regard to his § 1983 due process claim. The Court 
has previously discussed Plaintiffs § 1983 claim and it is to be dismissed. Plaintiff also raises a 
14 
new claim for inverse condemnation in his Memorandum in Opposition and not in his Amended 
Complaint. The Court however, has previously concluded Plaintiffs new claim for inverse 
condemnation as improperly pled; and, therefore, is to be dismissed. Further, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action for declaratory judgment requesting the Court 
declare his first four claims valid is redundant and as such, it is to be dismissed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons stated in the pleadings supportive of this 
decision, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court detennines 
that there exists no issue of material fact; and, therefore, respectfully dismisses all of Plaintiff s 
claims for relief. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and 
Plaintiffs suit is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
DATED this 3 / day of July, 2002. 
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Samuel D. McVey (#4083) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O.Box4S120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
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